



Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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CIS Border Troop Commanders Meet in Ashgabat

LD1001145194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1421 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Glazovskaya]

[Text] Ashgabat January 10 TASS—The Council of Border Troop Commanders of the Commonwealth of Independent States opened its meeting in Ashgabat, the capital of the Turkmen Republic, on Monday [10 January]. The commanders will discuss illegal migration and drug trafficking across outside borders of the commonwealth states.

They will also examine principles of cooperation in logistic supplies to border troops. The meeting will last two days.

Turkmen president Saparmurat Niyazov received the commanders on Monday morning. At the reception, the Turkmen president pointed to the importance of political factors which, emerging under the influence of new processes, affect positively relations between neighbouring states.

He instanced relations between Turkmenistan, on the one hand, Russia and Iran, on the other, which, "thanks to mutual respect and trust, opened a possibility to find ways for settling all problems, including border issues".

Niyazov singled out the factor of inviolability of the present borders as a guarantee of peace and quietude, stressing that his recent talks with Iranian President Rafsanjani "revealed full concurrence of the two leaders' views on these and other issues of cooperation".

"While touring the world, we saw that there were no borders with barbed wire anywhere. They remain only as a heritage of the former Soviet Union," Niyazov noted. He expressed hope in this connection that the present Ashgabat meeting and the following ones will bring closer the solution of problems existing on CIS borders.

Meeting Ends

LD1001172694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1616 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By TURKMENPRESS correspondent Anna Kurbanova—TASS]

[Text] Ashgabat, 10 Jan—The Council of CIS Border Guards Commanders met in Ashgabat today under the chairmanship of Andrey Nikolayev, commander of Russia's border troops. The meeting was attended by representatives of eight Commonwealth states. Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan were not represented.

The participants in the meeting discussed the results of work done by the council and its coordination service during 1993, as well as a plan of measures to be carried out during 1994. It was noted that all countries belonging to the Economic Union have an interest in the protection of the external borders of the CIS states.

The members of the council prepared for submission to the CIS Secretariat a document dealing with the problem of illegal migration and drug smuggling across the external borders of the Commonwealth countries. Additions and amendments to the regulations on the council's coordinating service were presented.

The next meeting of the Council of CIS Border Guards Commanders will be held in Moscow in April.

State of Ex-USSR Missile Warning System Examined

PM1101102194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jan 94 p 2

[Oleg Klichev article: "View of the Problem. The President's Eyes and Ears, or How the Missile Attack Early Warning System Operates Following the Breakup of the USSR"]

[Text] The top-secret missile attack early warning system [MAEW] was certainly assigned a special role among the strategic deterrence systems developed in the USSR during the Cold War years. Why? It provided the president, the country's military-political leadership, and the command of the branches of the Armed Forces with the information needed to adopt a definitive decision regarding the use of nuclear missile forces. That is, it can be said to have been in the direct sense of the word the eyes and ears of the country's leadership.

Today the Cold War is behind us. The Soviet Union does not exist. Many over the horizon [OTH] tracking stations, the basis of the MAEW, have ended up over the border. Furthermore, the geopolitical position of Russia itself has changed. How has all this affected the combat readiness of the system and the lives and service of the troops?

Here were are on the outskirts of Moscow. The trees are covered with snow. Before us is an outwardly unremarkable building, which has so to speak been legendary for many years. This is an MAEW command post, and no journalist has set foot inside it in its entire existence.

Inside the light is dim and the duty shift wear soft footwear. There are telephones to the defense minister and the chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff on the duty officer's desk.... Opposite stands a huge panel, the size of the screen at Moscow's "Rossiya" Movie Theater, indicating the operational situation, the movement of space objects, and the status and operation of OTH tracking stations tracking near-earth space, satellites in near-earth orbit, and all launches of carrier missiles that come within the zone of visibility.... Figuratively speaking, the key to our strategic security is here in this room....

It is here that the alarming inscription suddenly flashes from time to time (for training purposes): "Stand by. Launch. Missile Attack." Whereupon it gives the launch

site, the number of missiles, and where they are targeted.... This information automatically enters the special "Krokus" device which is then used to activate the "nuclear attache case" held by the country's president. At the same time it is accompanied by an audio signal, which was said to have irritated M. Gorbachev a great deal. This is said to have ended in the "Krokus" being rapidly removed from his office.

As for the people stationed at the command post day and night (the duty officer, the systems analysts, and officers in the analytical service...), throughout the Cold War they were destined to be the first to learn of the start of the nuclear apocalypse. Cynical as it sounds, their job is to anticipate nuclear war.

Information comes into the multicolored command post panel today from eight MAEW stations, five of them located abroad: in Ukraine (Mukachevo and Sevastopol), Azerbaijan (Mingechaur), Kazakhstan (Balkhash), and Latvia (Skrunda). They are still providing information, but what guarantee is there that it will not suddenly stop one fine day?

From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's file.

The development and creation of OTH MAEW and space surveillance radars began in our country in the sixties at the USSR Academy of Sciences Radiotechnical Research Institute under the leadership of Academician A.L. Mints. The first "Dnepr" stations were deployed in Kazakhstan and Siberia, forming a tight radar barrier 5,000-km long ensuring the accurate detection and tracking of space objects. During the seventies it proved possible to expand the radar field by including stations in the polar region, Latvia, and Ukraine.

A plan was then developed for total, continuous OTH coverage in the missile-vulnerable western, southwestern, southern, and northeastern sectors. At the same time work was also under way on a fundamentally new phased-array OTH radar station called "Daryal"....

As we can see, the system was progressively built in missile-vulnerable areas. Needless to say, at the time no one thought that the Union would break up and that the radar field erected would be bisected by the national borders of sovereign states. Or that they would de facto end up under Russia's "nuclear umbrella." However, now the question is this: Do the republics need these services today? And, if so, on what terms? If not, what is to be done with the stations?

Regrettably these are not idle questions, since there are still no clear accords in this sphere or clear prospects. Admittedly there is the Treaty on Collective Security signed by six CIS states. But "nothing is forever".... Remember the promises about the unified ruble, economic, and information area. What has happened to all that? Is it true that the future of these stations and maybe the future of the MAEW is today being decided not only in Moscow but also in the CIS nation states?

...The Balkhash area, where an MAEW unit is stationed, greeted us with cold gusts of wind and snow. A strange building like a gigantic hut rose above the wild semi-desert.

"Our new 'Daryal' looks strange and, you'll agree, impressive," Colonel G. Kozlyuk, deputy commander for work with personnel, broke into my thoughts. "The only thing is that the construction workers and fitters are unable to hand it over. So at the moment we are working with a 'Dnepr'."

Vast sums of money at the old prices have been invested in the station—around 1 billion rubles. It is a reliable radar. It has triple-redundant technological apparatus, several independent power sources, and space, radio, and facsimile communications.... It provides highly important information about ballistic missile launches, identifies objects during the booster phase of their flight path, and can instantly compute warheads' launch and landing sites as well as their flight time....

"We provided backup for the 'Soyuz-Apollo' flight and all flights from Baykonur and obtained information on 'Ferret,' 'Columbia,' and the shuttle," Colonel N. Buchuk, deputy commander for arms, said not without pride.

The MAEW has never given a false alarm regarding a missile attack (unlike its U.S. counterpart). But the "Dnepr's" have virtually outlived their service life, working continuously throughout this period.

It became clear that the almost complete new "Daryal" station is not at its best.

"Everything is vague now," Deputy Chief Designer Yu. Konkina, who leads a wretched life here now with an uncertain future, told me. "So it is not surprising if the equipment gradually gets neglected...."

Regrettably, signs of this neglect are already striking, to wit "explosive" old electric cable in the living quarters, empty shelves in the military trading store, the boarded-up windows of empty apartments, and the lack of clear guarantees for the officers that they will be provided with amenities in Russia.... Major General Yu. Kabakov, army deputy commander for rear services, involuntarily added to the picture by citing the following figure: "Compared with former conditions, supplies to our units in neighboring countries have dropped by around 40 percent, although the tasks have remained the same."

The various restrictions on the movement of freight and property and the confusion over supplies represent another barrier. In terms of some categories the unit remains on Kazakhstan's payroll, whereas as far as others are concerned it has been transferred to the Ural Military District. Realistically at the moment the unit doesn't know whether it is coming or going. And virtually everything—from uniform badges to pipes—has to

be brought by air from Moscow. You can imagine the kind of megabucks this costs, but there is evidently no choice at the moment.

Needless to say all this cannot fail to affect the people, their mood, and ultimately their attitude to their work.

It is becoming more and more difficult to get replacements for these units from Russia, Colonel Ye. Tokarev, head of the army cadre department, thinks.

Nonetheless at the moment, we would stress, all this is only indirectly affecting the unit's combat readiness. A commission from the Center led by Major General V. Pronov, the formation's chief of staff, came here to work and pointed to the reliability of the whole complex. It investigated a great deal and set a great deal to rights, so to speak. The unit received good marks, but its status remains unchanged. "We have no future here....," one officer told me bluntly.

Why is that happening in our country? The people who have to "pull" the strategic installation out of the mire without receiving proper pay, in many respects through personal initiative and self-restraint, should be rewarded, but they "have no future." Why did we make such a mess of the identical installation in Krasnoyarsk, owing to then Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze's, so to speak, tractability and under pressure from the Americans, and why are we now turning it into...a furniture factory? At a time when the United States has not just failed to mothball its long-range tracking radar in Greenland but has even modernized it and has absolutely no intention of cutting back its other stations.

From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA file:

The U.S. BMEWS ballistic missile early warning system is established and operating. It comprises three posts on Fylingdales Moor (Britain), in Thule (Greenland), and in Clear (Alaska), which have been modernized in recent years to enable the system to detect missiles at long range. This system uses a multifunctional Precision Approach Radar station comprising a "Safeguard" ABM defense system. During the eighties more powerful assemblies of the Pave Paws OTH stations were deployed on U.S. eastern and western seaboard and southern borders. The NORAD command post in Colorado Springs exercises operational control of the entire nuclear missile early warning system.

There is also a first-echelon tracking missile launches and engaged in nuclear burst fix acquisition—five "IMEWS-2" artificial earth satellites in orbit at distances of 30,000-40,000 km. This system still monitors the entire surface of our planet, including Russia and the CIS. And in spring 1993 during the Western European Union's military and scientific conference the question was raised of creating a European ABM defense system (EUROWISAT) combined with similar U.S. systems. Its deployment is scheduled for the year 2005.

So the breakup of the Union cannot so far be said to have had any effect on the MAEW. But there are problems, as we can see. Above all, the question of the status of MAEW units abroad needs to be resolved most speedily. Regrettably, everything is not as easy as we would like. Kazakhstan, for instance, has a bone to pick with the Russian military over use of its airspace, fulfillment of customs regulations, etc. But that is not the main thing. Major General A. Kasymov, chief of the Main Staff of the Kazakhstan Armed Forces, gave his view of the problem as follows: "The question of the future of the MAEW unit is in my view linked to the question of Kazakhstan's accession to the 1972 ABM Treaty. We know the Russian Federation's stance: People say that Kazakhstan cannot be a party to the treaty because it does not have the status of a nuclear state.... But this treaty must be reviewed today to take account of the opinions of states with elements of the strategic nuclear forces stationed on their territory. It is therefore necessary to lay down new conditions for the creation of the 'nuclear club,' either on a multilateral basis or on a bilateral basis with Russia. And to record these in a corresponding protocol like the Lisbon Protocol...."

S. Tyurin, Russian consul in Kazakhstan, is inclined to think that Russia should be quicker in making up its mind about the status of the MAEW military unit in Kazakhstan: "I am not a military man, but I believe that this unit is a very important installation, spearheading scientific and technical progress. And failure to pay attention to it will cause us a setback just like the earlier setback with Baykonur in terms of the space program. At the moment—this is a fact—the military are surviving here as best they can. You cannot describe them as occupiers, since their main weapon is radar equipment...."

Everyday material and technical difficulties are a minor misfortune. It is their uncertain status that is causing discord among the officers and the personnel. The republic has after all adopted a law laying down that anyone who does not apply for other citizenship by 1 March automatically becomes a citizen of Kazakhstan.... So you can understand their position. And, moreover, that of their wives and school-age children, who are not particularly enthusiastic about the need for mandatory study of the Kazakh language in local schools or about obtaining secondary education certificates here. Not to mention the fact that there are Kazakhstani security and prosecutor's office organs at the garrison.... Colonel General (Retired) Yu. Votintsev, one of the people who developed the MAEW system, believes that a sorry fate lies in store for these installations if the problems are not resolved. "The outdated 'Dnepr' stations will be able to operate for another two or three years, six years at most, and then the whole Commonwealth will be left without some of the most accurate means of detecting attacking missiles." However, owing to the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar a gap has already formed in our OTH tracking systems in the northeast of the country. Therefore logic itself suggests that it is necessary to at least preserve what is left.

"The point is that the highly effective system only works when it receives information from all OTH tracking stations. It would therefore evidently be right for the MAEW to be not a national but a supranational system," Lieutenant General S. Sokolov, MAEW army commander, said. "And, naturally, it would have other CIS countries taking a shared financial part in running it."

The Main Staff of the Air Defense Troops takes a similar view.

"Whether we need this installation or not is not under discussion," Colonel General V. Smirnov, commander of the missile-space defense troops, said. "But, in order to resolve the problems arising there, an agreement is first needed on Russian-Kazakhstani military cooperation—an agreement which is not yet in place."

Well, this would evidently be the optimum solution to the very difficult situation that has developed since the breakup of the USSR as far as preserving the MAEW installations is concerned. It is after all easy to destroy things—something that we have repeatedly seen over the last few years—but it is hard to create them. The MAEW embodied the best achievements of many generations' intellectual potential. And, however stable the world may be today, it was, is, and remains a crucial deterrent against the unleashing of a nuclear missile war.

A final point. A session of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Collegium was held recently. It analyzed the results of the Russian Federation's military cooperation with neighboring states and identified tasks for 1994. It was stressed that, as a result of joint work on the part of the Russian Federation Defense and Foreign Ministries, a normative-legal base has by and large been created for military-political and military-technical cooperation with the republics of the former USSR. It was pointed out at the same time that, in view of Russia's strategic interests in this sphere, there are still plenty of unresolved questions.

It only remains to hope that the necessary decisions on strategic arms will not be shelved. After all, the fate of the military and their relatives and friends depends on them. And ultimately the reliability of Russia's defense itself.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 11 Jan

LD1101073394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0613 GMT 11 Jan 94

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow January 11 TASS—Russian newspapers highlight a major event of the day—the opening of a session of the newly elected parliament of the country—the Federal Assembly.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, while noting that for 11 days Russia has had no parliament at all, points out that by the beginning of the session the deputies' factions in

the State Duma have failed to reach agreement on important questions, despite numerous talkfests.

"As far as the Federation Council session, opening here on Tuesday, is concerned, one can suppose that a struggle for leading positions in it will be no less tough than that in the Duma."

TRUD on the Federal Assembly functioning:

"The legal life of the Federal Assembly begins today. Will it be marked by an end to antagonism between branches of power and by businesslike contacts between the parliament and the government? It is only businesslike contacts that can bring reassurance and future material wellbeing to the country".

PRAVDA on the first State Duma session:

"The first day of the session of the State Duma will be decisive... Despite a certain played-up excitement, the general impression is that the deputies want and are prepared to work efficiently".

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an interview with Yuriy Baturin who was recently appointed the first assistant to the president of Russia on national security affairs.

Having pointed out that there are a lot of difficult tasks in this field, Baturin emphasised that "Russia's national security existed before and is still being elaborated". His opinion is that the concept "should be continuously modified in response to changing conditions. In our days, conditions change fast".

TRUD runs an interview with Sergey Stepashin, first deputy director of Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service (FCS) which was founded by a presidential decree.

Stepashin dwelt on how the newly-established service differs from the old one and singled out six main tasks of the FCIS, the first among them being "to expose, prevent and put a stop to intelligence and subversive activities of foreign secret services and organisations against Russia".

PRAVDA carries notes by Former Russian Parliament Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. The notes, dated October 3, last year, are headlined "Notes from the 'White House'". Khasbulatov analyses the situation in Russia after the August of 1991, expresses considerations about "direct motives for the anti-state coup" (as Khasbulatov describes the presidential decision to terminate the functioning of the Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies—note by ITAR-TASS), and criticises President Boris Yeltsin's policy, the kingpin of which, as Khasbulatov maintains, is "antagonism and confrontation"

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an interview with Ramiz Rizayev, Azerbaijan's plenipotentiary representative in Russia, who denied information that Afghan

mojahedin take part in combat operations on Azerbaijan's side in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

In SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, Vladimir Isakov, former people's deputy of Russia and one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front, strongly criticises the current privatisation policy. He believes that "everything seems

to indicate that privatisation in Russia will go down in history as an example of unprecedented and shocking social hypocrisy".

PRAVDA on President Clinton's forthcoming visit to Moscow:

"The U.S. delegation again has in its bag more pieces of advice and political declarations than specific economic programs, and, most importantly, funds for their realisation".

Commentary Views Clinton Visit, U.S. Attitude*LD1001201294 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1810 GMT 10 Jan 94*

[Text] Moscow is waiting for the visit of President Bill Clinton, who is to arrive here on Wednesday. The media say the program of the meeting between the American head of state and President Boris Yeltsin has been agreed upon on all key matters. It will be a continuation of the summit that took place last April in Vancouver, Canada.

According to the press service of the Russian president, the Moscow meeting will continue the search for ways of expanding partnership, in particular cooperation in the light of the strategy of reform carried out in Russia. The agenda also includes key international problems, such as the strengthening of security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, peace-making operations in regional conflicts. The talks should cover the entire spectrum of questions of bilateral relations too.

The Moscow summit should become a major international event, like the meeting in Vancouver and other top-level talks between the two great powers. This can be explained by the role that Russian-American relations play in the world community.

Still, one can say that the coming summit talks will have their own identity. They are going to take place in conditions of the further advancement of reforms in Russia. The reforms were in the centre of attention during the parliamentary elections in Russia last month. The pros and cons of the reforms became evident then. The election results influenced the domestic political scene in Russia and to a certain extent international relations too. A somewhat new situation emerged and new questions appeared, some of which are linked to Russian-American relations.

Vladislav Kozyakov comments on the distinctive features of the upcoming Moscow meeting. He writes:

If you review the road between Vancouver and Moscow, that is between last April and January, you will notice quite a few achievements. Russia and the United States have come closer to each other. Much of what was agreed on in Vancouver has been done. Here one could name the decision of the United States Congress to earmark means for support to Russia and several concrete aid programs. What is more important, scores of agreements in economy have been concluded. Russia will take part in the construction of an international space station together with the United States, while America will be involved in the modernization of the Russian oil industry. These and other programs should benefit both nations.

But now new tasks have come to the fore, primarily cooperation directed at encouraging democratic changes in Russia. The parliamentary elections in Russia clearly showed that the reforms, the way they were carried out so far, were too harsh for the broad masses. At a recent news conference President Yeltsin spoke of the need for

additional social measures. The Russian reformers are determined to somewhat amend their own strategy and take steps to raise living standards. It is indicative that Western capitals arrived at a similar conclusion. Declarations were made there in support of broader efforts to back social programs in Russia. President Clinton even spoke for doubling the efforts of Western countries in this sphere. One can foresee that this aspect of Russian-American partnership is going to be discussed in detail at the Moscow summit.

However, certain aspects of relations between Moscow and Washington should be altered in the current situation. The time that has passed since Vancouver has demonstrated the great potential of the establishment of fully normalized, equal relations in trade. However, even now, far from all the restrictions introduced by the United States during the cold war have gone down in history. Unfortunately, in some other spheres one can also notice that the West does not fully realize the true needs and lawful interests of Russian reformers, conducting democratic changes in such a mammoth country. Washington and other Western capitals, as well as international financial organizations, are trying to measure the progress of Russian reforms, their scale and speed, according to their own pattern and accordingly determine their attitudes to actual programmes of economic cooperation. Meanwhile, such an approach is absolutely unacceptable in relations with a great power.

There are also some other areas in which the west should stop being didactical in its dialogue with Moscow, to use the expression of the Russian foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev. Russia expects the coming summit in Moscow to be productive and be marked by new understanding, greater partnership in all spheres of cooperation.

Paper Previews Clinton's Visit to Moscow*PM1101112594 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 94 p 7*

[Yelena Ovcharenko article under the general heading "Visiting Boris—Via 'Borispol'? The U.S. President Has Quite a Lot of Things To Do in Europe—Beginning With Deciding Whether To Open the Doors to NATO Membership for All Who Want To Enter and Ending With an Impromptu Meeting With the Ukrainian President"]

[Text] Moscow—The special booklet carefully produced in Washington for those members of the U.S. press bound for the summit meeting in Moscow points out that Russia is a cold country where survival in winter is hard and where furthermore crime is to be feared and rides in "private taxis" are to be avoided. Among the plus points it lists "the likelihood of moderate prices for souvenirs if you pay in dollars." I would dispute that point: Prices in Moscow today, both in general and in particular, have outstripped those in America, despite the fact that the country is falling apart before our very eyes.

The present meeting between the two leaders is a jubilee one, the 25th since Khrushchev's time. But in terms of meetings between Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, it is the second and is surely once more akin to a "leap into the unknown." In Vancouver their discussion took place on the eve of the April referendum after a week of feverish thought in Washington about whether there was any point in meeting "on the eve of uncertainty." The situation is also quite tricky after the December elections in Russia. I am bound to agree with Brent Scowcroft, Bush's former national security adviser, who remarked that if this visit had not been planned long ago Clinton would surely not now have wanted to make the trip but would have waited for the dust to settle and for relations between Yeltsin and Zhirinovskiy to become clear. As for Vladimir Volfovich, the U.S. President has already decided not to meet with him for the moment, although during the visit he may demonstrate his sympathies for reformers not only of the pro-Yeltsin type.

Meanwhile during the visit the U.S. President will clearly have to try to convince his own fellow countrymen that, even if America does not have a clear concept of its relations with Russia today, it is at least working on one. That criticism has been expressed increasingly loudly lately, along with barbs aimed at the secretary of state, who is increasingly loudly being called "sluggish" and "irresolute" in the United States. Meanwhile the accusations that the U.S. Administration's course is unclear are being countered by the thesis that it is not only America but also international financial institutions which should respond more clearly and promptly to the social reforms in Russia—in the sense of providing Western aid. On the subject of Western aid, Russia has so far not received even the amount that it was promised. For example, the \$5.5 billion which the IMF proposed giving us is still in doubt. Since 1992 Russia has received \$2.5 billion. The rest will be paid only if the IMF considers that we will fulfill the agreed conditions.

Clinton's team believes that this is right, while at the IMF the rate of inflation and the imbalance in the money system are giving rise to definite doubts. In this connection two IMF missions will come to Russia to work in January. If they believe that the government does have concrete and durable remedies for stabilizing the economy they will "release" a further \$1.5 billion to us and will make recommendations on social aid to citizens who have suffered during the economic reforms.

According to information in BUSINESS WEEK, the U.S. President is considering offering his Russian counterpart a further \$1 billion for items of expenditure in the new budget in 1994. He will also focus attention on the theme of creating a social safety net in Russia—I do not rule out the possibility of technical assistance in elaborating it—relating to a system of unemployment benefits, food subsidies, and so forth.

During the visit there will probably be an announcement of a joint Russian-U.S. project aimed at prospecting and

opening up oil fields in West Siberia and on Sakhalin. U.S. oil and gas companies are planning to set aside \$3.4 billion for this purpose—meanwhile U.S. investments in Russia stand at \$400 million today.

I would recall here that the two presidents will also give their formal blessing to a whole series of agreements concluded in Moscow during U.S. Vice President Gore's visit—agreements on space, on ensuring the safety of nuclear reactors, and on new norms for foreign investments.

The U.S. President will spend four hours in Minsk—as a mark of gratitude for Belarus' constructive stance on the question of scrapping nuclear missiles. As for a meeting with the Ukrainian leader, after rumors that Clinton had invited him to Moscow earlier than Yeltsin a statement was made on an agreement to hold a meeting of the three presidents in Moscow. On 12 December the U.S. visitor will probably stop off at [Kiev's] "Borispol" airport.

The U.S. first lady and her daughter will join the President on Friday after spending a few days in Europe.

Here is one more fact: Several days ago, before New Year, the U.S. President visited his native state of Arkansas and with a laugh showed the whole country the "family" shorts given to him for his morning jog by the people of his state. Last Thursday Bill Clinton had to return to his home state, unfortunately for a very solemn occasion—in connection with the death of his mother. But one of the drawbacks to the President's work is that even personal tragedies do not cause state visits to be canceled.

'Serious Problems' Persist in U.S. Relations

PM1101115194 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[Vladislav Drobkov report: "What Will Bill Clinton Bring to Moscow? Once Again the U.S. Delegation's Baggage Contains More Advice and Political Declarations Than Specific Economic Programs or, Most Importantly, Funds To Implement Them"]

[Text] Washington, 10 Jan—U.S. President Bill Clinton will fly into Moscow on the evening of 12 January. The agenda for the greeting ceremony and for Clinton's entire first official visit to Russia has been prearranged in great detail. Supper with B. Yeltsin at the presidential dacha, talks in the Kremlin, a trip to the Danilov Monastery, a reception at the U.S. ambassador's residence.... The places and the exact times of all the meetings and talks have been decided.

In recent days the U.S. press has devoted considerable attention to the upcoming talks and to the whole package of relations between our two states. I have talked with many political experts, commentators, journalists, and entrepreneurs here and with "high-ranking representatives of the administration" who traditionally wish to remain anonymous. As a rule, they have all attached

great significance to the upcoming visit and hoped that it will help to determine the path for the development of Russian-U.S. ties.

At the same time both official spokesmen and the press have been unable to conceal the existence of serious problems in our relations. They have said that many Americans are unclear about the details of the changing political and social situation in Russia.

Commenting on the results of the elections to the Duma and the Federal Assembly, Sovietologists and Russian experts here—from journalists to scientists and officials—have been obsessed, as it were, by the figure of V. Zhirinovskiy, who suddenly pushed President Yeltsin himself into the background on the Russian political horizon. Clinton promised in advance not to meet with Zhirinovskiy. But then he seemed to regret his blurted assurance, since U.S. mass information channels at once carried caustic retorts from Vladimir Volfovich accusing the U.S. President of cowardice.

It has to be said that, in general, the U.S. reaction to the Russian elections still bears the imprint of perplexity and vagueness—leading, so it seems to me, to serious tactical errors. Such, in my view, was Clinton's recent statement that Russia should not put the brakes on but "continue the policy of reforms" with the same persistence. And the United States in turn should "redouble efforts" to assist these reforms.

Such provisos can only reinforce suspicions that the reforms, in the form in which they have so far been implemented, are advantageous to the United States rather than to Russia. This is not to mention the fact that Clinton's statement struck a discordant note against the statements by Yeltsin and by V. Chernomyrdin, who are receiving him in Moscow, on the need to revise the reforms' course and speed of implementation and urgently amend the "shock therapy."

To judge from this and certain other statements by leading figures in the Washington administration, people in the United States still find it difficult to answer the question of where Russia is going.

The NATO Council session in Brussels, preceding the Moscow talks, will have been a factor of considerable importance determining the substance and tone of this top-level meeting. The attempt which Clinton made there to direct the evolution of the North Atlantic alliance into the channel of the "Partnership for Peace" doctrine, which has still not been formulated sufficiently distinctly, attests that Washington does not wish to offend Russia too overtly by hastily receiving into the bloc the East European and even certain Baltic countries which are knocking on its doors.

The picture of Russian-U.S. cooperation in the security sphere appears far from brilliant. Because of continuing sabotage by Kiev, the START I Treaty has still not been ratified by all the parties to it. This in turn is blocking the

fulfillment of the next important agreement in the sphere of reducing strategic arms—START II.

One more problem could arise because of the alarm caused in the United States by Russia's new military doctrine, which provides for the maintenance of an army of more than 2 million men and the possibility, so it is believed here, of its being used to protect Russian interests in the former Soviet republics. The United States is really concerned about such a manifestation of the "imperial ambitions" of Russian generals, although the White House and the State Department are trying to damp down this alarm. Attempts have even been made here to essentially repudiate certain statements by Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev.

It is not entirely clear how and at whose expense the program of joint maneuvers by U.S. and Russian military units will be implemented. The money allocated by the U.S. Congress to assist in the matter of destroying the nuclear arms being reduced under joint treaties and agreements is not being used. A derisively small sum—just a few million dollars—has so far been spent on the widely publicized U.S. assistance in the sphere of constructing housing for Russian servicemen and their families. It is noteworthy that U.S. companies have refused to construct houses in Russia for such a pittance. True, there are now reports of the future allocation of considerably larger sums....

It is obvious that both in the case of the "Partnership for Peace" within the NATO framework and in cooperation with Russia on questions of security Washington does not yet have a definite, clear-cut program or a clear strategy. There is only the desire to secure the U.S. leadership position, as the only military superpower, and to accelerate the nuclear disarmament of its former "No. 1 rival."

Now, so it seems to me, only decisive, major, and effective steps by the U.S. Administration for the specific revival of the Russian economy are capable of saving the pretty-well undermined prestige of U.S. and Western "aid" in general to Russia.

Matters have reached the point where last year Russia found itself unable to pay even for subsidized U.S. grain, which for long years was the most impressive heading under "aid" from abroad. In the opinion of many economists, it is precisely this "grain fix," like a narcotic, that has shattered the health of Russian national agricultural production.

Once again the U.S. delegation's baggage contains more advice and political declarations than specific economic programs or, most importantly, funds to implement them.

New aid initiatives for Russia should not be expected from the visit, THE WASHINGTON POST warns. Impressive new economic aid programs will hardly be announced in Moscow, other newspapers echo it.

In vain have I spent several weeks asking "high-ranking representatives" to report on specific new initiatives or agreements which have been prepared and which will be discussed by the U.S. and Russian presidents at their talks in Moscow. Nor have I managed to obtain a detailed answer to the question of how the large-scale joint projects already announced are being implemented. Although it is maintained here that the first \$1 billion of the "Vancouver package" of \$1.6 billion has already been distributed.

Nevertheless, we know that it has not yet been possible to start implementing even many of the financial aid programs already promised to Russia. This applies in particular to the ambitious \$3 billion privatization aid fund. U.S. Administration staff admitted recently that this fund has not yet secured the necessary money. Nor has Russia succeeded in obtaining much of the \$2.5 billion in additional aid allocated by Congress after the Clinton-Yeltsin Vancouver meeting.

I would like to hope that in the talks the two presidents and the other participants in the dialogue between the two great powers will be able to find the way to really fill their relations with specific, businesslike substance.

It seems to me that this alone is capable of ensuring the long-term interests of Russia's cooperation with the United States. The United States still has to prove that the statements frequently proclaimed in Washington about our relations' shifting from the period of coexistence to an epoch of partnership will be backed up by specific deeds and decisions.

Paper Views Clinton's Presidential Leadership Style

*101111794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
Jan 94 First Edition p 4*

[Aleksandr Shalnev article: "U.S. President Coming to Moscow To Support Russian Reforms"]

[Text] Here's a joke. Bill and Hillary Clinton are driving down a country road. They stop to fill up. "Hey," says Hillary, looking at the pump attendant, "I know that guy.... He's someone I used to date at school." "So if you'd married him," Bill replies, "you'd be filling someone's car up now too." "No," Hillary objects confidently, "that guy'd be president."

There are not very many people in the United States who would argue that without Hillary, without her ambition, without her fierce self-discipline, and without her brilliant political instinct enabling her to recognize not so much current as future enemies and friends—without all this Bill would most probably have remained a provincial politician, even if he had managed to make it to Washington by becoming, for instance, senator for his native Arkansas.

It is said—and this is the truth, not a joke—that Clinton's daughter Chelsea phoned the White House

from her Washington school to check with her parents on whether "America's first child" was allowed to have some injections. They went straight to the President, as Chelsea had recommended, citing the fact that "Mommy's always busy, so it's better to ask Daddy."

But both Bill and Hillary are workaholics able to work late into the night and start again early next morning. I would note that in this sense Washington is a rather strange town. Press conferences starting at seven or seven-thirty are a tradition here rather than a rarity.

It is hard to be U.S. President without being a workaholic—although it is possible. One need only recall Ronald Reagan, one of the most successful presidents of this century—successful in the sense that he fundamentally carried out, and even exceeded, his agenda which, I would recall, combined a policy of exhausting and shaking up the Soviet empire while simultaneously building up America's prosperity. But this same Reagan had a truly legendary capacity to snooze through Cabinet sessions and limit his working day to four or, at most, five hours of normal presidential activity, devoting the rest of his time to pleasant pursuits such as riding or talking with his wife Nancy.

But Reagan had a surprising ability—he was excellent at delegating. This ability is almost an art—few politicians or statesmen have it. Those who do almost always win—they can focus seriously and thoroughly on the main, strategic, long-term issues, while letting their ministers, advisers, and other clerks handle the details.

One of Bill Clinton's problems, which was evident almost as soon as he became President, is his insatiable need to decide a lot—if not everything—himself. Which, incidentally, was a characteristic of one of Clinton's predecessors—the Democratic President Jimmy Carter. He himself decided which of his advisers and aides would play at what times and how often on the White House tennis courts. Any independence for the clerks was completely ruled out.

Carter often lost sight of what was important in a mass of trivia. Not for nothing is his presidency (while undoubtedly burdened by objective factors such as the very serious world energy crisis) considered one of the weakest in America's recent history—symbolized by the crushing and tragic failure of the attempt to free the American hostages held in revolutionary Iran. Carter took part at first hand in the job of working out the rescue mission—which required excellent military knowledge—often "knocking down" the opinions of genuine specialists.

Clinton too plunged into the job straight after the day in 1992 when the presidential election left him victorious over his rival—the Republican George Bush. Bill took on everything, quite forgetting that he was no longer governor of Arkansas but the president of a superpower where the budget for military bands is more than some other countries' state budgets.

Talbott Explains Post-Election 'Analytical Pause'*PM1001162994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Jan 94 First Edition p 1*

[Vladimir Nadein report: "Clinton Not Averse to Talking With Yeltsin in a Small Group"]

[Text] Washington—"There have been no zigzags in our attitude toward Russia," Strobe Talbott, U.S. deputy secretary of state, said in an interview with IZVESTIYA's correspondent on the eve of President Bill Clinton's trip to Russia. "We have not been backtracking or wavering. We have simply taken a short breather to study the results of the 12 December elections and to be sure that we have understood them correctly."

Even after his appointment to the number two job at the State Department, Strobe Talbott retains his position as architect of policy on the CIS countries.

Critics consider Talbott's erroneous forecast of the Russian Duma election results to have been a blunder.

"What happened 12 December was something we had not expected," Talbott admits. "But I do not think many Russians expected it either.... Our policy needed clarification. This has been done."

This interview took place on the eve of President Bill Clinton's departure for Europe. Certain critics have rebuked the presidential team for leaving some important tour issues unresolved until the last minute—from the vague proposals on Bosnia to the question of whether or not representatives of pro-Communist factions in the new Russian parliament should be invited to the reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

But Talbott clearly hinted that the United States has already gotten over its analytical pause, has cleared up its conceptual blank spots, and is again relying on a consistent program—"although nobody is ever 100-percent happy."

Using very cautious expressions and invariably accompanying his conclusions with riders to the effect that "it is not for a U.S. official to give Russian citizens and Russian leaders directions about how they should run their economy or their policy," Strobe Talbott gives two main reasons for the pro-government blocs' election failure.

"No democracy can fail to be concerned about how humane the government appears to its citizens. All U.S. presidents have to be concerned about this. Leaders may be sincerely convinced that everything they do is exclusively in people's interests. It may even be directly in people's interests. Nonetheless, leaders need public support. If a leader and his policy do not meet with society's support, they will fail. This is not such a big message, but we want to bring it to the Russian side's attention, because it is the truth about how a democracy works."

The second reason for the Russian Government's difficulties, Talbott believes, lies in the means used to implement the economic reforms.

"I have learned from the Russian press that a considerable number of those who voted for the Liberal Democratic Party were middle-aged people scared of losing their jobs. But this is something with which we are very familiar."

Strobe Talbott said that certain observers had attached to his words "less shock, more therapy" a meaning that they did not have. Russian citizens will merely suffer if the reforms are delayed.

Another reason why the "Partnership For Peace" program has undergone no changes since the 12 December elections is because the U.S. Administration interpreted Zhirinovskiy's success as a failure by the democratic government to explain its policy and as a reaction to specific mistakes in the implementation of democratic transformations—but by no means as evidence that three-quarters of Russian citizens like Zhirinovskiy's views.

There has been increased criticism of "Partnership" in the United States itself and particularly in East Europe in the wake of 12 December. The fact that the program lays down no specific timetable or conditions for new states to join NATO is seen by critics as playing up to an ever-present Russian chauvinism.

Talbott considered it necessary to emphasize that the program "is an excellent prospect for Russia, which gains many advantages."

The program does not exclude any European country—either neutral countries like Austria and Sweden, or former Warsaw Pact members, or those which have emerged from the ruins of the USSR.

"I met with President Clinton yesterday and we talked about the Russia trip," Talbott said in conclusion. "One of the points which struck him as very important on this long trip is to sit down in a small group with President Yeltsin and hear his view of the future."

Kremlin Setting for Yeltsin-Clinton Summit Described*LD1101102594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1007
GMT 11 Jan 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Veksler]

[Text] Moscow January 11 TASS—An official ceremony to greet U.S. President Bill Clinton is to be held in the Grand Kremlin Palace on January 13. Prior to 1917, the Kremlin served as the Moscow residence of Russian emperors. In the famous St. George Hall, the distinguished guest is to be greeted by President Boris Yeltsin.

The palace's largest hall, it is the place for state receptions and meetings dedicated to the Russian military

order of St. George the Victorious. The snow-white walled hall is richly decorated with stucco moulding. The walls bear bas-reliefs showing St. George hitting a dragon. Above the cornice, under the ceiling, there are statues symbolising Russian army victories in the 15-19th centuries. The marble plaques on the walls and pylons bear gold-lettered designations of military units that distinguished themselves in battles and the names of the holders of St. George, among them prominent Russian military and naval leaders: Suvorov, Kutuzov, Ushakov and Nakhimov.

The greeting ceremony in the Kremlin will be immediately followed by bilateral talks between the presidents of Russia and the U.S. In-between their talks, the two presidents are to take a stroll about the Kremlin grounds. It is not yet known what landmarks President Clinton will want to take in but he is sure to take interest in the cathedral square featuring Assumption, Annunciation and Archangel Cathedrals, the bell tower of Ivan the Great and other world-famed monuments of ancient Russian architecture.

The Hall of Facets adjacent to the Grand Kremlin Palace is rightfully reckoned a national architecture monument. The majestic and spacious hall, decorated with wall painting dealing with biblical subjects, is intended for state ceremonies. Territorial councils used to sit and Russian military victories were celebrated in it in olden times.

A state reception in honour of the U.S. President is to be given in the Hall of Facets.

Official Hopeful for Successful Summit

LD1101105794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1034 GMT 11 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow January 11 TASS—Press secretary of the Russian President Vyacheslav Kostikov has expressed the hope that the Russo-American summit meeting, which is to begin here today, would contribute to the strengthening of bilateral cooperation.

Replying to reporters within the building of the Council of the Federation, which held its first meeting here, Kostikov noted that the sides would "negotiate comprehensively and seriously" the relations between Russia and the United States. He believes that the U.S. President will explain in greater detail the American "partnership for peace" initiative. "Russia has no reasons to keep aloof of this initiative," the press secretary stressed. "It only remains to see to what extent its implementation meets the national interests of Russia.

Kostikov described as sharp and prompt the Russian Foreign Ministry's reaction to the unlawful actions of the Lithuanian authorities against two Russian generals. He said that "at present this reaction is adequate". "But the reaction of the president and of Russia might be even

tougher if such incidents were to reoccur in the future, even very tough compared to world precedents," the press secretary stated.

Filatov: Nuclear Arms To Be Main Topic of Summit

LD1101125894 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1200 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The main political topic of the upcoming talks in Moscow between the U.S. and Russian presidents will be the problem of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union, Sergey Filatov, head of the Russian Federation president's staff, told a RIA correspondent. In his view, the main problem is finding a way to ensure that there is only one nuclear state, Russia, on this territory.

Adviser Warns Against 'Illusions' on U.S. Trade

LD1101093094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0917 GMT 11 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow January 11 TASS—"One should have no illusions about trade and economic ties between Russia and the United States. If U.S. companies see no advantages, they will not go to Russia," said Anatoliy Porokhovskiy, deputy head of the Institute of the U.S. and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in an interview with ITAR-TASS timed to coincide with the issue of the "diplomatic courier" bulletin devoted to the forthcoming visit of the U.S. President Bill Clinton to Russia.

Porokhovskiy said that "cherishing hopes that the U.S. will spend money only because Russia needs help is pointless. One must take into account that whenever the U.S. allocates funds to support this or that country, primarily, it will give support to their own companies which will provide this aid, i.e. up to 80 per cent of funds will be realised through American private business and only 20 per cent of the allocated amount will directly reach facilities on the territory of our country."

"What we can hope for is the acceleration of processes which already began and the creation of a favourable atmosphere for the American business in Russia. As for the main task, we have to resolve it by ourselves. In this country, pinning hopes on the American capital to take us out of the situation in which we found ourselves will be another illusion, to put it mildly," Porokhovskiy said.

"It is necessary to precisely forecast what will be advantageous to our country and not to confine ourselves to only one variant in the search for the best option. Apart from America, there are Europe, Japan and other countries. We should take a flexible and active economic position which would clearly show that we come out for the development of relations with all countries, but on a

mutually advantageous basis, which is accepted in business circles of any country," Porokhovskiy said.

Progress in U.S. Economic Ties Welcomed

PM1101110194 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 10 Jan 94 p 7

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences A.G. Kvasov, deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's North America Department: "Russian-American Economic Relations Geared toward Era of Open Markets"]

[Text] Russian-American relations occupy a special place in the multipolar geometry of the world that has taken shape since the end of the Cold War. Looming larger and embracing more and more new spheres, economic collaboration between Russia and the United States has become a direct or indirect subject of discussion in our country. Discarding all the accretions, the main question here is: Why do we need economic relations with the United States? What is their role in Russian foreign economic policy?

Objective analysis of the world economy and the trends in technical progress indicates that for the commercial development of the most advanced achievements—"the technologies of tomorrow"—which Russian science and in part the defense industry possess we cannot do without the American market. In the 20th Century no country, not even Japan, has been able to establish a major technical innovation of any description without passing the test of the American market. That market, by virtue of its readiness to accept any innovation and its unsurpassed size, can also serve as a springboard for Russian enterprises. Our economic collaboration will require more favorable conditions if this plan is to be realized.

Russian-U.S. trade and economic ties have for many decades been subordinated to a considerable extent to considerations of a political nature. From this standpoint the meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in Vancouver in April 1993, which initiated the development of partnership relations between our countries, was a landmark. Even outwardly it was unusual in that for the first time discussion of economic problems took up a large part of the presidents' time. It was there that mutual understanding was achieved for the first time that the most effective way to help the Russian reforms is to give us the chance to earn the requisite foreign currency ourselves.

The creation of an intergovernmental commission under the leadership of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice President Al Gore was an important decision made at the Vancouver summit. The commission was essentially charged with the task of "depoliticizing" trade and economic relations between our countries and rendering them such that they promote the development of Russian-American partnership. The commission's mandate is to remove all possible obstacles as quickly as possible and to launch

specific bilateral cooperation projects, first and foremost in promising areas like power generation, including nuclear power generation, outer space, and other hi-tech sectors of the economy.

The first session of the Russian-American Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation was held in Washington at the start of September 1993. During the meeting a broader remit for the commission was agreed and an appropriate structure of working bodies, including committees for the development of business cooperation, energy policy, the conversion of the defense industry, outer space, the environment, and science and technology, was set up. The opening up of the American and world markets to Russian space equipment, technology, and services was the chief result of the committee's first session. Thus, under an agreement on commercial launches, Russia was granted a quota of 12 launches of spacecraft into orbit in the period 1996-2000, which could provide our aerospace enterprises with contracts worth up to \$700 million.

There was no issue, no problem, which Bill did not rush to tackle. Against the backdrop of his obsession with detail—which prompted many political pundits to compare the President to a "head clerk" but not a leader—Hillary, embarking on working out a strategy to reform medical insurance and the health care system in general, looked like someone who was really busy.

An abrupt change came almost immediately after he went on vacation in August and spent an uninterrupted three weeks not only relaxing and taking it easy, but thinking about whether he was organizing his presidential life properly. As the well-informed UPI noted at the time, "the President has clearly taken a big step forward in ditching his devotion to detail and getting a clearer idea of where he wants to take the country."

The switch to strategic goals does not mean, however, that smaller-scale problems have been totally removed from the President's attention, or that even when decrees and proclamations carry a computer-printed signature rather than that of Clinton himself, these decrees and proclamations are almost automatic candidates for revision, review, and repeal. I do not recall a single instance either in the Clinton presidency or during the Bush and Reagan era when a document in the name of the White House incumbent was repealed, altered, or simply ignored the next day. Indisputably, the President's staff deserves a great deal of credit in organizing this stability. And the fact that Clinton's guys—whose average age is nearly 30, who are mostly provincial products of Arkansas, and whose experience in government is virtually zero—have managed to avoid situations that are ever-present here in Russia is, of course, the result of the Americans' different political and administrative traditions.

Starting with the Gorbachev era, high-ranking Kremlin groups—led as a rule by the heads of presidential administrations or secretariats—have been regularly sent to

Washington for "proficiency enhancement" courses. Sergey Filatov recently visited their White House. The results of these trips are almost invisible. If the American experience had indeed been productive, the Kremlin would not have made frankly controversial and politically explosive decisions such as the decision not to allow the new Russian parliament into Moscow's White House. Even a 30-year-old rookie staffer from Arkansas would realize on joining the presidential staff that this kind of decision had to be avoided at all costs. It is an axiom of American political life and the basis of political stability that Congress must not be offended or humiliated. You can argue, shout till you're blue in the face, bang your fist, or even—like Khrushchev—your shoe, but in no circumstances must you wound, even by allusion, its comfortable sense of its own dignity and prestige.

Alongside the meetings which Clinton will hold in Moscow with Boris Yeltsin and which will be interspersed only infrequently with relaxation (such as a nice tour of a chocolate factory or a kind of TV discussion between the U.S. President and Russian citizens invited to "Ostankino") I would include on the Moscow visit agenda—apart from the mandatory and longstanding disarmament, economic, and trade issues—the question of what should be done and in what way to parliament when it becomes recalcitrant or simply unattractive because of its actions. I think that Clinton could tell us a lot, both from his gubernatorial practice in Arkansas and from his presidential experience. By hook or by crook he has achieved and is achieving ratification of bills in which his administration has an interest and which Congress initially met without raucous acclaim or even mere condescending approbation.

But, in general, if I were drawing up the program for Clinton's Moscow visit, I would expand the informal side of it as much as possible—the U.S. President is a passed master at glad-handing, and has appeared far more often on the streets of Washington and other American towns and cities than many of his predecessors (or, to be blunt, more often than the Russian president has appeared on Russian streets of late).

Bill Clinton first visited this country almost 25 years ago. He came to Moscow as a tourist from Oxford, where he was then studying. That trip played a lot on his nerves during the election campaign—Republican opponents charged that in that far-off era it was impossible for ordinary people to visit Moscow, and that if they did, it was only with the knowledge, approval, and, consequently, complete control of the secret police.

Now that Bill Clinton is coming again, the secret police as such no longer officially exists—it is in the process of a prolonged reorganization. Have no worries about coming, Mr. President.

Moscow, U.S. Pool Efforts in N. Hemisphere Research

LD1001182094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1401 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lev Frolov]

[Text] St. Petersburg January 10 ITAR-TASS—Specialists from Russia and the United States have pooled their efforts in coordinating international global research of the northern hemisphere. The first stage of the project provides for an exchange in geophysical technologies already tested by either side.

According to Yevgeniy Guryanov, vice president of the Leninets holding company based in St. Petersburg, leading research and producing firms of the two countries and aviation support groups will participate in fulfilment of the project.

Some contracts have already been completed, including the transfer of Russian magnetometers to an American company. Some earth surface research devices will soon be sold to the Americans.

The bulk of observations will be conducted from the air, using aircraft of the Canadian Air Force and coast guards. The parties involved have already identified the airfields and traffic control centres located in various Arctic regions in Russia, Canada and the United States.

Grachev Stresses Pan-European Security System

LD1001215094 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1930 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] A two-day summit of NATO member-countries opened in Brussels today. It discussed as its central issue the Partnership for Peace plan proposed by U.S. President Bill Clinton. This envisages the establishment of military links between the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of East Europe and the former Soviet republics, including the Russian Federation.

As is known, Russia does not object to these links, but is opposed to NATO's expansion into countries in close proximity to the Russian borders. Incidentally, experts of the Russian Defense Ministry note that NATO itself lacks unity of views regarding the next steps after the possible adoption of the U.S. Partnership for Peace plan. Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian defense minister, speaks about the stand of the Russian military in greater detail:

[begin Grachev recording] We are advocates of a path that leads to a truly pan-European system of security. This means collective actions—but not in accordance with the criteria of membership in the bloc—aimed at preventing and settling the crises and conflicts now shaking Europe. I believe that security and international stability should be indivisible and should be based on common European structures. Russia is proceeding from the fact that our relations with NATO should be richer

and should develop in broad-ranging cooperation. We believe that rapprochement between Russia and NATO should be going at an accelerated pace. [end recording]

NATO Agenda Generates 'Most Diverse' Views

PM1101123194 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 94 p 3

[Manki Ponomarev article: "Meeting in Brussels Begins"]

[Text] The work of the extraordinary NATO Council session at the level of heads of state and government of the military-political alliance's member-countries began yesterday in Brussels. Judging from initial reports received from the Belgian capital three main questions will take a central place on the session agenda. First, can the transatlantic alliance be maintained now that the Cold War has ended and the United States is terminating its military presence in Europe, and if so, how can this be done? Second is the relationship between NATO and its former adversaries—the states making up the Warsaw Pact, many of which, as well as Lithuania, Macedonia, and a number of others, are persistently knocking on the bloc's door. Third, what kind of future does the alliance have in general, and what tasks is it designed to fulfill now? In addition, at the insistence of France and the Netherlands, there will be a debate about whether bombing strikes should be made on Serb positions in connection with the latest exacerbation of the situation in the area of Sarajevo.

We will have to wait a day or two for the results of the discussion of all these questions. But even now it is clear that no NATO Council session has ever attracted such attention as the one now taking place in Brussels. An avalanche of speeches, statements, publications, and comments has swamped the public. The most diverse opinions are being expressed. The British SUNDAY TIMES, for example, claims that the North Atlantic alliance is on the brink of a slow death because the reason for its existence has disappeared. While THE NEW YORK TIMES observer W. Safire calls on NATO leaders to take advantage of the "temporary weakening of Russia" to expand the bloc and include East European countries in it.

U.S. President Bill Clinton also agrees with the need to review the alliance's role. But he believes that efforts must be channeled into developing partnership with East European countries, including those which previously comprised the USSR. And, THE WASHINGTON POST observed, he has taken on a solemn duty: America will play a leading role, "linking" the stable, democratic states of the West with the emerging democracies of the East in the military and economic spheres and in the sphere of creating democratic institutions.

This purpose should be served by the "Partnership for Peace" program, which will essentially be an intensification of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council's activity. The question of expanding NATO is not being

put on the agenda now because it carries the risk of dividing Europe into blocs and drawing new demarcation lines on its map.

Paper Welcomes Russia's 'Partnership' Strategy

PM1101124794 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 11 Jan 94 p 3

[Pavel Shinkarenko report under the "Yesterday" rubric: "Russia and NATO"]

[Text] A NATO session at the level of heads of state and government opened in Brussels yesterday. It is assumed that two key decisions will be adopted: Readiness to accept new members into the bloc has been expressed, and the start of the implementation of the "Partnership for Peace" program, aimed at closer military-political cooperation between NATO and the countries of the former socialist community, has been announced.

The insistent knocking on NATO's door by a number of former Warsaw Pact countries—first and foremost Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, joined by Lithuania in the past few days—has provoked a negative response from Moscow, which with every justification assesses the possible eastward expansion of the North Atlantic alliance as a manifestation of bloc ideology and an attempt to isolate Russia from Europe-wide processes. This assessment was voiced in a statement made by Vyacheslav Kostikov, the Russian Federation president's press secretary, and a number of speeches made by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. "The over-hasty eastward expansion of NATO has the potential to provoke the development of a most terrible scenario," the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry stressed notably during an interview with the German FRANKURTER RUNDSCHAU. "It will deliver into the hands of extremists in Russia a strong argument in favor of the need to revive the Russian empire in order to resist the 'offensive from the West.'"

According to Andrei Kozyrev, the fears about a renewed "threat from the east" about which our neighbors have been talking recently can be dispelled first and foremost through the strategy of partnership with democratic Russia, which is moving toward a rule of law state and a market economy. Those who talk about some kind of "aggressive" policy in Europe on Moscow's part are in no position to cite any specific evidence.

Nevertheless, East Europeans have the right to obtain greater guarantees for their security. No one is disputing this. But they can be secured in practice without becoming a permanent member of any military-political alliance. In particular, this aim can be achieved by carrying out the strategy of partnership in political questions, as well as in the sphere of security, put forward by Russia. As we know, Washington has agreed to this idea, formulating it in the "Partnership for Peace" program, as have the capitals of other European states. Right away, on his first day in Brussels, U.S. President Bill Clinton noted: "The changes which have occurred in

recent years in the international arena require the NATO allies to review the organization's role and channel efforts into developing partnership with the East European countries which have embarked on the path of democracy."

Other Western leaders agree with this stance. "I am in favor of NATO's expanding its relations with Russia in the security sphere," FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated on the eve of the Brussels summit. At the same time, he especially stressed the need to dispel concerns that the West is pursuing a line aimed at isolating Russia. Speaking in turn about the North Atlantic alliance's East Europe strategy, NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner stressed that the alliance's leadership has not yet determined specific dates for new members to join the bloc.

Today we will find out how close these statements are to specific actions. But one thing is clear: Without Russia's participation, security in Europe is impossible.

Yeltsin Invites Ukraine's Kravchuk to Trilateral Summit

LD1001164594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1613 GMT 10 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] In view of the agreement reached in principle on some important bilateral issues, including those connected with nuclear arms, President Boris Yeltsin invited his Ukrainian counterpart, Leonid Kravchuk, to come to Moscow, the Russian president's press service said on Monday.

The communique says that a working Russian-American-Ukrainian top-level meeting will take place in the Kremlin on January 14. According to an understanding reached between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton, the American president may make a brief stop in Kiev's airport, Borispol, on January 12 on his way to Moscow.

At 16:00 on January 10 U.S. diplomats in Moscow announced they knew nothing about any stopover at Kiev's Borispol Airport on his way to Moscow. Their message was received by Interfax.

Kravchuk Visit 'Would Be Problematic'

LD1001181994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1136 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Informed sources in the Russian Foreign Ministry told Interfax that Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk would arrive in Moscow to meet with Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton. The three presidents are expected to meet on January 14.

The sources also said that the reports on Clinton's visit to Ukraine were "groundless."

Meanwhile, informed sources in Kiev told Interfax that the authorities there do not rule out the possibility of President Clinton's stopover in the Ukrainian capital. They say that a meeting of Kravchuk and Clinton could resolve all issues in the stationing of nuclear weapons in Ukraine that cause American concern. The same sources note that in this case Leonid Kravchuk's trip to Moscow would be "problematic" unless trilateral documents could be signed there.

Zhirinovskiy Urges Vote for Shuvaynikov in Crimean Election

LD1001210994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1929 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Liberal Democratic Party Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has called on the Crimean residents to cast their ballots at the coming presidential elections on January 16 in favor of the leader of the Russian Party of the Crimea, Sergey Shuvaynikov.

Zhirinovskiy believes that the Russian Party of the Crimea is the only party in the peninsula capable of "sincerely defending the interests of the Crimeans, the interests of the Russian people."

"Remember that the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia will stand up for your rights together with the Russian Party of the Crimea. We will protect Russian people wherever they are," Zhirinovskiy said.

Embassy Protests to Latvia on Detention of Generals

LD1001181294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1804 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga January 10 TASS—The Russian Embassy in Latvia sent a note to Latvian authorities on Monday protesting against the blockade of Russian military facilities by Latvian paramilitary units.

Vladimir Ionkin, the press secretary of the Russian Embassy in Latvia, told ITAR-TASS that the militants detained two generals—Nikolay Tailakov and Anatoliy Vodopyanov—who were sent to the facilities by the commander of the Northwestern Group of Russian Troops. They handcuffed them and drove in an unknown direction. The generals were freed only after the intervention of the Russian Embassy. The Latvian authorities sent their apologies for the incident and assured the Russian Embassy that the facilities were being unlocked.

Early on Monday a group of Latvian militants stopped a car of the Russian ambassador and refused to let it pass despite the ambassador's protests. After long deliberations they allowed the car to pass but waved their guns at it.

The Russian Embassy issued a protest to the Latvian Foreign Ministry, describing the incident as a potentially dangerous provocation. The embassy expressed the hope that the Latvian authorities will take the necessary measures to prevent such incidents in the future. The note considered the incident as an attempt to thwart the talks on the troop withdrawal.

Troops Put on Alert

LD1001190194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1848 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 10 TASS—The Russian Defence Ministry issued the following statement on Monday, following the blockade of Russian military facilities by Latvian paramilitary units and detention of two Russian generals and the Russian ambassador's car.

"On the morning of January 10, 1994 armed groups of Zemessargs (Latvian paramilitary units) seized several facilities on the outskirts of Riga. Major-General Nikolay Taylakov, deputy commander of the Northwestern Group of Troops, and Major-General Anatoliy Vodopyanov, assistant to the commander of the Northwestern Group of Troops for work with personnel, arrived at the scene of the incident. In return to their demand to leave the seized facilities, the chairman of the Vidzeme district gave an order to arrest the generals. The Russian generals were handcuffed and put into a car which drove towards the Russian border. Commander of the Northwestern Group of Troops Colonel-General Leonid Mayorov informed the Russian defence minister about the incident. Defence Minister Army General Pavel Grachev issued an order to put Russian troops stationed in Latvia on alert and tighten security at the facilities and premises belonging to the Northwestern Group of Troops. On alert were also placed air-borne troops and military cargo aviation. The commander of the Northwestern Group of Troops informed Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis about the incident. The president expressed bewilderment over the incident, gave orders to free the detained generals and offered his apologies. By 17:00 the Russian generals and all seized facilities were freed.

The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation demands an immediate investigation and punishment of those guilty. Any violent or unlawful acts against the Russian servicemen, military units and facilities of the Russian Army will be checked in the most decisive manner. Responsibility for all possible consequences in this case will rest with the local authorities who must ensure a normal situation around the Russian military units," the statement said.

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despite the ambassador's protests. After long deliberations they allowed the car to pass but waived their guns at it.

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Further on Incident

LD1001193794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1914 GMT 10 Jan 94

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga January 10 TASS—A Russian airborne division deployed in the city of Pskov near the Latvian border went on high alert on Monday after an incident in Riga involving Russian military units, which Russian Ambassador-at-large Sergey Zotov qualified as a "provocation."

"Necessary measures have been taken to put the Pskov airborne division on alert," Zotov said in a statement on Monday, adding that units of the Northwestern Group of Russian Troops are also on high alert.

"As is known, on January 10 the talks were due to take place between the heads of the state delegations of Latvia and Russia on the set of problems connected with the troop withdrawal. Today, on the day of the delegation's arrival in Riga, outspoken provocative actions were taken against the Northeastern Group of Troops [as received] by the administration of the Vidzeme district of Riga," the statement said.

"Acting on the direct order from the district leadership, paramilitary units seized four facilities of the Russian Armed Forces and arrested Major-General Nikolay Taylakov, deputy commander of the Northwestern Group of Troops, and Major-General Anatoliy Vodopyanov, assistant to the commander of the Northwestern Group of Troops for work with personnel, who arrived at the scene of the incident. Violence was committed against the representatives of the troop command: The Russian generals were handcuffed and driven towards the Latvian-Russian border under guard," said Zotov, who is also head of the Russian delegation to the talks with Latvia on troop withdrawal.

"At the airport Commander of the Northwestern Group of Troops Colonel-General Leonid Mayorov informed the Russian state delegation about this flagrant provocative act by Latvian authorities. In this connection I voiced strong protest to the head of the Latvian delegation, Martyns Virsus, and demanded an immediate release of the arrested Russian generals and unblocking of the seized military facilities. The delegation

announced its decision not to begin talks until all circumstances of this extraordinary incident have been found out.

"I informed the Russian Foreign Ministry, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and the top Russian officials about the outright arbitrariness of Latvian extremist forces. It has come to the delegation's knowledge that respective military units of the Northwestern Group of Troops have been placed on high alert. Necessary measures have been taken to put the Pskov airborne division on alert. The Russian delegation considers the provocative actions by the Zemessargs (Latvian paramilitary units) as nothing else but an attempt to torpedo the Russian-Latvian talks and complicate relations between Russia and Latvia.

"In connection with the coming reports about the release of the Russian generals and the beginning of the unblocking of the seized facilities, and taking into account the apologies made by the Latvian leadership for the Zemessargs's actions, the Russian delegation has agreed to begin the talks on January 11," the statement said.

Kozyrev Comments on Incident

LD1001200294 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Kozyrev by Ivan Pankov on 10 January; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Pankov] What happened in Latvia?

[Kozyrev] In Latvia, judging by everything, there has occurred a most flagrant provocation, perpetrated by armed representatives of the land guard [okhrana kraya], that is, the government forces. But today towards the end of the day we received an official apology via the Embassy of Russia which intervened in this situation and it is possible that it is a question of a provocation also against the line of the Latvian authorities themselves, the President.

And the factual aspect is very simple and crude. These armed gangs surrounded and blockaded military facilities which they claim constitute a threat to Latvia, but which in actual fact involve a stadium, a swimming pool, and the residence of the Russian ambassador in Riga, which of course cannot in any way constitute a danger to anyone.

The two generals which were sent by the Russian command in order to assess the situation on the scene were subjected to insulting behavior, virtually arrested, taken somewhere into the forest, subjected to threats, they were even handcuffed.

This is absolutely impermissible, intolerable behavior towards representatives of the Russian Armed Forces which have been placed on heightened combat alert. The embassy immediately undertook measures to clear up the situation. And we must with all resoluteness warn

that Russia will take all necessary measures to protect her citizens especially those in military or diplomatic uniform, indeed simply any of her citizens, from such attacks and once again I repeat, we expect, at a higher level, a more extensive explanation, apology, and punishment of those guilty for this incident.

Accord With Kazakhstan on Baykonur Explained

PM1101112994 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1315 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "M-Trust" program; video report by unnamed correspondent]

[Excerpts] [correspondent over aerial shot of region] In December, on the eve of the New Year, the Governments of Russia and Kazakhstan finally decided on a way of preserving the vital operational capacity of the unique Baykonur Space Center complex. A recent press conference held at the Russian Space Agency was devoted to explaining the problems which have beset the multibillion industrial and scientific giant's 40-year history, and which are set to dog its present and its future. Baykonur started out as an isolated entity deep in the steppe heartland. Today, however, it is a whole state comprising impressive constructions, power-consuming plants, assembly buildings, and the city of Leninsk. Alongside the complex's famous No. 2 launchpad, the starting point for satellite launches, Gagarin's spaceflight, and indeed that of the cosmonauts currently in orbit—that is, alongside this living legend other launchpads have been constructed, including sites for the Proton and Energiya rockets. Many kilometers of cable worth billions of rubles have been invested in this site. And state-of-the-art technology is used in the rockets, the payloads, in work carried out in orbit, and in the help proffered from Earth. So Baykonur's separation from Russia's multifaceted space sector would result in a loss of resources and a dissipation of personnel and profitable contracts. The point being that the new super-complex being developed on the basis of Plesetsk is going to take between eight and 10 years to build. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent resumes over video of servicemen sitting on a bench] At the moment, Baykonur keeps going basically by dint of the fact that 28,000 Russian servicemen are there to operate it. For this reason it is hard to imagine any kind of commercial mechanism succeeding, be it a firm or a corporation. Frankly, to totally demilitarize Baykonur and replace military with civilian experts overnight would spell disaster. And talk of generating sufficient revenue on site for the giant Baykonur-Leninsk complex to pay its own way is little short of ridiculous. Russia is going to rent the entire complex from Kazakhstan, financially compensate for the ecological damage, and clear the 400,000 hectares of proving ground of scrap metal. However, this will not entail the billions of dollars which are being alluded to but will be done with due consideration for the overall state of accounts between Russia and Kazakhstan. Finally, at a

time when 37 percent of Russia's space budget goes on maintaining the Mir space station, our participation in the new international space project—the "Alpha" Station—will create new jobs for tens of thousands of people and a billion dollars in profits in the next four years alone. Not to mention the production of new spacesuits in conjunction with the Germans, and of collapsible modules for India—in fact, contracts have been concluded with 20 states in all. And all this represents technology, profit, and prosperity. [video shows shots of Baykonur, government representatives in conference, press conference, footage of Baykonur and surrounding area, space rockets, launchpads, spacecraft in orbit, cosmonauts, rocket launch, spacesuits]

Minsk Seen To Benefit From Merging of Ruble

*MK1001151094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 10 Jan 94 p 1*

[Svetlana Lyuboshits report: "'Hares' Were Mowed Down at Midnight. Belarus Has the Ruble Once Again"]

[Text] The lengthy hesitation about whether there should be a ruble zone were crowned on Christmas eve by the signing of a treaty merging the monetary systems of Russia and the Belarus Republic.

Andrey Illarionov, deputy chief of the Economic Reforms Working Center, thinks that in its content, the agreement brings us back to a situation where the non-cash monetary systems of the former Soviet republics were still undivided.

But the situation is essentially fundamentally new. Russia has presented Belarus with a really royal Christmas gift. The thing is that the National Bank of Belarus keeps its independence, and two emission centers are being created—that of the Russian Federation Central Bank and that of the Republic of Belarus National Bank. Curiously, the agreement envisions no effective mechanism to keep tabs on emissions, primarily noncash emissions.

One is also amazed, to put it mildly, at Article 6 of the agreement. Under it, the National Bank of Belarus and our Central Bank undertake to create a joint fund of gold [hard] currency, and other highly liquid assets in an agreed amount. Remarkably, the fund is to be formed in proportion to the share of the sides in the aggregate credit emission. Belarus has practically no such assets, with the result that the fund will be set up by Russia, with Russia having to transfer to Belarus part of its gold and hard currency reserves.

Being too big does not end there. It is proposed to merge the republics' [as published] on the basis of one "hare" [Belarus ruble has a hare depicted on it] per one ruble. Given the real market rate of 4.5 or 5 "hares" per one Russian ruble, this means that Russia would give Belarus virtually an interest-free loan of approximately 1.6 trillion rubles.

According to the most conservative estimate, Russia will simultaneously pay for it with a 10-percent rise in inflation in one fell swoop.

Zhirinovskiy Urges Poland Not To Join NATO

LD1001200694 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Text] While talking to journalists, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of Russian nationalists, has confirmed his readiness to come to Poland.

[Correspondent Andrzej Siezieniewski] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy was in a hurry to attend the first meeting of the parliamentary floor group of his party, but when he learned that we were from Poland, he stopped and spared a moment for us.

[Zhirinovskiy, in Russian with superimposed Polish translation] "We have the highest brotherly feelings toward you. We are Slavs. The hostility of the period of the Czarist empire and the period of communism, humiliations, suffering, big brother, little brother—this is all a thing of the past. We live side by side. We are neighbors and Slavs, and we would like Poland to be always a flourishing and democratic state."

[Siezieniewski] Asked whom he would like to talk to in Warsaw, he replied:

[Zhirinovskiy] "To everybody, the president, the head of government, Sejm deputies and leaders of every party and public organization. With journalists as well. I would like to talk with them about us ceasing to look at each other with hostility. How long could it last. You are Catholics, we are Orthodox. Is this sufficient reason to divide people? Let us take Yugoslavia as an example. The Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats are shooting at each other. This is a manifestation of savagery."

[Siezieniewski] We took the opportunity to ask him about his position toward Poland's plans to join NATO.

[Zhirinovskiy] "Negative. Let us all be neutral and neither we nor you join. Do not think that they are waiting for you there. Even if that is so, it is waiting for servants who would polish the boots of German or British generals. They would force you to feed foreign divisions, they would behave like peasants."

[Siezieniewski] This is what the leader of Russian Liberal Democrats maintains, and he adds:

[Zhirinovskiy] "Blacks from America will come over and kick you in the face. You are going to be a testing ground and a dump. You must understand that a neutral Poland and security guarantees for the whole of East Europe are what we need."

"We Russians have never had an urge to push west. We have problems in the south. So, if you want, we will give you Lvov back. Do not join NATO in any case."

[Siezieniewski] Finally, returning once again to his Polish sentiments, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy said:

[Zhirinovskiy] "I like Poles. My two deputies Zhebrovskiy and Vengerovskiy are of Polish origin. I want you to know that we are a normal democratic party. There is neither fascism nor communism nor any other extremism in us. We are for the best possible relations with Poland."

[Siezieniewski] During the first meeting of the Liberal Democrats parliamentary floor group, to which he was going, he pronounced himself for maintaining the strong presidential power and equally strong parliament. He accepts the new constitution 90 percent. He believes that the time will come when Russia will be able to become a real parliamentary republic without any dictatorship.

Andrzej Siezieniewski reporting from Moscow.

Zhirinovskiy Interviewed on Future of Poland, Ambitions

AU1001171094 Poznan WPROST in Polish 2 Jan 94
pp 47,48

[Interview with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Russian Liberal-Democratic Party, by Maria Graczyk; place and date not given: "The Remnants of the Empire"]

[Text] [Graczyk] You support the idea of a Russian-German border. Across Poland?

[Zhirinovskiy] In Europe, we are mostly interested in good relations with Germany, and it is in this context that one should address the Polish question. However, we do not want to interfere in Poland's internal affairs. Even if Poland wants to join NATO, that is an internal matter for Poland and NATO.

The creation of a new world order is a long process. Europe is currently experiencing a stage of profound destruction. After all, the Soviet Union has collapsed, and it would be hard to expect its remnants not to hit the neighboring countries. Poland has never had a permanent border. It has possessed various shapes at various times of history, and there was a period when it was divided and formed part of Russia, among other countries. Until recently, the Russian forces guaranteed the Polish border. Today, in this matter, one should turn to NATO and Germany, which play the greatest part in this section of the continent. For the time being, the Poles can carry on singing "Poland has not perished yet."

[Graczyk] What would change in Russia if you became prime minister?

[Zhirinovskiy] There will be a better economy, a strong state, and better guaranteed rights for all Russians, wherever they live. Is that too little?

[Graczyk] During the election campaign, you promised you would double the standard of living of your countrymen. How?

[Zhirinovskiy] We will do this without any help from outside. Until now, the so-called help from the West has caused us more harm than good. Russia has been exploited materially and intellectually. Let them leave us alone, and we will reestablish Russian power. As prime minister I would make three basic decisions—an end to all financial help for foreign countries, an end to the conversion of the weapons industry to civilian production, and a sharp struggle against crime.

The adherence to the arms embargo on the Middle East, for example, is costing us many billions of dollars. Russia could earn about \$50 billion a year from weapons exports. After six months, not only would people's standard of living increase, but also their security. I would also bring more militiamen and soldiers out onto the streets.

[Graczyk] That smells of totalitarianism.

[Zhirinovskiy] The state should not have been allowed to disintegrate! The Soviet Union might still exist today; one should have provided greater independence and divided the country into provinces. Such a variant should also have been suggested to the Asian and Caucasian regions, plus Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic countries. Then they would have realized the advantages to be gained from living within one large state in which all the principles of freedom—cultural and economic freedom—are respected. Look what is happening right now. Entire settlements are burning, towns are being bombed, people are perishing.

[Graczyk] Is the return of the USSR still possible?

[Zhirinovskiy] Yes, in a territorial sense. But the law, ideology, and government will be different. The territory of the former USSR could become the territory of a reborn Russia. That will only be possible when a new democratically oriented authority appears in the Kremlin, one that will work out a model of a strong state. A reborn and strengthened army is required for this purpose, together with a nuclear potential that must be improved so that our possible adversaries know that we are prepared to use it. Therefore we will develop our nuclear weapons, create a base in space, and from there we will defend Russia if the need arises. The ideal scenario calls for the existence of a Russo-Swedish and Russo-German border, and a border with China and India in the south.

[Graczyk] How can one describe the present situation in Russia? Is it democracy, yet another "disturbance" [smuta], or perhaps something else?

[Zhirinovskiy] I would call it a political cocktail, because it contains obvious signs of chaos and anarchy from the time of the Great Disturbance, but also the beginnings of democracy, fascism, and nationalism. Also possible are potential sources of future religious wars and conflicts caused by the clash between two worlds—the Christian one and the Muslim one.

As a lawyer and expert on human rights, I am an advocate of democracy, but I do not think democracy is the right medicine for the state's diseased organism. The only panacea is strong authority. Only after the organism of the state has recovered from the crisis and the economy has healed will it be possible to switch over to a democratic system.

[Graczyk] The communists also promised that democracy would occur after the period of proletarian dictatorship.

[Zhirinovskiy] That was their mistake. I am opposed to an ideological state.

[Graczyk] Then why do they call you a fascist?

[Zhirinovskiy] The disease of destruction is very far advanced in Russia, and the economic crisis has assumed a particularly acute form. That is why it is essential to apply drastic measures. Only through fear can one enforce an end to the civil war, stop the disintegration of the army, and stem the tide of emigres. Economic structures must be made operational again. One must reestablish the old links between work places, factories, and kolkhozes. First we must heal Russia and lift it off its knees.

[Graczyk] Do you think the Russians expressed their weariness of democracy by voting for you?

[Zhirinovskiy] They have never lived under democracy! By voting for me, they have opted for democracy and entrusted me with it. Democracy is in the right hands now.

[Graczyk] But how can one introduce democracy to a country that has never had it? First there was the Czarist empire, and then the Bolsheviks came.

[Zhirinovskiy] The shift to democracy must be suitably prepared. Democracy needs an economic base, political parties need varied social strata, and the Army needs an objective and specific conditions. What is needed today, however, is a freeze, a political diet. One must not sow seed in a fallow field—a tractor has to go over it first. We need a strong authority.

[Graczyk] Boris Yeltsin's spokesman said recently that he does not rule out the possibility of cooperation with you. Under what conditions would it be possible?

[Zhirinovskiy] I am ready to do anything for the good of Russia. We will cooperate with our president any way he wants. Together with my staff I am preparing a program that we will submit to the president soon. I hope that on

parliament's first sitting on 11 January, President Yeltsin will entrust me with the task of forming a government. But if he appoints someone else, I will accept that. We will not even be offended if we do not obtain any ministerial post. Time is working to our advantage.

[Graczyk] Until recently you were critical of Boris Yeltsin. You even called him your worst enemy. And now you want to cooperate with him.

[Zhirinovskiy] I respect the will of the voters who voted for him. But I have no doubt that I will win the next presidential election. Neither the so-called democratic camp nor the communists will stand a chance. That is a pity, because I am accustomed to a sharp struggle. I am sad that the victory will be so easy.

No Intention To Establish Contact With Serb Krajina

LD1001203294 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1900 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] The Russian Federation does not intend to establish official contacts with Serbian Krajina. The statement was made by a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official in Moscow.

According to sources in Belgrade, a delegation of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina intends to arrive in Moscow on Tuesday. The republic is a Serbian-populated area in Croatia, conflicting with Zagreb, and favoring unification of Serbian lands into a separate state.

A Russian diplomat said such a republic does not exist for Russia. Russia maintains contacts with Croatia, which is a member of the United Nations.

Churkin Meets Slovak Officials in Bratislava

LD1001224994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1830 GMT 10 Jan 94

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Rzhevskiy]

[Text] Bratislava, 10 Jan—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin met Slovak Republic Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik here today. Questions relating to the development of security structures for Europe were looked at in depth, including NATO, along with the main trends in political and economic relations between European states. After expressing, on the whole, mutual satisfaction with the first year in which links have been developed between Russia and Slovakia, the two spoke in favor of developing them in all ways possible.

European integration was discussed during the meeting between V. Churkin and Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Prokes.

Official Denies Rumors of Fighting on Cargo Ship

LD1101094094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0244 GMT 11 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valentin Vasilets]

[Text] Ottawa, 11 Jan—"Khudozhnik Pakhomov," a Russian container vessel, unexpectedly called on Monday at the port of St. John's, Newfoundland, causing a wave of controversial reports on alleged dramatic events on board. The CBC television company reported in the morning, quoting police sources, that Canadian policemen and customs officials boarded the ship after learning that there had been a gun battle on board. At least one person was reported killed. Canadian Press agency reported, quoting its own sources, that two people had been killed and three wounded. It was alleged that the conflict began after stowaways had been found on board.

However, representative of the Russian Federation marine fleet in Montreal, Nikolay Zharnakov, contacted on the phone by ITAR-TASS, categorically refuted these reports. He said that there had been no gun battle and no firearms on board, and of course there were no casualties or fatalities. Mr. Zharnakov added that "Khudozhnik Pakhomov" had been heading for Montreal, having taken part one week ago in the search for the crew of "Marika-7", a Greek vessel that had sunk in stormy seas 1,500 km off of Newfoundland. The container vessel,

owned by the Baltic shipping line, had also been affected by the storm and its anchor had been damaged. The vessel had to head for the nearest port for repairs. As she was approaching St. John's, a stowaway, who had been hiding in the hold, emerged on deck. The captain called the police and customs in order to have the surprise "passenger" sorted out.

A representative of St. John's customs service also confirmed in the evening that no dramas had happened on board. Police detained six stowaways who had penetrated the ship in a port in Europe. The customs official said three of the stowaways were Romanians, two Armenians, and one Russian. They all requested asylum.

Algerian Submarines To Be Repaired at St. Petersburg

LD1101120094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1130 GMT 11 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Svetlana Ivanova]

[Text] St. Petersburg January 11 TASS—An Algerian Navy submarine, built here a few years ago, is now in a dock of the St. Petersburg enterprise "Korabelnye Verfi" for a major overhaul which is scheduled to be completed by the end of 1994.

The enterprise has already received an order to restore another Algerian submarine, also built in Russia.

Political Issues

'Confidential Sources' Say Yeltsin Visits Grachev

PM1101112194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 94 p. 2

["Own Information" report carried as part of "Military Review" feature under the general heading "Everything Changes in the Army. Except the Defense Minister's Birthday": "It Isn't Every Minister That the President Visits Bearing Flowers"]

[Text] According to information from confidential sources, Pavel Grachev received a visit 1 January from Boris Yeltsin, who congratulated him on his 46th birthday that day. The unofficial meeting between the president and the defense minister at the festive table lasted over two hours, after which, according to an eyewitness, both men went out into the street in noticeably good spirits. In the opinion of observers, the fact that the president visited the defense minister on his birthday demonstrates B. Yeltsin's sympathies for the military department and its leader. The visit was all the more important for Grachev since before this event, according to reports in some of the mass media, he had tried to obtain an audience with the president to discuss the results of the elections and the results of the year in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but the president did not have the time for a meeting.

That there has been some change in the cool attitude of the president's structures and B. Yeltsin himself toward the Defense Ministry and toward P. Grachev since the 3-4 October events is also indicated by comments from Dmitriy Volkogonov, the Russian Federation president's adviser on military questions. On B. Yeltsin's behalf he characterized the Russian Federation Defense Ministry's activity as "normal."

The Russian president's adviser called the reorganization of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff at the present time dangerous because society and the Army are not ready for that just now, although he did not rule out such a possibility in the next few years.

Chernomyrdin Expected To Name Soskovets, Gaydar Deputies

LD1001183094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1746
GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is expected to name Oleg Soskovets and Yegor Gaydar as two of his deputies in a new government, government sources told INTERFAX.

Former Prosecutor General Stepankov on Resignation

LD1001190294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1746
GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Russia's former Prosecutor General Valentin Stepankov has dismissed various rumors concerning his

fate after the early October events in Moscow. Right after the tragic developments of October 3 and 4 he decided to use up his annual leave for the past two years. After his vacation he resigned.

The new Prosecutor General, Aleksey Kazannik, signed his request for resignation without even interviewing him. "I resigned because the present office of prosecutor general with its new functions and powers does not conform to the model I had created," Stepankov stressed.

According to him, he has not been summoned yet as a witness in the legal proceedings connected with the October events, though he participated in them on both sides.

Beginning with September 21, Stepankov explained, he visited the parliament building more than once, where the congress of people's deputies was taking place, and attended sessions held at the headquarters led by First Deputy Premier Oleg Soskovets.

As Stepankov said, he is still out of work. He declined the only offer he received: the Foreign Trade Minister, Oleg Davydov, offered him a job abroad.

When asked by INTERFAX's correspondent why he had taken no part in the race for parliament, Stepankov said that his former work as a member of the Supreme Soviet had not satisfied him, and so he was not prepared to join the new parliament. "I belonged to no faction in the previous legislature, and now I have no wish to represent the interests of any party in the new parliament," Stepankov pointed out.

With reference to the case of those who plotted the failed August 1991 coup, the former prosecutor general said: "Now, looking back, some charges against myself could be revoked." According to Stepankov, at one time he was accused of procrastinating with investigations. "But those investigations began only four and a half months previously, and 9 months more were spent on acquainting the defendants and their lawyers with the materials. The trial has been in progress for over a year now, but only one defendant has been questioned so far."

Soskovets Expected To Remain in Government

LD1101112094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1059
GMT 11 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow January 11 TASS—Everything seems to indicate that First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets will remain in a new government and retain his job, according to reliable sources in the government.

Soskovets directly participated in preparing a presidential decree on the structure of federal executive power bodies, the sources said.

Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Oleg Soskovets had a meeting on Monday, reaching understanding on government reforming matters.

Consultations Under Way on Cabinet Composition

LD1101122294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1128 GMT 11 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Jan— Active consultations are under way in the Russian Federation Government on the new composition of the cabinet.

We recall that the president of Russia, having signed a decree "On the structure of federal executive bodies," has defined the new government as being five people—a chairman, two first deputies and two vice-premiers.

ITAR-TASS has been told by a reliable source in the government that the new government will be as little changed as possible, despite the reduction in numbers. Judging by all accounts, the candidates for the two first deputy chairmen of the government have already been decided. Oleg Soskovets and Yegor Gaydar will retain their former posts as first vice-premiers. This is shown by the fact that they have both taken an active part in drafting the president's decree on reforming the government.

The source also noted that members of the government will be of similar outlook, as they say, to Viktor Chernomyrdin and share his views on the implementation of economic reforms in the country. On the basis of that, the source said, it is most likely that the vice-premiers' posts will be taken by Aleksandr Zaveryukha, who is responsible for the agricultural sector in the government, and Yuriy Yarov, who is in charge of social issues.

Foreign Minister Said To Get Two New Deputies

MK1101095094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 11 Jan 94 p 3

[Viktor Zamyatin, Sergey Tsekhmistrenko report: "Personnel Shakeup in Russian Foreign Ministry. Minister Will Have New Deputies"]

[Text] The just completed New Year and Christmas season has brought about more changes in Russian diplomacy. According to information available to KOMMERSANT-DAILY, the question of appointing Aleksandr Panov, the current ambassador to Seoul, as deputy foreign minister, has for all intents and purposes been resolved. It has come to light simultaneously that Igor Ivanov, ambassador to Madrid, will probably become yet another deputy for Andrey Kozyrev.

Georgiy Kunadze, whose place will probably be taken by Aleksandr Panov, was in charge of Foreign Ministry personnel policy and relations with the countries of Asia and the Pacific region. Kunadze was not quite successful

in the personnel job, though, some high-ranking diplomats note. One of the probable reasons is the fact that he has not been a career diplomat (before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he was in academic science), which is why they argue on Smolenskaya Ploshchad that he could not entirely get rid of his "outsider" image. Last October, personnel work was entrusted to an "insider"—Sergey Krylov—and some time later, the question of Kunadze's appointment as ambassador to Seoul was resolved in principle. This leaves the Asia and Pacific region "untended," and now Aleksandr Panov is to step into this breach.

As for Igor Ivanov, according to some information, he is tipped to take the place of current First Deputy Minister Anatoliy Adamishin, who has become a member of parliament. It is still not clear, though, which Foreign Ministry areas he will be in charge of if one thinks that changes in the ministry's structure (and the redistribution of duties among top diplomats it entails) have not been yet completed.

[article contains following boxed passage]

Profiles of the Russian Foreign Ministry Head's New Deputies

Igor Sergeyevich Ivanov, born in 1945. Diplomatic rank—extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador. Graduated from the Moscow Maurice Torez State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages, has been working in the Foreign Ministry system since 1973. Was counselor-envoy of the embassy in Spain, a Foreign Ministry expert, minister's aide, division head and chief of the Foreign Ministry General Secretariat, member of the Ministry Collegium (1989-1001). In 1991, he was appointed extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the USSR (of Russia as of 1992) to Spain.

Aleksandr Nikolayevich Panov, born in 1944. Diplomatic rank—extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador. Graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, candidate of historical sciences. He has been working with the Foreign Ministry system since 1968: first at the embassy in Japan, from 1997; at the USSR permanent mission with the United Nations, from 1983; and at the embassy in Tokyo again. In 1988-1990, he was a Foreign Ministry apparatus staffer, and as of 1992 the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of Russia to the Republic of Korea.

'Text' of Edict on Federal Restructuring

LD1001161894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1406 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, 10 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has today issued an edict: On the structure of the federal bodies of executive authority. The text of the edict follows:

On the structure of the federal bodies of executive authority, in connection with the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and with the object of regulating the structures of the federal bodies of executive authority, I decree:

1. To adopt the following structure of the federal bodies of executive authority.

2. To establish that the state committees of the Russian Federation enjoy equal status.

To establish that the federal bodies of executive authority are subordinate to the Government of the Russian Federation, excluding cases when this is guaranteed by the constitutional powers of the president of the Russian Federation or bodies subordinate to the president of the Russian Federation in accordance with the legislative acts of the Russian Federation.

3. To transform:

The Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation into the Ministry of Health and Medical Industry of the Russian Federation;

The Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation into the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of the Russian Federation;

The State Committee for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of the Aftermath of Natural Disasters of the Russian Federation into the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of the Aftermath of Natural Disasters of the Russian Federation;

The State Committee of the Russian Federation for Economic Cooperation with Member States of the Commonwealth into the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Cooperation with Member States of the Community of Independent States.

4. To eliminate the federal bodies of executive authority within the jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian Federation and not included in the structure of federal bodies of executive authority confirmed by the present edict.

5. The Government of the Russian Federation must:

within two weeks confirm in accordance with Point Four of the present edict the compositions of the eliminated commissions and resolve the question of the expenditure connected with carrying out the elimination procedures;

within a month resolve the question of the property of the federal bodies of executive authority that are being eliminated;

and within three months complete the elimination procedures.

6. To transfer the functions:

of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Machine-Building and Servicing Maintenance of Agriculture to the Committee of the Russian Federation for Machine-Building;

of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Social Support of Citizens and the Rehabilitation of Territories that have Suffered from Chernobyl and Other Radiation Catastrophes, and of the Committee for Conducting Special Underwater Operations attached to the Government of the Russian Federation, to the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Matters of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Dealing with the Consequences of Natural Disasters;

of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Federation and Nationalities Affairs, and of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Social and Economic Development of the North, to the newly formed Ministry of the Russian Federation for Nationalities Affairs and Regional Policy;

of the Committee of the Russian Federation for Youth Affairs, the Committee of the Russian Federation for Tourism and the Committee of the Russian Federation for Physical Culture, to the newly formed Committee of the Russian Federation for Youth Affairs, Physical Culture, and Tourism;

of the Russian Federation Committee on Computerization to the Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technical Policy;

of the Russian Federation Committee for Municipal Economy to the Russian Federation State Committee on Questions of Architecture and Construction;

of the Russian Federation Committee on Food and Processing Industry to the Russian Federation Ministry of Agriculture and Food;

of the Russian Federation Committee on Price Policy to the Russian Federation Economics Ministry.

The Russian Government should within two weeks solve the issue of the functions of other bodies which are being eliminated and are not mentioned in this clause.

7. To put:

the Russian federal aerospace research and rescue service under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation Ministry on Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Recovery From Natural Disasters having transformed it into a state institution under the ministry;

the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and to transform it into a state institution under the ministry;

the Russian Association of Information Resources for Scientific and Technical Development under the

Council of Ministers—Government of the Russian Federation under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technical Policy and to transform it into the Russian Association of Information Resources for Scientific and Technical Development.

8. The Russian Federation Government:

should bring the functions of the federal bodies of executive authority in line with the Russian Federation Constitution, federal laws, and this edict, paying prime attention to how the Russian Federation Government and these bodies will interact with the Russian Federation Federal Assembly and the Security Council, as well as to how to demarcate the powers of the federal bodies of executive authority and the bodies of executive authority of the subjects of the Federation;

Within one month the maximum number of workers in the central apparatus of the federal bodies of executive power, the pay fund and other conditions of ensuring the activity of these bodies and their workers are to be determined in line with the requirements of economizing state funds and the need to reduce the overall number of workers in the central apparatus of the federal bodies of executive power; and the civil servants being released are to be ensured the guarantees provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation.

9. It is to be established that the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation has four deputies including two first deputies.

10. The chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation is within one week to submit proposals on the candidatures of the first deputy chairmen and deputy chairmen of the Government of the Russian Federation and the federal ministers.

11. The Government of the Russian Federation:

Is to immediately submit to the Federal Assembly proposals on amending the legislative acts of the Russian Federation for the purpose of transforming the state committees of the Russian Federation into different federal bodies of executive power;

And is within one month to bring the previously passed decisions into line with the present edict.

12. This edict comes into force from the moment it is published.

Structure of the federal bodies of executive power

1. Government of the Russian Federation

Federal bodies of executive power

1. Federal Ministries

Ministry of Fuel and Power Engineering of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Science and Technology Policy of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Agriculture and Food of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Health and the Medical Industry of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Communications of the Russian Federation

Ministry of the Russian Federation for Cooperation with the Member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Ministry of Social Welfare of the Population of the Russian Federation

Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs of Nationalities and Regional Policy

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation

Ministry of Labor of the Russian Federation

Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Natural Disasters

Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy

2. Other Federal executive bodies power

State Committee of the Russian Federation for Architecture and Construction

State Committee of the Russian Federation on Anti-Monopoly Policy and Support for the New Economic Structures

State Committee of the Russian Federation for Higher Education

Committee of the Russian Federation for Trade

Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves

State Committee of the Russian Federation for Industrial Policy

State Committee of the Russian Federation for Management of State Property

State Committee for Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision of the Russian Federation

Committee of the Russian Federation for Land Resources and Land Management

Main Directorate for the Protection of the Russian Federation

State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Defense Industry

State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation

Committee of the Russian Federation for Youth Affairs, Physical Culture, and Tourism

Committee of the Russian Federation for Geology and Mineral Resources

Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation

Committee of the Russian Federation for Metallurgy
 State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation
 Committee of the Russian Federation for Cinematography
 Committee of the Russian Federation for Fisheries
 Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information [FAPSI]
 Committee of the Russian Federation for Machine Building
 State Tax Service of the Russian Federation
 Committee of the Russian Federation for the Press
 Russian Federal Geodesic and Cartographic Service
 Federal Border Service—High Command of the Border Troops of the Russian Federation
 Committee of the Russian Federation for the Chemical and Petrochemical Industry
 Tax Police Department of the Russian Federation
 Committee of the Russian Federation for Patents and Trademarks
 Committee of the Russian Federation for Water Resources
 Federal Counter Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation
 Committee of the Russian Federation for Standardization, Metrology, and Certification
 Russian Federal Currency and Export Control Service
 Russian Federal Migration Service
 Russian Federal Service on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control
 Russian Federal Mining and Industrial Inspectorate
 Russian Space Agency
 Committee of the Russian Federation for Precious Metals and Precious Stones
 Russian Federal Employment Service
 Russian Federal Forestry Service
 Russian Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Inspectorate
 Russian Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service
 Russian Federal Service for the Supervision of Insurance Activity
 Russian State Archive Service

Supreme Attestation Committee of the Russian Federation
 Federal executive bodies under the President of the Russian Federation on issues for which he is responsible under the Constitution of the Russian Federation or in accordance with acts of legislation of the Russian Federation.

Shakhray Comments

LD1001210294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1929 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Russian Vice Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray believes that the presidential decree "On the structure of the federal bodies of executive power" was influenced by the following three factors: the political situation, adoption of the new constitution and the state of economy. In an interview with Interfax today, he pointed out that he listed the reasons for the decree in the descending order.

Shakhray declined to comment on individual provisions of the document, though pointing out that "this seems to be a fourth reshuffle of the government." He supposed that if they left more than one vice prime minister in the government, there will be more of them in future (according to a presidential decree, the prime minister shall have four vice prime ministers, two of them being first vice prime ministers - Interfax note.)

Shakhray said he had not received a proposal to chair the ministry for federation affairs and regional policies designed to replace the State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs he chairs now.

'Main Task' of New Counterintelligence Service Viewed

LD1001183494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1617 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By CRIME-PRESS correspondents Sergey Oleynik and Vladimir Taranov]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 10 Jan—The main task of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS], set up by a presidential edict to replace the former Security Ministry, is to prevent foreign special services from carrying out subversive activity against Russia. [passage omitted]

A number of subunits of the [former] Security Ministry have been transferred to the Federal Agency for Government Communications and to the directorate for protection of the government.

Unlike the Security Ministry, which was subordinated to both the president and the government, the FCS is subordinated directly to the Russian president.

A special attestation commission now working in the FCS will spend one month reassessing staff, Sergey Stepashin [deputy FCS director] said. The central apparatus will be reduced from 3,500 to 1,500 employees. Sergey Stepashin said that, in a conversation with him, Yeltsin asked not for purges during the reorganization process but for selection of staff on the basis of professionalism, loyalty, and willingness to serve the country and state. Staff members who do not pass the attestation will not end up without a job, Sergey Stepashin said, but will be able to transfer to the Interior Ministry, the tax inspectorate or the general procuracy.

Official Explains Role

LD1001171994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1702 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By CRIME-PRESS correspondent Sergey Oleynik—tass]

[Text] Moscow January 10 TASS—The staff of the central Moscow headquarters of the Russian Counterintelligence Service will be reduced by more than a half and will go down from 3,500 to 1,500 officers, first

deputy director of the service Sergey Stepashin told a press conference on Monday.

Earlier spokesman of the service Aleksey Kondaurov told TASS that the total number of Russian counterintelligence officers will amount to 75,000 which is 46 per cent less than before the former Security Ministry was transformed into the Federal Counterintelligence Service.

Stepashin said that besides counterintelligence tasks, his service will, jointly with the Interior Ministry, fight political terrorism.

"The president, the government and the parliament have to know what's happening in the country. It is necessary to predict also situations connected with political terrorism, other actions aimed to overthrow the constitutional system", he said.

This task will be partially solved by the Interior Ministry and partially by the counterintelligence service, he added.

The main objective of the counterintelligence service, which directly reports to the president, is to cut short foreign spying and subversive activities against Russia, according to Stepashin.

The service will have a department of counterintelligence operations, of counterintelligence provision for strategic objects, of military and economic counterintelligence.

At the same time the former Security Ministry anti-organised crime department was transferred to the Interior Ministry, while the investigation department became a part of the office of the Russian prosecutor general. The former KGB investigation prison in Lefortovo was also transferred to the Interior Ministry. The counterintelligence service, in its turn, may get the "Alpha" and "Vimpel" commando units.

Officials Hold News Conference

PM1001163994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 94 p 1

[Vasily Fatigarov report: "Russia's Counterintelligence—Special Service Without Investigative Functions and Lefortovo"]

[Text] A press conference, timed to coincide with the creation of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS], was held in Moscow yesterday. Taking part in it were Sergey Stepashin, first deputy director of the FCS, and Yuriy Baturin, assistant to the president of the Russian Federation for national security.

Henceforth the FCS, in terms of both its structure and its purpose, will be a special service which will in no way mirror the former Ministry of Security. In Sergey Stepashin's opinion, "all prerequisites for the revival of political surveillance have been destroyed." The new service

is intended only to expose and terminate operations by foreign special services against the Russian Federation and "to acquire information about threats to our country's security." It is also tasked with waging a struggle against terrorism, the imports of weapons and drugs, and the struggle against illegal armed formations. Despite the fact that the Border Guard Troops have evolved into an autonomous service, the FCS will continue to provide counterintelligence backup for the effective protection of Russia's state borders.

Although the FCS is the successor of the former Ministry of Security, it will henceforth be subordinate only to the president. The service has parted with its Investigations Directorate, having transferred its establishment to the General Prosecutor's Office. And the notorious Lefortovo prison has been transferred to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. Nonetheless, the former Ministry of Security's operational and technical services remain under the FCS. The question about transferring the "Alpha" and "Vimpel" special subunits to the FCS has not been raised yet.

According to Stepashin, the FCS's creation became necessary in light of the growing corruption within power structures, the stepped up activity of foreign special services from both nearby and distant foreign countries, and the attempts to recruit state apparatus officials. Last year alone, 20 persons were sentenced for espionage against Russia.

The press conference participants also dwelled on the problems of social protection for FCS military personnel. Former Ministry of Security staffers who have failed the certification process can either transfer to other state structures or take retirement with all statutory benefits.

Cutbacks in the FCS's numerical strength have affected primarily the central apparatus. Whereas the service as a whole will be 46 percent smaller than the former Russian Federation Ministry of Security, the center will employ only 1,500 instead of 3,500 staffers. Cutbacks apply primarily to backup and management structures, rather than to operational structures.

Yeltsin Edict on Counterintelligence Service

PM1001154394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Jan 94 First Edition p 5

[Edict No. 19 of the president of the Russian Federation, signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin and dated Moscow, The Kremlin, 5 January 1994: "On Ratifying the Statute of the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] In connection with the formation of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] of the Russian Federation, I decree:

1. To ratify the appended Statute of the FCS of the Russian Federation.

2. To permit the director of the FCS of the Russian Federation to have five deputy directors of the FCS of the Russian Federation, including one first deputy director and one deputy director—chief of the FCS of the Russian Federation Directorate for Moscow City and Moscow Oblast. A collegium comprising 11 persons is to be formed as part of the FCS of the Russian Federation.

The numerical strength of officials in the management apparatus of the FCS of the Russian Federation is to be set at 1,500.

3. To set the numerical strength of military and civilian personnel of Russian Federation counterintelligence organs at 75,000 (not including the numerical strength of workers at scientific research and military medical subdivisions and institutions or personnel employed on the utilization, protection, and servicing of service buildings and premises).

5. To permit the director of the FCS of the Russian Federation to introduce amendments to the structure of the FCS of the Russian Federation taking into account edicts and directives of the president of the Russian Federation within the limits of the set numerical strength of military and civilian personnel and the budget appropriations assigned to it.

5. The FCS of the Russian Federation is to bring departmental normative acts in line with the Statute ratified by this edict.

6. Edict No. 42 of the president of the Russian Federation of 24 January 1992 "On Forming the Russian Federation Ministry of Security" and subsequent amendments thereto are hereby declared no longer in force.

7. This edict comes into force from the moment of its signing.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] Moscow, The Kremlin, 5 January 1994

National Security Aide Baturin Interviewed

PM1101103194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

[Leonid Nikitinskiy report on interview with Yuriy Baturin, newly appointed assistant to the president for national security; place and date not given: "The Most Secure of the President's Assistants"]

[Text] The appointment of Yuriy Baturin, assistant to the president for legal affairs, to the specially instituted position of assistant to the president for national security created a sensation just before Christmas. Only time will tell whether this event will turn out to be a Christmas gift to the country, but for now this is what Yuriy Baturin told IZVESTIYA's correspondent about the circumstances surrounding his appointment to the new position.

President Yeltsin telephoned Baturin in his Kremlin office 5 January and said, according to Baturin, literally the following: "I have come to the conclusion that it would be right for the president to have an assistant for national security. I would like you to be this assistant."

Doctor of Juridical Sciences Yuriy Baturin was offered his former position in the president's administration in April 1993 and had almost two months to think it over and accept, with his formal appointment coming on 2 June 1993. But the tone in which the president's new request was couched ruled out any delays and Baturin agreed immediately. Being no doubt in possession of much more extensive information than he can reveal today, Baturin realized at that moment the precise nature of the danger threatening the president, the state, and Russia, the diverse interconnections, and the reason why a certain role in preventing this danger was being assigned by Boris Yeltsin precisely to him.

When describing Yuriy Baturin it is evidently necessary to dwell primarily not on his businesslike qualities, no matter how high they might be, but on his personal qualities. Being in many regards an "outsider" in the president's administration and a highly obstinate person who only superficially accepts the apparatus rules in operation there, Yuriy Baturin has nonetheless succeeded in integrating within the presidential apparatus, primarily due to the fact that he lacks personal political ambitions (his ambitions lie in some different sphere). He has the rare ability to abandon his personal motivation outside the offices he has occupied and, thanks to this, many people both in Yeltsin's apparatus and in Gorbachev's apparatus earlier on have found him to be an obstacle that is difficult to surmount, rather than a rival in the struggle for power and influence.

Baturin asked just one question during his 5 January telephone conversation with Yeltsin: Would he be able to carry on performing his duties as assistant to the president for legal affairs? The president replied that the nature and volume of his new duties would hardly allow him to physically cope with that, although there are no objections at all in principle to Baturin continuing to assist the president also in the sphere of his legal policy. A new assistant will evidently be appointed to replace him, someone from among a number of qualified jurists whom Baturin himself would be able to nominate, although the final choice will rest with the president.

During his conversation with IZVESTIYA's correspondent, Yuriy Baturin refused to offer an exhaustive definition (not even a list of general functions) of the extremely broad term "national security," claiming that it would be more appropriate to do so not in a newspaper interview but in the concept of national security which ought to be elaborated on a priority basis with his participation, but the principles and details thereof have not yet been coordinated with the president.

His appointment to the new position came as a complete surprise to Baturin and to everyone else, as did the

earlier edict disbanding the Ministry of Security, which the former assistant to the president for legal affairs saw only after it had been signed. But, since the end of December, on Yeltsin's instructions, and in his former capacity, he has been taking part in elaborating the Statute of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] jointly with the former leadership of the Ministry of Security, reported to the president on this matter, and the latter was evidently pleased with it. His practical experience of work with security organs is evidently limited to this.

Already exercising his new powers as assistant to the president for national security (incidentally, he is the only one of the president's assistants whose range of duties is enshrined in an official description of his office), during the Christmas holidays Yuriy Baturin met with FCS Head Nikolay Golushko and his first deputy Sergey Stepashin, and had a separate meeting with Colonel General Nikolayev, chief of the Federal Border Service.

Baturin will evidently have meetings in the very near future with the leadership of the Army, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the Foreign Intelligence Service, and other structures which are conventionally described as "power structures." The separation of powers with the Security Council, which will continue to function under the president, is being clarified. According to Baturin, his appointment has not resulted in any changes regarding the future of leaders of the Presidential Protection Directorate, which has recently expanded its activity beyond the limits of strictly ensuring his personal protection right up to the setting up of its own analysis subunits.

Answering a question about the way his new activity fits in with his former beliefs, Baturin replied that he does not intend to "convert" and adapt his well-known and firmly held legal beliefs to some new tune. Especially since the law offers the basic system of security for citizens and the state alike. But the special services, whose activities will henceforth be in his charge, by their very nature operate in conditions of extreme necessity—so who but a legal expert is best placed to define the criteria of such necessity and the limitations for any retreat from overall law and order permissible under extreme necessity, if it were to arise at all?

Yuriy Baturin evidently attaches priority importance in the sphere of national security to the creation of powerful analytical subunits which should, from this specific point of view, evaluate the objectives of the Russian state's national policy, including economic, legal, foreign, domestic, and regional state policy, as well as the means used to attain these objectives. Security primarily means the security of citizens, the president is perceived as the main guarantor of this security bearing total responsibility for it by virtue of his office, and state security is conceived in the key of the concept of a

rule-of-law state, in other words a state which attaches paramount importance to the interests of its citizens and not of its functionaries.

Burbulis on Split in Russia's Choice, Support for Yeltsin

LD1001202794 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1728 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1728 GMT on 10 January in a new, live program of news and analysis entitled "Details" [Podrobnosti], journalist Nikolay Svanidze interviewed Gennadiy Eduardovich Burbulis, of Russia's Choice. Svanidze opened the program by looking briefly at the immediate accommodation problems facing the new Federal Assembly over video of building work in progress. The interview was interspersed with brief voice excerpts over video of Chernomyrdin speaking on 5 January and of Yegor Gaydar speaking at today's press conference.

Svanidze began by asking Burbulis why the Russia's Choice faction left the talks over election of a parliamentary speaker.

Burbulis replied: "We realized that these talks had very little to do with the final results of electing a chairman. They were cunningly demonstrative and, moreover, the Russia's Choice bloc risked losing its political face which is something we cannot allow. We are very worried about the possible domination of parliament by two extremist political forces, namely the communist and national-fascist ones and we cannot be linked with decisions worked out hand-in-hand with them."

Svanidze then said: "I have learned that a split is developing in the Russia's Choice bloc, or rather has already developed. Incidentally, you were not there next to Gaydar today at the press conference, nor have you formally become one of the bloc's leaders and I have even learned from the lobbies that Andrey Makarov has sharply criticized Yegor Gaydar." Burbulis replied: "I think those observations are rather surface, superficial ones. We criticized not only Gaydar but also each other. Most importantly this partial assessment was needed to evaluate honestly the causes of the relative defeat that we suffered in the elections." Svanidze pressed him further: "If the criticism of Gaydar is connected with a search for reasons for the election defeat, then it would be logical to assume that you link this defeat with the name Gaydar?" Burbulis replied: "No it is not so simple, not so straightforward."

Asked whether the Russia's Choice faction should now lobby the present government, Burbulis said: "No I don't believe so and I think that it would be useful both for the government and for the country if our tactics were to draw a precise and clear distinction between those government actions and decisions which correspond to our notion of reform of the country's economy and those

which do not correspond to it at all but which manifest contrary interests and aims."

Svanidze inquired: "So you do not like being associated with the government?" to which Burbulis responded: "We do not like this and we made a serious mistake in the election campaign when we took on full responsibility for the actions of the government and our opponents readily exploited this."

Burbulis added that Russia's Choice would very much like to be able to coordinate its actions with the president, actively and constructively and asserted that "the country needs a new political culture, a culture of coalitional activity. This is required of the president, it is required of the government and it is required of all of us."

Asked whether now he personally regarded himself as Yeltsin's political supporter, Burbulis said: "To the extent that the president adopts decisions and acts while preserving the country's reformist, democratic future, yes I am Yeltsin's supporter. Where his actions do not correspond to that future and where they give rise to considerable problems and difficulties in the system of government, I cannot support him and I will not support him."

On Russia's Choice's attitude toward Zhirinovskiy, Burbulis had this to say: "Any political or ideological contacts with Zhirinovskiy and his grouping are totally unacceptable until an assessment, including a legal one, has been made of the obscurantism which he has offered the country today." He added: "Any compromises with the national-fascist ideology which threatens to appear and find a mouth-piece in parliament are totally unacceptable," but he accepted that his faction would have to find a way of working with other factions in parliament.

Officials View LDPR Success, Zhirinovskiy

LD1001185494

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1614 GMT on 10 January presents a program on Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) entitled "There Actually Is Such a Party" hosted by Sergey Torchinskiy. His studio guests are Zafar Maksudovich Fatkudinov, Academician at the Academy of Economy, Finances and Law, doctor of juridical sciences and a writer and Andrey Fedorovich Zavidiya, Chairman of the Galant company.

Asked to explain why he wanted to take part in the program, Zavidiya says: "Well, to be brief, there is currently too much noise around the LDPR's sensational victory at the parliamentary elections. As the main organizer of these victories, I bear my share of the responsibility for all the statements which Vladimir Volfovich subsequently made and that is why I am here: to debunk a myth, dispel some rumors and conjectures."

Zafar Fatkudinov explains that no single party was as skilled as the LDPR in capitalizing on people's fears, emotions and gut feelings, hence its electoral victory.

Andrey Zavidiya then says, "The point is that the LDPR's program and its rules are completely out of sync with Vladimir Volfovich statements." Zavidiya shows the viewers Zhirinovskiy's "The Last Push South" and the party's program, entitled "The Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union—Documents and Materials" and says that the party's program "is a fine program. I recall that when I paid for it, it was 26,000—the Zavidiya firm paid for the LDPR's program in 1991. Let me just remind you that I was, I am, and will remain a rank and file communist and that it is possible and desirable to cooperate, if not with everyone, then with the majority. I have practically no objections to this program and that is why I lent my support to the leader of the party whose program we intended to implement together. In particular, during the 1991 presidential elections we came third with him, in tandem with him and this was sensational. But the LDPR's program certainly fails to tally with Vladimir Volfovich current statements and that is why it is actually necessary to shed some light on this issue.

"That is to say that the program does not plan any pushes south, or any other direction, north, west or east. But in his book he does plan such pushes, going so far as to state that it would be no tragedy at all for a country like Turkey to vanish from the face of the Earth. These statements are very poor tactics, of course, and I am aware of my own personal guilt in the sense that this man has practically come to power and I am the main agent to have facilitated this and that is why I would like to take this opportunity to say that I am duty bound to apologize to the peoples and countries visited by Vladimir Volfovich where he was rude to their peoples and leaders".

Fatkudinov explains that the retaking of the Baltic states or the area of Alaska, as advocated by Zhirinovskiy, would entail rivers of blood, as was already once the case with Finland in 1940. Zhirinovskiy's adventures might lead to a nuclear holocaust, says Fatkudinov. People in the post-imperial Russia are very sensitive to the perceived suffering of their fellow countrymen elsewhere, but these issues are to be resolved by diplomacy and not tanks. No one has yet been able to recreate their own former empire and the way forward is to try and find room for refugees as was done successfully in Germany after the Second World War, says Fatkudinov, stressing that this is the only way to avoid bloodshed. Torchinskiy regrets that this was not spelled out during the election campaign and Fatkudinov agrees. The government must facilitate this expected influx of refugees and Zhirinovskiy's statements merely exacerbate the position of the Russophone population outside Russia.

Asked by Torchinskiy about the LDPR's economic program, Zavidiya replies that it owes a great deal to former Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, a personal friend.

Torchinskiy jokes about Zavidiya's self-proclaimed communist views and his position as Chairman of the Galant company which has 1,500 enterprises. Zavidiya goes on to say that the Galant company set up 3,500 organizing committees throughout the country and that they voted for him, rather than Zhirinovskiy who allegedly relegated his party list place from

Zavidiya says that his was "a decisive" contribution to the victory. "The point is—and we have had conversations with him on this—that generally speaking he senses that I am a more serious rival than he is himself at the future presidential elections in 1996."

Returning to the party's economic program, Zavidiya says that it revolves round the principle of mixed economy and the development of all forms of ownership. Fatkudinov derides Zhirinovskiy's reckless promises to improve the lot of all and sundry immediately. He finds particularly objectionable Zhirinovskiy's notions of fighting crime: Execute them on the spot. We've been there once, recalls Fatkudinov. Zavidiya adds that many people expected Zhirinovskiy to step down from his party chairmanship following the victory and to concentrate on being a deputy in the Duma. Torchinskiy then goes on to ask: "Many materials appear in the press to the effect that the appearance of the LDPR was provoked by the CPSU, the then CPSU leadership, of course and by the KGB."

Zavidiya replies: "I categorically disagree with this, for the simple reason that I first made my acquaintance with Vladimir Volfovich during the events marking the anniversary of the October Revolution on 6 November 1990. It was also there that I met Boris Nikolayevich. I personally gave my visiting card to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and to Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy, during the celebrations of the October Revolution anniversary in the Kremlin. Boris Nikolayevich did not telephone me, but Vladimir Volfovich did. We met and began to cooperate. The first thing he said was: Andrey Fedorovich, how can the program, already being printed, be paid for? I said it would have to be looked at. I mean he gave me, he showed me their program, I saw that it was a normal program pure and simple and paid for it—26,000 rubles all in all, I paid for the whole program. I also paid 10,000 for his posters—10,000 for his posters and not a single kopeck more was handed over personally or otherwise. As for the election campaign in Russian, I paid for my travels with my own money."

Asked about other sources of financing, Zavidiya says: "I simply have no such information, but since he turned to me for such a trifle as 26,000 and 10,000—well, I do not know, if there were other sources of financing, surely he would not have turned to me for such trifles, but this is just what I think."

Asked about who defrayed Zhirinovskiy electoral expenses, Zavidiya says it was not his concern, for his organization worked for and voted for him and assured

him that they did not share Zhirinovskiy's views. Fatkudinov concludes his contribution to the program by quoting the Criminal Code which makes propaganda of war a crime punishable by imprisonment of between three and eight years. Zavidiya doubts that many people share such extreme views. The task of electoral victory was accomplished, but between 50 to 60 percent of those who voted are his supporters, now leaving the party, says Zavidiya: "The LDPR bloc will collapse in the nearest future, you will see that". Asked for his forecast for the future, Zavidiya says that Zhirinovskiy will desperately push for presidential elections in 1994—his last chance. He hopes there will be no such elections. Asked whether he would take part in a live TV debate with Zhirinovskiy, Zavidiya says he would be delighted to do so, it would be his wildest dreams come true, and that he is ready for this at any time.

Poll Shows 72 Percent Against Zhirinovskiy as Premier

LD1001155794 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1517 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Tamara Ivanova]

[Text] Moscow January 10 TASS—A total of 67 per cent of 1,223 respondents in a public opinion poll carried out by the Grigory Pashkov Service said Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party, will not keep his election pledges.

At the same time, one in ten believe he will.

Seventy two per cent of those polled said they would not like to see Zhirinovskiy as prime minister, while eight per cent are of the opposite opinion.

Kostikov Outlines 'Clean Russia' Principles

PM1101110794 Moscow *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian* 10 Jan 94 First Edition p 7

[Article by Vyacheslav Kostikov: "Outlines of a 'Clean Russia.' Law and Order Are Product of Mature Democracy and Legal and Everyday Standards, not Ideology"]

[Text] I remember that one of the most pleasant sensations of my childhood was the clatter of our yardwoman's broom. The windows of our old Moscow house looked out onto the streets and in the intervals between the thunder and squealing of the tram wheels turning the sharp corner at the church of Metropolitan Filipp, at number 2 Meshchanskaya Street, I could clearly hear this "whoosh," which I still remember, coming from the yardwoman's ancient broom. These sounds began at around 0500-0600 hours, that is when it was still dark in the winter, but when early in the morning the Moscow working people or we primary school children emerged from our homes the sidewalks were "scraped clean" and swept and in the summer were washed with water from a black hosepipe and in winter after snowfalls neat piles of snow rose up at the roadsides and were later taken

away into the yards in huge plywood crates with the most vigorous support from us small boys.

Today many people are inclined to idealize the order maintained on the streets and in the yards and doorways and to present it as a model of the "socialist way of life." Most of us probably remember how Moscow was ordered to be a model communist city and consequently the world's cleanest city. With the adroitness of communist propaganda and the vitality of Soviet myths this illusion of outward order fools many people. And there is nothing surprising in the fact that the party of the "communist broom" was very successful at the Federal Assembly elections.

The Communist Party and the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] as though in collusion both put forward the introduction of order as virtually their main election slogans while not, it is true, specifying how this would be achieved in reality: through rebukes from the "parteigenosse" at party meetings, with the aid of a radical GULAG or, even more radical, by means of a war against their own people, on which subject the leaders of the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks-CPSU have nothing to learn from anyone: They surpassed everyone in practice, beginning with the suppression of the Kronstadt and Tambov uprisings. Here the communist and national-socialist agitators "forget" to tell the population that order, legality, and cleanliness have existed in the majority of European cities for several centuries. That is, long before Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler tried to grace Russia and Germany with the theory and practice of social and racial cleansing.

Law and order are the product of mature democracy and legal and everyday standards, not ideology.

How to explain the popularity of slogans of order for Russia or the interest displayed by the public in the idea of a "clean Russia," if we are speaking of its more workaday transformation?

Probably by the fact that alongside civil rights, rights to education, medical services, freedom of religion, and others there is, without being described in law, citizens' right to order. If you talk of simple and clear elements in the people's life then the concepts of democracy and freedom as reflected in daily life are implemented through the order, calm, and cleanliness of urban and rural life. Cleanliness and order in the country begin with cleanliness in your own doorway, on your own threshold.

It is only in our politically unsettled times that we have to go to the polling stations several times a year. In countries with a stable democracy such an expensive "pleasure" is permitted only once every several years. It is we, concerned with repelling the ideologists and leaders of the communo-fascists, who are prepared to go to the barricades or meetings at the first call to defend our fragile democracy. In old Europe meetings and demonstrations take place with the strict observance of established regulations and under police guard. In our country abuse and obscenities against the president and

government are considered virtually to be in good taste for the newspapers which flaunt their new independence. A real democratic press knows how to say unpleasant things and even to cut into the flesh with the expertise of a skilled surgeon. During Watergate Richard Nixon was brought to political death not by the newspapers' unbridled statements but by professional journalists' painstaking work.

In a healthy society politics and the population do not notice each other, in the good sense of the word. The assembly bell should ring in exceptional cases and only when the people do indeed need to be pushed to accomplish something extraordinary.

One of the underlying reasons for the democrats' failure at the elections is the fact that neither the parties nor their leaders have the stomach or the ability to perform routine work for the sake of the genuine values of the state and the people. The aim of the election campaign was not to put forward ideas which could normalize Russia but to obtain deputies' seats and to win a successful percentage. Not a single one of the election blocs' programs essentially even mentioned how nationwide problems, as opposed to narrow party or group problems, would be resolved. The Agrarian Party of Russia quite frankly preached the conservation of the collective and state farm system in the interests of "soviet landowners"—the directors and chairmen of the state and collective farms. The "Civic Union" interpreted the interests of the "red directors." "Women of Russia" introduced its own "feminine" note to the chorus of demands made on the government. The communist party, having repealed the dictatorship of the proletariat for reasons of expediency, traded wholesale and retail in the specters of an equalizing social happiness.

The very concept of the "social state" stuck in the new Constitution sounds like the echo of communist ideology and essentially reflects the same party division in the face of the general and indivisible interests of all Russia and the entire people. It is merely through the inertia of Soviet thinking that it preserves the illusion of the possibility of preserving social peace by issuing unbacked loaves.

Yet the lack of uniting national-strategic political parameters that are clear to the people is extremely dangerous. The Federal Assembly, recruited on the basis of the party and leader [vozhd] principle, by virtue of this face alone is already programed for political and personal disputes. It is hard to believe that, counter to the Russians' hopes, it will be able to give an account of itself as the expresser and defender of the people's life. Russia's national, underlying interests could again be beyond the Federal Assembly's purview.

It could happen that a truly broad movement of the population for national normalization will be formed around a nonparliamentary figure and outside the Federal Assembly walls. Examples of such phenomena are known to history. There has been Gandhi and Gandhism

in India, Tolstoy and Tolstoyism in Russia, and the movement around Martin Luther King in the United States. There is the O. Palme phenomenon in the Scandinavian countries. A. Sakharov could have been such a figure in our country were it not for his untimely end.

Without underestimating the country's economic difficulties I should like to express the opinion that the main barrier complicating Russia's emergence onto a strategic expanse is the lack of a clearly formulated national goal brought to the awareness of every family and citizen. The absence of, if you like, a "Russian idea," a Russian goal and dream. And it is obvious that this aim is outside short-term politics and even outside the economy.

One reason for the democrats' defeat at the elections was that masses of the population did not want to identify themselves with any of the democratic parties or with any bloc. And it is not that the leaders or promises were bad but because not a single party was able to clearly disclose a uniting strategy.

Our new politicians argue intelligently about a collective approach [sobornost] and its benefits to the Russian man and state. They forget that for the overwhelming majority of peasants, workers, and housewives whom they want to tempt with a collective approach and great powerdom these words sound as absurd and incomprehensible as "Snickers" or the "Maastricht Treaty."

A person will understand that matters in our country have finally turned toward order not because he is given a correct explanation of how and why the White House was burned down and why a trial was needed of the State Committee for the State of Emergency and totalitarian ideology but only if his wife, daughter, and grandchildren are no longer afraid to leave the house after dark. Millions of people who suffered from the tyranny of the CPSU will only believe that the suppressed rebellion has saved us from the threat of a communist restoration if the lovers of red-brown sauce, sickles, hammers, and swastikas are firmly and clearly shown their place in society.

But if in our country punch-ups, drunkenness, car thefts, and fighting between racketeers continue on the streets even after the October events, if a month after the rebellion's leaders entered Lefortovo their lawyers are beginning shamelessly to demand that the president stand trial, if several weeks after the president's supporters were almost hanged on the Kremlin trees, the inflammatory newspaper DEN is again starting to be sold in Moscow, if after all that we learned of the National Salvation Front and of Anpilov and Anpilov's supporters and they have the impudence to apply to picket the new parliament... then that person, whom they want to lead by collective and great-power means toward democracy with a Russian face may quite justifiably send the democrats and democracy packing and demand a real dictator. Which in part is what happened 12 December.

The new parliament will probably be able to become a testing ground for running in and calibrating statesmen. For all the shortcomings already discerned in it, that will be its useful mission. Here they must not only be clearly aware that politicians' personal accounts far from always coincide with the nation's aspirations. Being a politician is always a profession with all its transient, often pleasant but, alas, short-lived attributes and gifts.

In connection with the possibility of the Federal Assembly's "self-disillusionment" in the very first months of its work, particular importance attaches to the Constitution which has been adopted. The development of the Constitution is of strategic importance to Russia. It reveals the democratic future of a single and indivisible Russia as the aim of national policy. In other words, for the first time in our state's history a general national uniting task has been set before Russia's people.

But the new Constitution, with enormous internal creative energy, is nonetheless a sleeping Ilya Muromets. This hero still has to be awoken and taught to walk and act. It would be naive to suppose that after 12 December there will be a miracle of Russian transformation. The great American constitution was adopted 200 years ago yet the American economic boom began only after World War II and without any direct link with the constitution. The constitution is only a "great promise."

And perhaps the most important thing which we must all understand is that the new Russian Constitution is not the truth, it is a path.

With the coordinated collaboration of the state and the democratic parties that path can be shortened. But only the united people themselves can plow the deep furrow of their own fate and implement it on the basis of the ideals of the Constitution.

I have already written about the idea of the "Clean Russia" movement. About the extra-party people's movement which would be based on Russia's nationwide aims. Of course it is not a case of revising the democratic idea of pluralism. The parties in a democratic society perform an essential role, ensuring the generation of competing ideas and the necessary level of critical control over the activity of the government, president, and other parties. But the actual principle of party-mindedness contains the idea of people's division on the basis of their interests: class, professional, corporate, social, and property interests. In addition the party is always a vehicle for moving toward power. And whether the leaders of the parties want it or not, even the most sincere of them are obliged, especially under crisis conditions, to subordinate their actions to the imperatives of the struggle for political survival. National aims proclaimed in the party programs are most often camouflage for the road leading not to the temple but to power.

The "Clean Russia" movement would not set itself power goals. It does not need deputies' seats or government posts. Its strength would lie in the moral solidarity of the entire population around a few goals determining

the health of the nation and the unity of the country. The instrument of the "Clean Russia" movement would be not violence but the voluntary donation of a small part of one's labor, a modest contribution, physical or moral participation. It would not be a movement of likeminded people. But people adhering to different views could unite for joint actions for Russia's benefit. I could cite as an example one of these nationwide goals.

The collapse of the USSR generated major migration movements. The Russian-speaking population is flowing out of nearly all the former USSR republics. In each specific case, for each family obliged to move away from their home and go out into the unknown it is a drama, often a tragedy.

Of course, one can see this problem in a political and propaganda focus. One can demand sanctions against the states which expel the Russians. One can push the Russians to resist. One can ultimately achieve certain concessions through the use of certain means. In the short term this policy and these tactics can bring short-term dividends for a party or leader who has declared himself the defender of the oppressed. But as a result of reciprocal national violence there can arise such a complex knot of contradictions and hatred that it cannot be unravelled without bloodshed.

There is another path. A nationwide program, based on all-Russian solidarity, for the Russians' return, to draw them inside Russian borders. We have tens and hundreds of cities and villages which were once declared "unpromising" and escheated. Yet Russian people lived for centuries in these cities and villages. They lived and worked, augmenting the country's wealth. Today these lands lie empty and the cities are going to ruin, degenerating demographically.

Russia has spent too generously on "developing" adjacent lands, exerting itself immoderately, tearing its own umbilical cord. Dozens of cities, plants, factories, and airfields constructed by the genius of the Russian mind and the skill of Russian hands, when union property was shared out made us the hostages of alien intentions, the victims of national improvidence. We are already being blackmailed with the technological and cultural munificence we ourselves bestowed. Russia gave primers to many peoples who did not even have their own written language and now they are trying to teach us, the heirs of Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Dostoyevskiy, they are trying to teach us "human rights" on the basis of these primers.

Russia does not need other people's resources. But we must distribute our own resources in the manner which is customary in a healthy family: first to our own children, elderly parents, and our own orphans, and then (if the granaries are not empty) to close and remote neighbors.

The "Clean Russia" ideas are based not on racism but on a normal and healthy feeling of national patriotism. Someone who does not know how to provide a sufficiency in his own home is useless to his neighbors. We

must equip and sweep clean our own house and only then speak of the concepts of humanism for all mankind.

Here the Russian people, the Russians must pose least of all in the guise of some kind of ideal and model and least of all surrender to the messianic temptations of the "third Rome" ideology. We have no grounds for this. We must simply reach the level of other peoples who have learned to live normal human lives under the conditions of democracy.

For this discipline is needed. The discipline of the nation and of each person. We must rid ourselves of laxity in work and daily life. We must introduce normal models of labor discipline and conduct into society. So that it is clear to everyone where the permissible limit of "naughtiness" ends and where hooliganism begins, where there is normal festive drinking and where it turns into drunkenness, boorishness, and lack of labor discipline. Today these borderlines are eroded in our country. In our country people can ridicule a teetotaler, a man who speaks in a literary Russian language, an educated man, and softheartedly take pity on a drunkard and idler known to everyone in the apartment block. A dangerous distortion of the concepts of good and bad has occurred in society. A foul-mouthed idler drinking with the foreman at the plant in our country often passes as a "great guy." An overt criminal passes for a resourceful businessman. We have become accustomed to the shameful filth of our doorways, muck on the streets, and bureaucrats' bribe-taking and arrogance. We have gotten out of the habit of walking normally and dressing normally. Often not even because of poverty but because of the primitive nature of our taste and education.

And at the same time these are Russian citizens or ethnic Russians [russkiye ili rossiyanye]. The task of the "Clean Russia" movement is to return to them their human dignity or at least not to allow them to defile the lives of their own children.

We do not need much money for that.

We need powerful and coordinated work by all the mass media interested in the country's upsurge.

I do not remember whose idea it was that to encourage a people to rise up they must be aware of the degree to which they have fallen. In my opinion we are close to that. Today many people in our country are speaking and writing about patriotism. The false monopoly of the Communists and national socialists on love for the Fatherland is being broken. Democratic writers and journalists are speaking seriously and profoundly about patriotism. Patriotic impulses are emanating from the Russian president.

But today it is important to take the next step. To switch from agitation and competition in patriotism to action. It is important to transfer the concept and expression of patriotism to the plane of routine, daily life. It is not every day and every year (fortunately) that society requires lofty sacrificial patriotism, examples of which

were given to us by the Great Patriotic War. Patriotism and love for the Fatherland in everyday life can most often be displayed in the unremarkable actions about which no one will write in the newspapers.

If instead of being in the habit of cursing the Moscow city hall for badly cleaned streets several apartment block residents were to go out onto their own doorway with brooms and shovels after a heavy snowfall that would be a small step toward a "Clean Russia" (someone would probably ridicule it to start with). If in a small provincial city a few intellectual and educated people were to organize lectures on linguistic standards that would be a small exploit in the name of Russian culture. If through our collective protests (not political protests, with no banners or raised fists, but through peaceful civic means) we were to get television to observe a ban on the advertising of alcohol and tobacco, that would mean that the "Clean Russia" movement had begun to exist in reality. If together with the church we were to ensure that it is not the funeral mafia which runs the cemeteries but that normal, honest people work there, that would be a small step toward returning the nation's dignity.

"Clean Russia" is not a fantasy, not mythmaking. It is a feasible reality precisely because it calls people not to exploits, not to sacrifice, but to the display of humanness and discipline in the simplest circumstances of daily life. If there are millions of us, Russia will be transformed.

Decree Issued on Backup for Science Centers

PM1101101994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Jan 94 p 4

[Decree No. 1347 of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government "On Priority Measures To Guarantee the Activity of Russian Federation State Scientific Centers," signed by O. Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, and dated Moscow, 25 December 1993]

[Text] In compliance with the Russian Federation president's Edict No. 939 of 22 June 1993 "On Russian Federation State Scientific Centers," the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decrees:

1. Scientific enterprises, institutions, and organizations and higher educational establishments which have been given the status of a state scientific center (hereinafter called a center) are deemed scientific facilities of federal status with special forms of state support and backup for their activity.

2. A center's activity is carried out in accordance with work programs approved by the interested ministry (department) and coordinated with the Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technical Policy, and is defined by the statutes on the conditions of state support of a center.

The draft statutes on conditions of state support of a center are elaborated by the scientific enterprise, institution, or organization or higher educational establishment which has been given the status of a center, are coordinated with the Ministry of Science and Technical Policy and other interested ministries and departments, and are to be submitted to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government for approval.

3. A change in a center's organizational-legal form and form of ownership can be effected in accordance with Russian Federation legislation by agreement with the Interdepartmental Coordinating Commission for Scientific and Technical Policy.

4. The Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technical Policy carries out targeted funding of the programs and work undertaken by centers.

The financial resources allocated are channeled into:

carrying out basic, exploratory, research and development, technological, and other research work;

the upkeep and development of the scientific-research and experimental and testing facilities, renewing fixed productive capital, and ensuring the maintenance and normal operating conditions of centers' existing testing, metrological, and production facilities;

information backup, including the acquisition of scientific and technical literature, including foreign literature, and into utilizing electronic information networks, including international ones;

training and retraining highly-skilled scientific cadres, except that being carried out by higher educational establishments;

participating in international scientific and technical cooperation.

5. It is prescribed that employees of centers which are budget-financed institutions (organizations) are paid under the procedure and at the rates stipulated by the Russian Federation Government Decree No. 785 of 14 October 1992 "On Differentiation in Levels of Payment for the Labor of Workers in the Budget-Financed Sphere Based on the Uniform Wages Network."

6. When funding centers' work programs through the Russian Federation republic budget, the Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technical Policy is to increase the envisaged wages fund—within the limits of these resources—by 50 percent in order to increase the wages of certain highly-skilled employees.

7. Centers which are budget-financed institutions (organizations) are permitted, by agreement with the Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technical Policy, to carry out autonomous economic activity with the aim of utilizing spare production capacities and in order to

enhance the proficiency of cadres of industrial enterprises' and scientific organizations' leaders and specialists.

8. The charges for centers to use in their names the words "Russia," "Russian Federation," and words and word combinations formed on the basis of these are reduced by 50 percent.

9. The executive branch organs of republics comprising the Russian Federation, krais, oblast, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg are instructed to prescribe for centers preferential tariffs for electricity and heating, as well as for water consumption and water disposal.

10. The results of research and studies carried out by centers using budget appropriations are federal property.

11. State property transferred to centers under the procedure prescribed by Russian Federation legislation is exclusively federal property and cannot be leased, deemed as counting toward incorporation capital, or be mortgaged.

12. Deliveries to a center of products and goods needed to solve the tasks for which it is responsible are included in the products and goods delivered for state needs under the procedure stipulated by Russian Federation legislation.

13. According to Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technical Policy proposals the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy is to provide for the priority allocation of centralized capital investment for Russian Federation state scientific centers under a separate heading as part of the funding of state programs and investment.

14. The Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technical Policy is to organize the keeping of a register of Russian Federation state scientific centers.

[Signed] O. Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government

Economic Issues

Former Minister Denies Economy Beginning To Stabilize

LD1001162394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1442 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Sergey Glazyev, former Russian minister of foreign economic relations, has denied assertions that economic stabilization has begun in Russia.

The "chaotic disintegration" of the economy may continue for a long time to come, he told a conference in Moscow on Monday [10 January].

Glazyev listed what, in his view, are the essential measures to stabilize the economy. The main step is to

restore the controlled public sector, namely a network of state-owned enterprises, he said.

Another important measure is stimulation of "vertical reintegration" and creation of "large vertical corporations." The restrictions on the merger of enterprises and the absorption of one enterprise by another must be lifted, Glazyev believes. Creation of corporations—state, private and mixed ones alike—should be encouraged, he said. "One of the main destabilizing factors" in the economy is the implementation of the government program of privatization, which "is leading to the severing of economic links," he said.

State control of natural resources should be restored, for that could also play an important stabilizing role, Glazyev believes. No less important, in his opinion, would be tight control over the use by enterprises of the funds they receive for the maintenance and renovation of their equipment. Today such money is often spent on wages, he said.

In general, it is efficient microeconomic ties that would provide the basis for stabilization, Glazyev said. "We do not reject macroeconomic stabilization, but we believe it is insufficient," he said.

Statistics Committee Presents Economic Report for 1993

LD1001184094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1746 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Russia's economic performance in 1993 has proved much less impressive than the government's economic forecast made at the end of 1992.

The gross domestic product diminished by 12 percent, and, compared to 1991, by 29 percent.

Experts of the independent research center Macroecon-Link note in this connection that in October 1992 the Economics Ministry predicted a 5-8 percent decrease. The rate of the reduction of Russia's gross domestic product has outstripped the same index in the U.S. during the great depression (38 percent compared to 30 percent in the U.S. from 1930 to 1933).

In 1993, the volume of industrial production dropped by 16 percent, which is slightly down from the 1992 index of 18 percent.

The aggregate price index grew 10 times (in 1992 - 26 times), while the average salary increased 8 times.

Last year, Russia manufactured 6 percent less electric energy than in 1992, 12 percent less oil, 4 percent less gas and 10 percent less coal.

The production of steel dropped by 13 percent, tractors - 35 percent, harvesters - 43 percent, cement - 18 percent, fabrics - 26 percent, meat - 14 percent, milk - 17 percent and sugar - 5 percent. The crop of grain amounted to 99 Mn tons compared to 107 Mn tons in 1992.

Manufacture of refrigerators increased by 10 percent, TV sets by 9 percent and vegetable oil by 14 percent.

Russia's foreign trade turnover amounted to \$76 Bn. The exports grew by 13 percent to \$ 45.9 Bn, including the export of oil by 21 percent, gas - 3 percent and timber - 3 percent.

The value of Russia's imports was over \$30 Bn, which is 15 percent less than in 1992. Grain imports did not exceed 11 Mn tons, which is 62 percent less than in 1992.

Economic Security Meeting Studies Issues

LD1001213994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1715 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Jan—The first session of the inter-departmental commission of the Russian Security Council for economic security took place today. By decree of the Russian president, Andrey Zverev, head of the economic department of the Russian Federation governmental apparatus, has been appointed the commission's chairman. Questions connected with working out a state doctrine of economic security, the progress of the economic reforms in the country, and other matters were examined.

Heads of ministries and departments reelected in the commission took part in the session.

Potential Role of Free Economic Zones Viewed

PM1001160594 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Ryzhov, chief of the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development administration for the development of free economic zones, investment programs, and resources: "Free Economic Zones: When Will They Start Operating?"]

[Text] Some 14 free economic zones [FEZ's] have now been established in Russia. Most of them were announced in 1990-1991. It was then that 12 FEZ's appeared at once. Most of them covered the territories of entire oblasts, such as Chita, Kemerovo, Kaliningrad, Sakhalin, and others, but none of them, even such a promising zone as "Nakhodka," is actually in operation, and there are objective reasons for this.

For instance, when preferential economic and legal status was granted to territories that in many cases are bigger than some European countries, the state's actual economic potential was not taken into account. World experience was also ignored. It shows that countries spend \$20-70 million per square kilometer of FEZ to provide all the facilities. The state's greatest outlay is at the initial stage, the establishment of the production infrastructure, in which the foreign investor avoids investing. The "Dauria" FEZ in Chita Oblast alone

covers an area of more than 431,000 square km. Moreover, in such "superzones" it is virtually impossible to ensure proper monitoring of the implementation of the special customs and currency rules. And these are key elements of the FEZ economic mechanism. No wonder, then, that in the course of further changes to the existing legislation on the zones the main concessions, including tax concessions, were abolished.

So the FEZ question remains open: Formally they exist, but in practice they do not operate. In our view, the lack of a realistic idea of the purpose and potential of the FEZ's and of a cogent blueprint and program for their creation were largely responsible for this. Many regions thought, indeed in some cases believe even now that the zones are a kind of panacea, particularly in the socioeconomic sphere. In fact, they are just one factor in the development and functioning of the market mechanism. Their main role is to boost foreign economic activity and expand export production by bringing in foreign and Russian investments, advanced technology, equipment, and managerial experience. Only after they have been formed and developed, which will take years, can the zones have a modernizing effect on the local economy.

And, as world experience shows, the crucial factors in successful FEZ development are a convenient and advantageous economic and geographic position, the presence of the requisite production, transport, and business infrastructure and manpower reserves in the region, and favorable opportunities for conducting foreign economic activities. It is also extremely important that foreign investors should be interested in investing capital in this particular region.

Of course, as was mentioned before, you have to weigh up very carefully how big the FEZ should be. For instance, the world's first and one of the most efficiently operating export production zones is in the vicinity of Shannon International Airport in Ireland. Originally it occupied 10 hectares. Or take the "Masan" FEZ in South Korea. It occupies less than one square kilometer, yet it provides export products worth around \$2 billion per year. Foreign experts recommend limiting the size of FEZ's to 140-160 hectares, at least at the initial stage.

Of course, there is also the experience of the relatively large Chinese special economic zone, but it is highly specific and has not spread elsewhere either in China itself or in the world as a whole. The socioeconomic conditions in the PRC were different from those in Russia. One very important purpose behind the creation of these zones was to "test" the market management mechanisms for subsequent introduction into the planned socialist economy. The fact that they were orientated toward political as well as economic results is also of considerable importance. Their very location was obviously geared to the businessmen of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. It is no accident that the bulk of foreign investments in them comes from foreign businessmen of Chinese extraction, primarily from Hong Kong.

It is indicative that export production in these zones is, as a rule, low-technology. The proportion of products for export is not great enough either. At the same time, wide use is made of imported raw materials. The FEZ's did not obtain a positive balance of payments until 1990; that is, 10 years and more after they were founded.

Certainly the Chinese example shows many clearly positive results, but we are talking here only about choosing the most effective way forward. Incidentally, the compact economic and technical development zones created in a number of "open" PRC coastal cities, similar to the "classic" export production zones, have demonstrated a much greater ability to actively involve foreign capital in the retooling of industry.

So what kind of future lies in store for the Russian FEZ's? It depends to a crucial degree on the creation of a strong and stable legislative base. There already is a draft law on FEZ's. It was sent by the Russian president to the former Supreme Soviet as long ago as last March, but it was not examined. Now it will be adopted by the Russian Federation Federal Assembly.

The draft law, prepared with international practice in mind, contains new conceptual approaches to the formation of FEZ's. In the first place, it is proposed that they should be compact, no more than a few square kilometers in size. This kind of area can be equipped without creating too great a financial burden and within an acceptable timeframe, proper customs and financial control can be arranged, and the requisite infrastructure can be fully established. Indeed, tax concessions will not go to entire oblasts but will extend only to small zones. The plan is to equip them in the manner of industrial parks. The range of preferences is to be made pretty wide and, we hope, attractive to foreign businessmen. At any rate, it will not differ significantly from the more or less standard range.

The FEZ's will be divided into two types: export production zones (production type) and unbonded zones (warehousing type). Incidentally, the latter have now been given the go-ahead with the publication of the Russian Federation Customs Code, and the drafts are now being worked out.

International practice indicates the advisability of FEZ specialization. There are around 400 warehouse-type zones and more than 300 export production zones in the world at the moment. Most of the former operate in industrially developed states. There are around 130 in Europe and more than 180 in the United States.

Export production zones are more popular in developing countries. At the beginning of the nineties there were more than 300 operating, over 100 were in the process of being organized, and 50 and more were at the planning and preparation stage. More than three million people are employed in them (in 1990 it was two million). Of course, there is far less need for them in the developed countries, since they already have a full-fledged market and major high-technology export potential.

As for the future Russian export zones, it is envisaged that they will be obliged to supply at least 50 percent of their products for export. If a FEZ resident fails to accomplish this task he could lose his license. At the same time, there are plans for a flexible system of incentives for producers of export goods. The size of the concessions will depend on the volume of exports, the degree of processing, the standard of the technology used, the proportion of local raw materials and supplies, and so on.

In order to create the FEZ's, the draft law provides for the allocation of funds from the federal budget (including tax concessions), budget loans, part of the money obtained in the course of privatization, and also the use of the budgets of the regions where they are being formed.

In this connection it is important to bear in mind that the proposed future redistribution of the powers of the center and the regions, in particular in the budget sphere, will obviously also make significant adjustments to the process of financing and developing FEZ's. Local authorities will have to tackle many problems independently and ensure, in particular, that the zones are not turned into economic enclaves, isolated from the national economy, but are closely linked to the corresponding region and use its resources, raw materials, components, and so on. There has been a very marked desire of late on the part of private Russian investors to get involved in the formation of the zones. Given the current budget deficit, this is a perfectly possible extra source.

Nonetheless, the formation of zones is primarily a state issue. So the preparation of a state program for their creation is envisaged. Obviously it will be worthwhile having a proper competition among preselected drafts and, at first, a limited number of FEZ's, primarily for export production. Otherwise we will continue to have the "zone mania" which has gripped many regions of Russia in the past couple of years, and the government, as in the past, will be inundated with ill-conceived and often totally unacceptable proposals on opening FEZ's.

It is equally important to identify the federal management organ responsible for coordinating all the work. These functions used to be performed by the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development, although not entirely. Recently the agency, together with the Russian Federation Customs Committee, was instructed to organize unbonded zones, but the problem basically remains.

This has been a brief account of the past and immediate future of the creation of FEZ's in Russia, but if you glance further into the future, the example of the developed countries shows that export production zones sooner or later lose their significance for them. Russia is just at the start of this road, but when production facilities in our FEZ's develop and attain maturity it will be sensible to buy them from foreign partners, as the

South Koreans have already started to do in the case of highly efficient enterprises in the "Masan" zone, but unbonded zones are traditionally an effective means of boosting the foreign trade of both developed and developing states and they remain effective.

The creation of FEZ's here, as in many other regions of the world, could be an effective means of attracting foreign investments and a catalyst for the development of foreign economic relations and the economy of the country as a whole, but to achieve this the policy behind their formation must be well thought-out and consistent.

Federal Assembly

Yeltsin Gives Opening Address to Federation Council

LD1101093894 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0702 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Opening address by President Boris Yeltsin at the first session of the Federation Council in Moscow—live]

[Text] Esteemed members of the Federation Council! Under the Constitution, 178 places are provided for in the Federation Council - 171 people have been elected, 140 people have registered. So the Federation Council is competent to begin its work. Allow me, in accordance with the Constitution, to declare open the first sitting of the Federation Council, of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. [applause followed by Russian national anthem]

Esteemed members of the Russian Federation! As of today, Russian statehood is acquiring new qualities. The bicameral parliament of the Russian Federation is beginning its work. At the same time, the chronological link which was broken for decades is restored. The State Duma has begun work at the same time as the Federation Council. And it is not a matter of the formal restoration of the name of a state institute of Russia. The meaning of what has happened is much deeper. Russia is returning to its roots, is restoring lost traditions. It cannot acquire its true character without that. It's not possible to go forward without that. It's not possible to take a worthy place in the contemporary world without that.

The new Russian statehood is based upon a solid legal basis, the Constitution, which was adopted not by a group of people, not by a party but, for the first time in the history of Russia, by nationwide vote. We all still have a lot to do to ensure that the constitutional statutes become norms of our life, to learn to live in accordance with them.

I recognize fully the particular responsibility that lies upon the president in that common work. As president of the Russian Federation, in carrying out my duties, I will observe and defend strictly the Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted on 12 December 1993 by

nationwide vote, respect and guard the rights and freedoms of the people of Russia and serve faithfully their interests, defend the sovereignty and independence, security and territorial integrity of the state, fulfill conscientiously the duties placed upon me by the Constitution. I am counting on the deputies of the Federal Assembly also to adhere strictly to the Constitution of Russia in their actions.

Those who are here in the Federation Council are those who won free and democratic elections in sharp and open competition. I congratulate you on this great political and personal success. You have been elected to the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly. Russian citizens have put their trust in you, they have transferred on to you part of their power and at the same time placed on you great responsibility for our fatherland, for the people of Russia. I hope every one of you fully realizes this.

You will now participate immediately in running a great power, in determining its destiny. Each of you will now have a much greater opportunity to be of use to Russia. I believe that you you will use this opportunity to the maximum for the good of our people.

On this exciting day I should like to share with you what I believe to be especially important for present-day Russia. First of all, the parliament starts its proceedings in a country which is at peace. The electorate expects from deputies real efforts to consolidate civil peace. Last year a great effort was required to retain this peace. At the hardest moment most of those now in this hall backed the president and helped to avert chaos and civil confrontation in Russia.

There is a great need now for members of the Federation Council and deputies of the State Duma leading the Russian parliament to the road of creation. Cooperation must be the main thing in relations between the legislative and executive authorities. The Federal Assembly is starting its work in a single Russian Federation state. No matter for whom our voters voted, no matter what party or bloc they gave their vote to, they were unanimous that the Russian Federation should continue to be an integral state, a firm federation. It is our duty to fulfill this will. The Constitution clearly demarcates what things come under the jurisdiction of the federation and of its components. We must strictly adhere to that, and at the same time remember that strong regions are the condition of Russia's prosperity.

Parliament is starting its working at a most crucial moment of the existence of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Each of the states is increasingly coming to understand that alone they cannot cope with most difficult problems, and that they cannot survive alone. Our countries are already being linked together, and in this process it is Russia's vocation to be the first among equals.

Our compatriots, those in the former Soviet republics, first and foremost, rely on the fact that voluntary, free,

and peaceful integration will grow from strength to strength. They hope that their lawful interests will be protected. And our duty is to live up to these expectations.

The election of the Russian president to the post of CIS chairman provides an exclusively favorable opportunity to implement these aims. Our position remains unchanged. The richer, the more comprehensive, and the closer the relations between our states are, the better. You are starting work in an atmosphere of profound transformations in the country. We all know how difficult it was to move from endless and fruitless talk to practical deeds. It is imperative now not to stop halfway.

Over the two years of reforms in Russia, the basis for a market economy has been laid. But this is just the beginning. In the course of the parliamentary campaign, many fresh and original ideas were voiced which can give fresh impetus to reforms.

The parliamentarians have a realistic opportunity to implement these ideas, first and foremost in laws. It is laws which are the foundation of democratic power.

In many respects, the Russian Federation's legislation has still not become the legislation of the market. Almost insuperable obstacles still remain both for businessmen and bankers and private farmers. If during the time of your work in this sphere you can bring about a breakthrough, you will not only justify the aspirations of the electorate, but will assume a worthy place in the history of Russia. We have many resourceful and energetic people who want and can get down to work. Today they are in need of our support. We must finally give them the opportunity of working and earning. These people are the very basis of our country's prosperity. It is their hands that are creating a stable and prosperous society in which no one will feel himself humiliated and alienated.

At the same time, material prosperity alone will not make the country happy nor revive in citizens of Russia a sense of their own dignity. We must honestly admit that in the most difficult transformations in the Russian Federation, only a very little of the mighty potential of the multinational culture of the fatherland has so far been activated. This culture has been left on the sidelines of the reforms, and it is perhaps this that is the reason for many difficulties and failures. It is our common task to align the market and culture to the greatest possible degree. Unless we do so, the market will not become civilized; unless we do so, the market will not emerge from crisis, there will be no revival of spirituality, there will be no revival of Russia's greatness.

I call upon you to bear this constantly in mind in your work. The Federal Assembly is starting its work in a period when the Russian Federation's democratic statehood is being established. Everyone knows with what pain and difficulty this process has been proceeding. The adoption of the Constitution offers a realistic opportunity for making this more calm and effective.

It can be said that for the first time agreement has been reached in Russia on the rules and norms which are obligatory for all political forces. And we must at all costs preserve this accord, in order that there can be calm in the country, in order that dictatorship can never return to Russia. We can and must help public and political forces to find accord on the main issue, the categorical and total exclusion of force from the country's political life.

There shall be no justification for those who organize mass disorders. No one must evade responsibility for calls for violent actions, for inciting national, social or religious dissension amongst people.

There is one more issue I would particularly like to dwell on. Russia is a great power and it will never agree to be on the sidelines of world civilization. The time has ended when our country felt itself to be a besieged fortress and was in confrontation with the rest of the world. Our task today is to activate truly wide and equal cooperation with the world community.

It is not by military might alone that a worthy place in the world is defined. Our country and people have a great resource of vital energy, and it is up to us to help our fatherland to gather its forces, to revive those powerful stimuli which would resurrect its greatness. International law is our fundamental guideline in the world. Russia will strictly abide by its norms and principles, convinced that this is the most efficient way of protecting national interests.

However, one other aspect is of no lesser importance: all states must also strictly abide by norms of the international law in their relations with Russia. No double standards will be tolerated here. I hope that State Duma and Federation Council deputies will support both the president and the government in this respect.

Esteemed members of the Federation Council! The majority of you are experienced politicians who have learned the secrets of power and are capable of distinguishing great politics from petty intriguing. I see you as one of the main stabilizing forces of Russian statehood. And both the president and parliamentarians could voice disagreement with one or other decisions taken by the other, could be dissatisfied with each other, could argue and stand their ground. But any political problems can and should be resolved only by legal procedures. We must remember always that we represent a great country, a great people, multinational Russia, and that means that as long as our powers are in force we are not free from that demand, even in our private life, and even more so on the state tribune.

It is essentially, finally, to forget revolutionary vocabulary, to rid ourselves of the vestiges of unhealthy suspicion and political maximalism [maksimalizm].

Given the diverse party nature of parliament, there is a fundamental basis for joint constructive action - that is concern for the citizens of Russia, that is sticking to the

strategic course for economic reform. We should consider the constitutional and democratic procedures for forming power and defining the political and economic policy of the country to be unshakable and inviolable. At the same time, the state is obliged to defend democracy by all legal means. In Russia, in Russian statehood there are quite a few old and not so old traditions. They are to be enriched substantially and new elements are to be introduced into them.

This directly concerns the Federation Council. Constitutional norms define the overall structure of work of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament. A lot of work lies ahead to specify these norms. I hope you will approach it looking not just one or two years ahead, but far into the future, into the 21st Century. I intend to be in constant contact with legislators, to hold consultations with the leaders of parliamentary factions on all the most important issues.

The Constitution envisages an annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly. I will make one shortly, after procedural matters are solved in either chamber. In this address I will submit to you a program for political and economic changes in 1994, the main directions of domestic and foreign policy, and I will also outline plans for the next two years. The address will take stock, as carefully as possible, of all the constructive ideas contained in election manifestoes and programs, as well as of deputies' proposals on ways to organize our cooperation.

Esteemed Russian members of parliament: you have been asked by the citizens of this country to lay the foundation for the building of Russian parliamentary culture. This is peaceful, creative, and also very difficult work. Special responsibility has been placed upon you: you are the start, and the future of Russia depends to a large extent on how successful this start is.

Let me wish you success in our common cause of shaping our fatherland. Thank you.

Federation Council Hears Electoral Commission Report

LD1101095894 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Report by special correspondent Yelena Kuznetsova from the Federation Council]

[Text] At the proposal of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, the first session of the Federation Council following the elections is being chaired by senior deputy Yuriy Chernenchenko, who announced that the first question on the standing orders would be a report by Nikolay Ryabov.

The chairman of the Central Electoral Commission reported on the results of the elections and called on the deputies to justify the high trust of the people. The next issue on the standing orders was the election of the credentials commission and recognition of the authority

of the deputies. The main question on the agenda is the election of working bodies and of the chairman of the Federation Council and his deputies, as well as the formation of committees.

The house will elect yet another commission today from among the deputies to conduct the secret nomination of candidates for the post of chairman of the Federation Council. They will be responsible for the preparation of the voting paper. Each deputy will be given one voting paper which will be filled in in a booth for secret voting. In accordance with the rules, only one name may be entered for the post of chairman of the Federation Council. As a result of the secret nominations, the tellers' commission will draw up a report which will be signed by all members of the tellers' commission and confirmed by the Federation Council.

Ryabov Presents Election Figures to Federation Council

LD1101120494 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Nikolay Ryabov has reported that 58,187,000 people, or 54 percent of the total electorate, took part in the vote on the draft new Constitution of the Russian Federation. A total of 32,937,000, or more than 58 percent, voted in favor of the Constitution. After the elections, 150 complaints were registered and some of these had been submitted for examination in the courts. The election campaign cost 160 billion rubles. Nikolay Ryabov also reported that representatives of 29 nationalities had been elected to the Federation Council. Russians make up 76 percent of the total number of deputies in the upper chamber.

Shumeyko on Federation Council Proceedings

LD1001184694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1746 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] President Boris Yeltsin is to make a brief opening speech at the first session of the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, at 10:00 on Tuesday, Council Member and First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko told FC deputies.

He informed Council members about a presidential decree to equip the House with modern communications allowing to in contact with a total of 44,000 telephone numbers nationwide.

The session is expected to discuss and adopt procedures and house rules on its first day of work, Shumeyko told INTERFAX.

Since the constitution does not say who exactly is in charge of the first session, the organizing committee will recommend the eldest deputy do so to fall into line with the procedure adopted by the State Duma, he said.

He named leader of the Peasants' Party Yuriy Chernichenko as the eldest member of the Federation Council, which is also expected to elect its Speaker.

The Council is to meet every third week of the month. The session's seven-point agenda includes discussion of house rules and organizational matters, elections of Speaker and his deputies, formation of house committees and election of its leaders.

Shumeyko spoke of two viewpoints on the arrangements for the Federal Assembly. Some say the two houses must employ the same staff for day-to-day management. Others prefer independent staffs since the two house operate autonomously.

The Council will need about a week to cover the whole of the first session's agenda, Shumeyko said.

Shumeyko Tipped as 'Head' of Federation Council

MK1101102094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 11 Jan 94 p 1

[Vladimir Todres report under the "Senate" rubric: "Vladimir Shumeyko May Become Federation Council Head. 'Territorial Factions' Take Shape in Upper Chamber"]

[Text] It seems that the Federation Council will not wait too long to elect its chairman, who may be named as early as today. Vladimir Shumeyko, chief of the organizing committee, has already said that he is going to propose the vote right after the question of voting procedure was resolved.

By many accounts, it is Mr. Shumeyko, elected in Kaliningrad Oblast, who has the best chances to assume this job. He even plans to ask Boris Yeltsin to allow him to combine his permanent job at the Federation Council with being deputy prime minister. Earlier, Vladimir Shumeyko had said that he did not consider the future speaker as "a ceremonial figure, but as a decisionmaking politician"—apparently unlike "the first-night speaker," Yuriy Chernichenko, who will open the senate's meeting as the oldest deputy.

There have been no reports about any consultations among other senators as to who would be their head. Viktor Stepanov, chief of the Karelian Supreme Soviet, even suggested that there should be no speaker in the upper chamber at all so that "no one will manipulate the deputies." This option is unlikely to materialize. What this means, however, is that Vladimir Shumeyko may have as many as 169 competitors, but none of them can seriously challenge him.

Still, one should proceed with care when forecasting the results of the vote. The Federation Council, unlike the State Duma, has so far been devoid of party lines. Any talk about party factions in the council is yet out of the question: out of 170 seats, the communists have 12; "Russia's Choice," 6; and the Agrarian Party, 1.

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy claims that senator Leonid Polezhayev, Omsk Oblast governor, has connections with his party. Mr. Polezhayev himself denies this. Mr. Shumeyko has already said that he was "glad that the upper chamber does not have any party affiliation." It is likely, however, that territorial blocs will emerge in it instead of party factions.

Eduard Rossel, dismissed from governorship but still leader of the Urals Economic Cooperation Association, continues his efforts to form a group called "Deputies of the Urals." On Monday evening, the council of the "Siberian Agreement" association was meeting to work out its line of conduct; the next meeting was scheduled for Wednesday.

The essence of the policies regional elites are expecting their delegates to pursue was formulated fairly clearly by conferences of entrepreneurs in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, and Magadan: They requested that the Far East authorities take protectionist measures to shield domestic businesses and introduce tight taxation rules for foreign entrepreneurs.

Federation Council Members Promised 'Major Privileges'

LD1001163094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1519 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow January 10 TASS—170 lawmakers of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the new legislature, were promised major privileges in the near future at a meeting with a presidential representative on Monday.

Pavel Borodin from the administrative office of the president told the lawmakers, who are mostly regional leaders, that their chamber will get 500 office cars, a special polyclinic, country houses, as well as four-room apartments in Moscow.

Some of the lawmakers opposed the privileges qualifying them as "impermissible luxury".

But Borodin said that the accommodation privileges may be expected only in the middle of 1995 when a corresponding complex of buildings with a total space of 360,000 sq metres is to be constructed. Besides, it will be the parliament which is to adopt the final decision on the issue, he said.

For the time being, lawmakers will have to tolerate some inconveniences. They will live in hotels, share one office for two people, work in a poorly prepared conference hall which has dark walls and unpleasantly looking chairs.

But Borodin promised fast improvements, including an office for each lawmaker.

Chernomyrdin Reads Yeltsin Message to State Duma

LD1101094394 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0744 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Message from President Boris Yeltsin to the State Duma in Moscow on 11 January; read by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed deputies of the State Duma! Permit me first of all to deliver greetings from the president of Russia to this state authority, the State Duma.

Esteemed deputies of the State Duma! The Federation Council and the State Duma of Russia today commence work. For the first time in the history of our country, the representative and legislative body has been elected on a multi-party basis in an environment of a free contest of views, positions, and philosophies. The Russian Federation parliament is beginning its work under a real division of powers, which is not only proclaimed by the Russian Constitution, but also is consistently implemented in its provisions. This is the most important condition for constructive interaction between the Federal Assembly, the president, the government, and all bodies of state in the country.

Before us stands one task that unites us all: to seek decisions that take the fullest possible account of the diversity of interests that is natural in any pluralist society. A range of groups within society is represented in the current Russian parliament—a range of sentiments and opinions in contemporary Russia are reflected here. I do not call upon you to show unanimity, but it will be difficult to save our country from upheaval without acknowledging and rallying toward shared values. These values are civic peace, stability, the unity of the country, and its renewal.

We are responsible for this. Our electors live and want to live in a peaceful Russia. They desire stability and calm, and all the arms of power should not confound the aspirations of the people of Russia. We should all unite in our striving to preserve the integrity of the country, the dignity of Russia, and a sense of civic pride in our fellow countrymen.

One of the major tasks facing us is to overcome the economic crisis, and to achieve a high standard of living in Russia. It is not only possible but essential to pool our efforts to resolve these problems.

On the eve of the New Year, I sent a letter to every Russian parliamentarian seeking suggestions on how best for us to work together. Many of you responded and displayed an interest in cooperating. Every suggestion is being carefully examined and analyzed. I thank you, and I assure you that it is possible to conduct a civilized political dialogue that will exert a favorable influence on the situation in contemporary Russia.

Ahead of you, esteemed deputies, lies a great deal of hard work. I hope that in accomplishing it, you will manifest

your best human and political qualities, and that you will justify your electorate's trust, for the good of our motherland. I believe that the destiny of Russian Federation parliamentarianism will have a successful outcome. Bon voyage, esteemed deputies!

Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia. [applause]

Addresses State Duma

LD1101101194 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0748 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Address by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to the State Duma in Moscow on 11 January—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed members of the State Duma! I hope that the good wishes and salutations from the president of the Russian Federation will set the tone for the State Duma's work, bring us all together in a businesslike and constructive mood, and usher in a work pattern of harmony and cooperation.

I should like to add a few words from myself, on behalf of the Russian Government. The first day of work of a fundamentally new parliament elected by the citizens of a sovereign state provides good grounds for reflecting on the lessons of the recent past. We have traversed a long and difficult road together—the road from declarative sovereignty and the formal attributes of the independence of Russia to a state that draws up its own borders and its own armaments and forces and occupies a worthy place among the world powers. This is the road of new economic realities which, although encumbered by a multitude of problems, are already delivering our fatherland from a topsy-turvy economic world. This is the road of awareness of the impermissibility of hostility and confrontation—the road to the new political realities of this new year, which are emerging as a result of the people's approval of the new Constitution and of the elections to the Federal Assembly. The results of the referendum and elections are unambiguous on the main point: the citizens of our country opted a new Russia, for a strong power, for political stability, for reforms and democracy. The state has acquired a firm legal foundation, and it is now our common duty to finish building the edifice of our new Russian Federation statehood.

The government is ready, and will work jointly with the corps of deputies in all areas of legislative activity—and together we have plenty to do here. That's putting it mildly. To date, there are about a hundred bills that have been prepared by the government alone that are ready to be submitted for examination by the State Duma. They include a civic code for the Russian Federation, laws on delegated management of property, on mortgages, on making amendments and additions to taxation legislation, laws on banks and banking activity, the foundations of land, labor and housing legislation, and many others.

Esteemed deputies: there are in our native language two related words which I, as chairman of the government,

would like to exclude from the political style of the executive branch of power. They are intolerance and impatience. Renouncing the first means primarily an ability and readiness to hear and listen—to hold constructive dialogue with a political opponent. For this reason, taking account of everything that is useful and promising in the economic resources of the factions and other deputies' associations represented in the Federal Assembly becomes an everyday obligation of the government. Second—what it is that the government should renounce—impatience, which in striving for quick results has frequently led us, and still leads us today, to mere outward effects, but far from always equally effective decisions. The prohibition on impatience envisages primarily scrupulous work on bringing order to all the resources of state economic policy. I am convinced that order in the state economy begins with establishing order in the work of the government. A presidential decree actually aimed at this has been signed.

The results of the elections bear out that the limits to society's patience have to a considerable degree been exhausted. But it has to be soberly acknowledged that slackening efforts and attempts to soften the burdens of the crisis by populist measures will not bring alleviation, but will only drag out this stage of the development of the crisis and the associated deprivations. Analysis of the first results of the work that has been done on the state of the economy and existing problems enable us to draw an important conclusion. The prerequisites have arisen for moving on to a new stage of reforms—the stage of stabilizing the economy—when the center of gravity of all the government's activity shifts to creating favorable conditions for the work of Russian manufacturers. In order to implement this task, I shall make every effort to consolidate the activities of the government, the parliament, and the Russian Central Bank.

In social policy we are bound to turn the reforms face to face with the people. Social policy for us means not only targeted support for the poor, but also granting all citizens the possibility of having worthy living conditions. We intend to proceed without sudden and unjustified shifts in policy and ill-considered shock decisions. We are pondering a certain adjustment in our program of practical actions. Most of what we want to do is compatible with the basic principles contained in the pre-election policy documents of many parties and electoral blocs. In my view, this provides a real basis for joint work by the government and parliament. The government expresses confidence that this work will succeed. We are geared precisely for this. I hope that this is how it will work out. I wish you success in your work. Thank you. [applause]

First Session of Duma Opened by Lukava

LD1101103394 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Our correspondent Yevgeniy Zherebenkov reports on proceedings in the State Duma:

[Zherebenkov] The first session of the lower house of parliament, the State Duma, was opened by Lukava, senior deputy and representative of the Liberal Democratic Party. Then, at the proposal of the faction of the Communist Party of Russia, the deputies stood in memory of the victims of the October 1993 events. [passage omitted: Chernomyrdin conveyed Yeltsin's greetings to the Duma and spoke on government's plans]

The deputies also listened to a report by Aleksandr Ivanchenko, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, on the results of the 12 December elections, and they have now started work on the formation of temporary working bodies, a temporary secretariat, a tellers' commission, and a commission for monitoring electronic voting.

Central Election Commission Chairman Addresses State Duma

LD1101111594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1057 GMT 11 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 11 TASS—The first meeting of the Russian State Duma, one of the chambers of newly-elected parliament, was today addressed by Vice-Chairman of the Central Election Commission Aleksandr Ivanchenko. He noted that the elections to the new Russian parliament were held at a dramatic period of the country's life. Their main result is that they have laid a good foundation for national concord.

Ivanchenko said that more than 58 million people had taken part in the elections. As a result, the country got a new constitution. All the parties and movements have expressed their readiness to create a new parliamentary system. The elections were held for the first time in Russia according to the proportional system. They refuted the view of some sceptics that elections in Russia could be held only according to the majority system.

Ivanchenko noted the openness and glasnost of the election campaign. The Central Election Commission was able to guarantee equal rights and opportunities to each of the 13 registered election unions.

"The elections were monitored for the first time by international observers. More than one thousand of them came to Russia for that purpose," Ivanchenko stated.

"The Election Commission had accomplished a huge amount of work during a very short space of time," he added. Ivanchenko noted that only 150 complaints and appeals were received by the Central Election Commission after the voting, and that they were all carefully studied and corresponding measures were taken. He said that there was no doubt that the elections were absolutely legitimate. Ivanchenko also stated that the financial

activities of all the election unions were now being checked and the results would be published.

The vice-chairman of the Central Election commission said that 144 deputies were elected to the State Duma of the Federal assembly (parliament), including 225 in federal constituencies from parties and movements, and 219—in single-mandate constituencies. He recalled that no elections were held on the territory of the Chechen Republic due to the stand assumed by its leadership. No elections were held also in several constituencies of Tatarstan. Six seats are yet to be filled in the State Duma.

Ivanchenko said that the newly-elected deputies of the Duma included people of 32 nationalities. More than one-third of the deputies have scientific degrees or titles. Representatives from presidential structures account for about five per cent of all the Duma members. The State Duma includes 68 former people's deputies of the Russian Federation, 32 of whom were elected in single-mandate constituencies. Ivanchenko dwelt also on shortcomings of the present election system. He stressed that the electoral legislation should be improved.

State Duma Disputes Composition of Factions

LD1101121494 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1157
GMT 11 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow January 11 TASS—State Duma, the low chamber of the Russian Federal Assembly (legislature) is now engaged in a heated debate about how many people can form a parliamentary group or faction. No decision was reached before the lunch break. Three figures were proposed—14, 20 and 50 people. A rating vote left only the last two numbers for further debate, but none scored a majority in further voting.

Factions, their leaders and numbers are of special concern to the present legislature in which the Liberal Democratic Party can command the largest single group of deputies and thus have a decisive say in voting.

Before the break the Duma elected members of the commission charged with seeing to it that the electronic system used in registering and displaying voting results function effectively, and two other commissions. The deputies also elected a provisional secretariat of the State Duma

Formation of State Duma Blocs Assessed

LD1001175194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1717
GMT 10 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow January 10 TASS—The latest consultations and negotiations held by the factions of the State Duma give reason to say with a big degree of certainty

that the lower house of the new parliament will begin its work with determining "the weight categories" of deputy groups.

It should be recalled that the State Duma which consists of 450 deputies includes representatives eight election blocs. On the eve of the December 12 elections political scientists divided the blocs according to the classical scheme "left—center—right." However, after the elections the scheme turned out to be inapplicable as even the factions which considered themselves democratic (the Russia's Choice election bloc, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord and the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc /Yabloko/) failed to set up a parliamentary coalition. Meanwhile, the left—communists and agrarians—have already struck deals on some issues but keep silent about their alliance with the faction of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR).

The Women of Russia bloc and the Democratic Party of Nikolay Travkin stand somewhat aloof in this scheme as they consider themselves a "centre" and are likely, together with independent deputies, side either with their left or the right. It is noteworthy that none of the factions has received a parliamentary majority in the State Duma.

The deputies are most likely to be preoccupied with struggling for power in the new parliament in the first couple of days of its work. Russia's Choice leader Yegor Gaydar voiced concern that the communists and LDPR members will try to gain the upper hand in the duma by taking under control its major committees and commissions dealing with defence issues and international relations. The three other biggest factions of the duma (LDPR, the Communist Party and the Agrarian Party) obviously have refused to support Russia's Choice in its intention to take over the Duma Budget Committee. As a result, the bloc has withdrawn from the talks with them.

Moreover, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord "suspects" Russia's Choice of striking a deal with the three above-mentioned factions to nominate four deputies of the State Duma speaker. Independent deputies elected in individual constituencies have repeatedly warned that deputies elected on party tickets who have only half of the seats in the house are trying to push through their candidates to the duma ruling bodies by the principle of factionalism rather than professionalism and political neutrality.

Thus, the interfactional discussions have resulted so far only in an agreement that the post of speaker will be most likely taken up a representative of one of the small factions since big factions are strong enough to influence decision making in the house. Among the candidates are Anatoliy Adamishin and Vladimir Lukin of the Yabloko bloc, and Alevtina Fedulova of the Women of Russia bloc.

It is unlikely that representatives of the State Duma factions will reach a consensus on the coexistence of the

legislative and executive branches of power. Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, obviously unaware of the presidential decree on the composition of the new government published today, said that his party will "continue its struggle for the government to be formed with consent of the parliament."

Vice-prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin recently regretted in an interview with ITAR-TASS that the government is being formed in unprecedented secrecy, while Gaydar emphasized that his bloc will support only those ministers in the parliament who share its programme. All this goes to prove that there is strong opposition in the parliament to the constitutional right of the president and prime minister to form a government independently.

Political observers are doubtful that factions will manage to act constructively while adopting more important laws in the future. The majority of blocs, including the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, the Yabloko bloc, the Democratic Party, Women of Russia, the Communist Party and LDPR strongly oppose "shock therapy" as a method of carrying out economic reform in the country. At the same time, Gaydar and his followers, although admitting the need for social reorientation of reforms, still insist on a tough monetary policy.

Observers believe that no peace and accord will reign in the State Duma even after the first "hot" sessions of the house. In this situation the president may count only on support of the Upper House, the Federation Council, whose deputies include the presidents of several Russian constituent republics, heads of regional administrations and independent deputies. This will enable the Upper House to control and curb the unpredictable Lower House.

Under the new constitution, the Federation Council considers laws adopted by the Lower House and makes decisions on the redrawing of borders between the subjects of the federation, imposition of a state of emergency and on holding presidential elections. In fact the Federation Council will virtually act as a buffer between the president, the government and the State Duma.

Duma Opposition Seen Asserting Independence

*MK1101101094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
11 Jan 94 p 2*

[Aleksy Kirpichnikov report in the "On the Eve" column: "Extra-Parliamentary Opposition Makes a Statement. Some of Its Colleagues Promise To Follow Its Commandments"]

[Text] At yesterday evening's news conference in the Rossiya Hotel well-known opposition leaders presented a "Statement by Leaders of Parties and Public Organizations 'On the Illegitimacy of the Constitution Submitted to the Referendum by B. Yeltsin.'" In the opinion of the authors of the statement, the constitution restores

an authoritarian system; it was cooked "in the president's kitchen" and was adopted with extremely gross violations not only of the 1978 Constitution but even the 1990 Referendum Law, namely: the election commissions were formed on the decision of the executive branch; they openly campaigned in favor of the constitution; and the opposition was not given access to the media, while the vote count was conducted incorrectly and with widespread rigging. Therefore the politicians who had invited the journalists proposed that the constitution be deemed illegitimate. The Federal Assembly, however, in their opinion may work, but work only with one goal—to approve the law on elections to the Constituent Assembly which in its turn will adopt a new and "fair" constitution.

The statement was signed by Rumyantsev, Aksyuchits, Pavlov, Astafyev, and other well-known opponents of the presidential team representing the National Salvation Front, the Constitutional Democrats, the Russian People's Union, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, and other organizations of similar orientation. What makes the statement special, however, according to the meeting's organizers, is not the fact that it bears a few signatures by newly elected deputies to the Federal Assembly (for instance, Mr. Baburin) but the promise to join the signatories given by leaders of the Agrarian Party and the communists. Thus, according to Mr. Rumyantsev, the agrarians were among the initiators of working out the document, while according to Mr. Pavlov, not only communist leader Zyuganov expressed a wish to sign the document, but even a party plenary session has already made a corresponding decision.

Therefore, in the opinion of the press conference organizers, the first sessions of the State Duma will follow not the presidential scenario wherein "Mr. Filatov wags his finger to tell the deputies to engage in organizational matters for two months" but, to the contrary, they will proceed according to the plan devised by the authors of the statement. With just a day to go before the opening of the Duma the opponents of the Yeltsin team are sure that the objective of many factions and deputies will be to analyze the question of their own legitimacy in light of the events of last September-October, which will naturally come into conflict with the goals of the president's supporters.

Because as of now, according to Mr. Rumyantsev, we have "a powerless Duma," this opposition inside it will not immediately lead to the goals declared in the statement—the adoption of a law on the Constituent Assembly and a new, "democratic" constitution. In these conditions special importance will be taken on not so much by opposition to the government course in the Duma as by extra parliamentary struggle wherein a weighty word will be spoken by politicians not elected as deputies, that is to say, an overwhelming majority of signatories to the document that was promulgated to the press.

Such hopes are surely not devoid of certain reason. Even coming from outstanding parliamentarians of the recent past, however, they appear rather to be illusions since the movements represented in the Federal Assembly certainly have their own cadre plans, including with respect to activity outside the State Duma. And although the upcoming Duma debates cannot possibly be called cool, it seems that the factions in opposition to the government will follow the path proposed by their colleagues with no deputy mandates precisely up to the point where their fervor results in an undesirable and irreversible buildup of pressure in the Duma boiler.

Communists Not To Seek Post of Duma Speaker

LD1001161194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1542
GMT 10 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow January 10 TASS—The leaders of major Russian parliament factions have not adopted the final decision on the candidate to the post of the State Duma speaker, but succeeded in "working out the concept of approach to this issue," Viktor Zerkaltsev, a communist lawmaker told ITAR-TASS.

He said the factions have decided not to disclose the preliminary agreements on this issue, but did not deny that the Communist Party would not claim the speaker's post as "it does not consider itself to be a small faction".

The leaders of the four biggest factions agreed that the post of the speaker should be occupied by the representative of "a neutral small faction" while all the big factions will get the posts of deputy speakers, according to a statement made by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party. But on January 7 leaders of the Russia's Choice bloc abandoned the talks on the question.

Zerkaltsev regards this decision of the Russia's Choice bloc as "surprising". Until recently the bloc "though not accepting the candidates still agreed with the conception of choosing the speaker", he pointed out. He believes that the chairman of the State Duma will be elected on the second day of the session. Otherwise the process will become endless, Zerkaltsev stressed.

Shakhray Courts Independent Deputies in Campaign

MK1101103094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Jan 94 p 3

[Radik Batyrshin report under the "Federal Assembly" rubric: "Sergey Shakhray Does Not Like To Move Twice, and Acts as Independent Deputies' Defender"]

[Text] Yegor Gaydar said yesterday that following talks with the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR], the Agrarian Party of Russia [APR], and the Russian

Federation Communist Party [RFCP], "Russia's Choice" started coordinating efforts with independent deputies and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRES] faction.

The PRES leader held a news conference on the eve of the Federal Assembly's opening session, in which he suggested that the parliament begin its work with a vote of confidence in the government or personally Viktor Chernomyrdin. According to Sergey Shakhray, this would boost the current cabinet's stand, for deputies from the radical opposition would raise this question sooner or later anyway. He said that Viktor Chernomyrdin responded to this idea favorably when meeting with PRES chiefs, although he has not yet finally made up his mind. Sergey Shakhray pointed out at the same time that reorganizing the government before the parliament began its work "amounts to an apple of discord between the government, the president, and the parliament," because, in his view, this should have been done after consultations with Federal Assembly factions. He said he did not know what place would be accorded to him in the government and, therefore, he did not take part in the move to the White House because he did not like "to move twice." Incidentally, yesterday Boris Yeltsin signed an edict on the structure of the Russian Government and tasked Viktor Chernomyrdin with naming the government's lineup, which puts off the tide of resignations expected by analysts further into the future. "We cannot accept the attempt of the four largest factions ("Russia's Choice," APR, RFCP, and LDPR—R.B.) to strike a deal on the speaker and candidacies of committee chairmen," the PRES leader said. He also supported the newly formed group of State Duma deputies with an intimately familiar name—the Interregional Group of Independent Deputies. The group is made up of around 50 deputies. The crux of the grievances voiced by the independents and backed by Sergey Shakhray is that they insist on the participation of regional associations comprising deputies elected in territorial districts in all talks on the candidacies of the speaker and committee chairmen. They propose that all the State Duma's working bodies be formed on a parity basis (with one half allotted to the parties, the other half to the "territorial deputies"). This is why the "independents," the PRES, and the "republicans" (15 deputies from republics and autonomous entities) oppose a vote based on party lists and insist on a secret ballot for electing State Duma chiefs. According to Sergey Shakhray, the formula of representation should be as follows: the State Duma chairman should have two deputies from parties and another two from "territorial" parliamentarians; each of the eight committees should have accordingly either a party chairman and a "territorial" deputy or the other way around. Obviously, the PRES leader's throwing his weight behind the 225 deputies elected in territorial districts could have drastically boosted Sergey Shakhray's speakership chances, which have dropped nearly to zero, had it not been for two "buts." First, it is fairly dubious that the "territorial deputies" are completely nonpartisan; second, the four

"pillars" of the State Duma have already given up "behind-the-scenes deals" and have switched to open confrontation.

Russia's Choice Halts Talks on Key Duma Positions

MK1001152094 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 10 Jan 94 p 1

[Mikhail Shchipanov report under the "News From the Very Top" rubric: "Nothing Has Been Decided Yet"]

[Text] It came to light on 7 January that the Russia's Choice executive council had made a strategic decision to cut short the four-sided consultations with the Communists, Agrarians, and Zhirinovskiy-Liberals on a preliminary distribution of key positions in the State Duma.

Such a step may look quite symbolic. In fact, Russia's Choice had previously been accused of being inconsistent: It had promised "never to shake hands with Zhirinovskiyites," and then went on and sat down with them at the same table as if thereby sanctioning the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia as a component part of the political establishment. In the given case, however, Russia's Choice expressed a concrete protest against the attempts by the remaining three parties to bring coordinated pressure to bear on it while distributing the positions of Duma committee chairmen. Zhirinovskiy, who had been refused entry to a number of countries, is modestly soliciting the position of chairman of the international affairs committee, while the Communists, in league with the "bearers of the sickle"—the Agrarians—are seeking the positions of heads of the defense and security committees. As if this were not enough, Yabloko went and demanded for itself leadership of the budget committee, which Russia's Choice would have paid any price to reserve for itself. So it is no accident that Russia's Choice should decide to make such a tough move.

In the meantime, despite the clear desire of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord leader, the factions have in fact managed to agree on an exceptionally "narrow circle" of contenders for State Duma speaker. Observers believe that having the two hot bets down the home stretch are: A. Adamishin, former first deputy foreign minister; and A. Fedulova, the former "first Young Pioneer" of the land of Soviets. According to our lights, A. Adamishin confirmed the other day the seriousness of his parliamentary intentions, having tendered his resignation from his Foreign Ministry position. Unlike his boss, Kozyrev, he cannot simultaneously have his seat in parliament and keep his ministerial seat. (Incidentally, Adamishin's aides have resolutely declined any comment about his intentions).

I. Ivanov, Russia's ex-ambassador to Spain, has already become Kozyrev's new first deputy. Mrs. Fedulova, however, seems to have some moral edge on the career diplomat. The election of a woman to the position of speaker would send good vibrations around this country

and the world in addition to cutting the ground from under the nascent feminist movement in Russia.

Gaydar, Fedorov Deny Knowledge of Parliament Building Plan

PM1101114894 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Rustam Arifdzhonov report: "Government's First Resolution: Build a New Parliament Center"]

[Text] Decree No. 1 of the Russian Federation Government was signed by its chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin on 6 January 1994. It is the document "On the Construction of a Complex of Buildings for the Parliament Center—Official Residence of the Federal Assembly."

We wrote in the last issue of the newspaper about the proposed construction of a new administrative complex for parliament in Moscow. The initiative for building it came from the president's administration, and according to Pavel Borodin, the president's administrator of affairs, as quoted by INTERFAX, it is proposed to earmark about half a billion dollars for the purpose.

However, the report was denied almost immediately by government First Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar. He stated that no such decision is in preparation, or at least he is not aware of it.

Nonetheless, apparently at the very same time as Yegor Timurovich was refuting the report, Viktor Stepanovich was signing the first decree of the year. According to this decree, it is planned to carry out work on the erection of a complex of buildings for the new Parliament Center in 1994-1995. The government of Moscow is instructed, in conjunction with the president's administration of affairs, to identify a plot for the construction of the complex in the central section of Moscow within a month. A competition is announced among Russian and foreign firms for the best design. It is planned to commission the new Parliament Center in the first half of 1995.

The figure of half a billion dollars does not appear in the decree. Nonetheless, the sum total of expenditure on an imposing new construction project is expected to be equally vast. The Ministry of the Economy is instructed to allocate the necessary quotas of state capital investments, including hard currency resources. Yet meanwhile Gaydar, who runs that ministry, knows nothing about the preparation of the decree. He simply was not informed.

Boris Fedorov, the other vice premier and minister of finance, only learned of the decree "from the newspapers" on 10 January. Prior to that, he too had stated that no government decision exists as far as he knows—"at any event, I have signed nothing and authorized nothing."

After the decree's existence became known not only to the country's ordinary taxpayers, who were not expecting their money to be used in quite this way, but also to the vice premiers, IZVESTIYA's correspondent asked the finance minister some questions. According to the minister, he really had not been in the know. No session of the government or the government presidium had been convened on this subject. As for Boris Fedorov's personal opinion, he thinks: We cannot at the present day permit ourselves a construction project of \$500 million or thereabouts. Such a sum is simply not available in reality, or even in the plans. Furthermore the finance minister does not consider the government's removal to the White House to be justified.

Maybe the construction will be financed out of the funds of the president's administration of affairs? Not likely. The president's administration of affairs does have what is known as a separate line in the budget, but it seems that no such sums are envisaged there.

The new construction project will be a heavy burden on the country's already unenviable budget. Is it really necessary today? Especially since there does not appear to have been any special pressure from the newly fledged deputies along the lines of "build us a new house immediately."

Obviously we are not so rich as to allow ourselves to buy things on the cheap. But nor are we so poor as to create new administrative palaces in the shortest possible time "for show."

I admit we were waiting with considerable interest to see how the government would begin the new year and what, in the changed situation, would be its first step. So now we know.

Article Appeals To Common Sense as Parliament Opens

PM1101114994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin: "Federal Assembly Starts Work. Wishing It and Ourselves Success"]

[Text] Not long before the memorable 21 September, at the old parliamentary Defense and Security Committee, I was shown the schedule for the preparation of draft laws in 1993-1994. More than 30 of them directly affected the Armed Forces. I would not presume to judge how far all these drafts truly reflected the vital problems of the Army, servicemen, and their families, but certainly the schedule itself indicated the existence of a comprehensive program of legal provision for the life and activities of the Armed Forces. Suffice it to say that the draft Fundamentals of Legislation on Veterans had already passed its first reading and was close to becoming law.

I recall this today only because I would like the new parliament's deputies and us to remember the purpose of

the lofty assembly—not only to resolve Federation Council and State Duma property questions, not only to enable factions to get down to brass tacks, make political statements and debate with the government and the president, but also to carry out meticulous work on Russian legislation. Particularly as it turns out that our legislation is far from perfect and has big gaps in it, like a ship on the stocks.

But this is just one area in which legislators apply their efforts. One of many. And servicemen, of course, are one stratum of the population that is waiting impatiently for the rule-of-law state to take their interests into account. If one is talking about laws that have already been adopted, they represent merely a kind of foundation stone—there is no end of work to be done to provide the superstructure and work out the details.

Both chambers of the Federal Assembly start work today, 11 January. Having found their workplaces, not without difficulty (and scandal), our elected representatives have to solve a mass of organizational questions—who is to head the chambers, who is to head the committees and commissions, what the standing orders should be, what to pay attention to first and foremost, and so on. At the stage of consultations the parliamentary forces did not make much progress toward accord. But let us hope that the very atmosphere of parliamentary business will attune the deputies to cooperation. As for various threatening statements by the leaders of factions in the State Duma, let us put them down to the obligatory rhetoric on such occasions.

Of course, it would be naive to hope that the new parliamentarians will focus exclusively on legislative activity. The obligatory backcloth, as in any parliament, will be political struggle. The question is to what extent will this struggle preoccupy deputies' minds and will there be any room left for actual legislation.

We are all faced with an example of the tragic denouement of the conflict between the two branches of authority. Will this lofty assembly be the bulwark of a rule-of-law state or will it turn into another source of political tension in the country, embroiling the broadest strata of the population in an internecine struggle? Unfortunately, there are few grounds for optimistic forecasts at the moment. On the one hand, the energy of election rivalry is not yet spent and is still making an impact, on the other hand, the new parliamentarians' ambitions are beginning to take shape. Naturally, the interplay of these ambitions is hotting up the atmosphere of the Federal Assembly, which was not exactly cool to begin with.

What can one hope for in such a situation? The common sense of the majority of parliamentarians, that is all. Presumably, only a few of them will not be aware that what is being decided today is the fate not of individual statesmen and politicians who see themselves as irreplaceable, but the fate of the reforms, and, ultimately, the fate of Russia. In fact, it is all clear and simple: If this

parliament turns into an arena of intransigence, with squabbles and feuds as its main attractions, we will all have to forget about our dreams of a civilized, rule-of-law state for a long time.

So a new chapter of Russian parliamentarianism is beginning. It is hard to imagine any Russian citizen not wishing the Federal Assembly success. In the end, any other outcome would result in irrevocable losses for society and the forfeiture of civil peace. But, as the say, let us wait and see.

Deputies Look Ahead to Work of Duma

PM1001132794 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 10 Jan 94 p 2

[Statements by Duma Deputies Irina Khakamada, Vladimir Lysenko, and Yekaterina Lakhova; carried under "The Duma Through the Eyes of Deputies" rubric]

[Text] Irina Khakamada: Walking the Tightrope

The parliament which we elected is unpredictable. No one has an absolute majority. Whether a decision is passed or not will depend each time on what forces reach agreement between themselves in the Duma. Not only are the interfactional alliances movable, but each faction itself is not monolithic and is also movable, since the leaders' ambitions and the increasing influence of personalities within their associations will also play their role.

Why the democrats lost and what conclusions should be drawn from their defeat is a question that has been discussed quite thoroughly already. I only wish to stress that if the government carries out unpopular reforms and at the same time wants to win elections, it should prepare itself support among the population in advance. The decisions on increasing pensions and the transfer of the militia to municipal authority (after all, our militia today cannot defend the citizen—I have encountered this in my own life) should have been published not today, after the elections, but before them. Voters refused to follow the word "democrats" out of inertia, thus demanding that they be shown respect: If you want their support you have to give them money and responsibility. Give them the chance to see what they get for their taxes: Here is where they are going, and this is the sort of return I am getting. Therefore populists of all sorts were able to play on the absolute insolubility of social problems. From the example of my election campaign I can assert how difficult it is to oppose categorical, "splendid" promises. I was a candidate in a district where there is a concentration of "dormitory suburbs" (spalnyye kvartaly) which are unsound in every aspect, including ecologically. And one of my rivals promised that, if elected, he would close down the plant that is poisoning life in the entire region. Of course, he will not close the plant. But it sounded good! There is, of course, the normal mechanism—but one which, admittedly, requires a longer time to take shape: The plant's profits should be taxed

only after all expenses necessary for purification installations have been deducted from them. I am sure that I managed to win the election campaign not by handing out impossible promises but only because my program—notice that it is a liberal program, and therefore does not enjoy absolute support today—was absolutely specific.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia has such a broad representation in parliament because it combined the votes of those who thereby expressed their dissatisfaction with the inconsistency of the reforms, and of those who truly share the ideas of the leader of that party. However, Zhirinovskiy's party today represents a big question mark, in my view. Everyone is talking about its leader, but what do his comrades in arms represent? Will it receive a political weight in parliament corresponding to its size? This will be shown by the proceedings in parliament. Even today, however, it is clear that, given such a parliament, it is impossible to expect the clear-cut advancement of reforms. There will also be difficulties over the formation of the government, the power ministries, and foreign policy. Much will now depend on the president, who, thank God, has been given significant powers under the new Constitution. A huge part will also be played by the extent to which both communists and democrats take responsible stances, to what extent they are professional and analytical in their choices. Let us have no more fighting to prove who is cleverer and stronger. Let us have as much negotiation and as much accord as possible.

Vladimir Lysenko: "Period of Grace" for Parliamentarians

The "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin" bloc is preparing quite seriously for parliamentary work: Yavlinskiy in the "EPItsent" (Economic and Political Research Center) has drawn up many documents, and we have interesting social and economic programs; we will have plenty of things to propose to the State Duma.

Our faction is one of the few which proposes to create a parliament based not upon a rigid faction system but on a "soft" option. That is to say that, as a rule, deputies should work in the factions for whom they were elected; but it would be incorrect to bind deputies so rigidly that they could be expelled from parliament if they have some kind of difference with their faction or want to switch to another faction. This is incorrect because the rules of the game were initially different; neither the Statute on the Federal Assembly nor the Constitution provides for rigid discipline within factions. Second, it should be borne in mind that, in a transitional period, much changes, events move from one stage to another, and positions change too. For instance, I have many friends in "Russia's Choice" and in Shakhrai's bloc with whom I would like to cooperate. But I do not rule out that the situation could reach a point—as often has been the case with the democrats—where we could end up virtually as each other's main enemy, if we pursue the previous policy. I am also thinking of the activity of

certain bloc leaders. Hence, it seems to me, a deputy should have the right to change faction at least once.

I am for the democrats coordinating their actions in parliament. Everything should be discussed and agreed between ourselves beforehand; we should find common ground on which to stand in negotiations with the rest. Unfortunately, there are other approaches in our faction. Some deputies believe that we should reach agreement with the communists on one issue and with "Russia's Choice" on another. This position—keeping equidistant from either side—is quite frankly alarming.

Yekaterina Lakhova: Women Will Not Be "Tame"

We realize that voters who supported the "Women of Russia" bloc in the elections will follow closely how we justify their trust. Either we will discredit the women's movement, or we will strengthen it. We intend to work seriously in parliament in order to overcome the traditional idea of women's low political activeness and to fight to increase women's social status—right now it is intolerably low. We seriously intend to fight to see that a woman is elected one of the deputy chairmen of the State Duma. It is time to stop treating half the population of

the country like second-class people; we should not be a laughing stock in the world community.

I think that parliament should actively influence the formation of state policy. Insofar as this policy is formed in laws, everything is in our hands. I object to the idea that, if the government does not change its course, we should not support it; we can influence this course by adopting new laws and making rational amendments to existing legislation, especially as regards property questions, privatization, and so forth.

Will our faction's voice be heeded in parliament? It is hard to predict at this stage. But we will not be "tame"—that is unequivocal. People are constantly trying to pin "Women of Russia" to someone else's coattails—now to one bloc, now to another. I think that every faction will try to preserve its autonomy. We will find common approaches in resolving some problems, but we will also seek allies in other factions to lobby for our issues. We will try to make ourselves heard. Especially since there is the experience acquired in the previous parliament. We will take account of this, just as we will take account of past mistakes.

International Affairs

Kravchuk on Removal of Nuclear Warheads

AU1101123694 Kiev UKRAYINSKA HAZETA in Ukrainian No. 1 (43) 6-19 Jan 94 pp 1, 2

[Second installment of interview with President Leonid Kravchuk by UKRAYINSKA HAZETA Editor in Chief Valeriy Zholdak in Kiev on 9 December: "Ukraine Will Be Independent and Strong"]

[Excerpts] **The President Stakes His All on the Issue of Nuclear-Free Status and Makes a New Statement Through UKRAYINSKA HAZETA**

[Zholdak] Leonid Makarovych, thank you very much for finding time and responding to my request to meet with UKRAYINSKA HAZETA and discuss issues that are of particular concern for the Ukrainian people today. There is no doubt that these issues also concern you as president, the first president of independent Ukraine. Today, you, Mr. President, are bitterly assailed from all sides—by National Democrats, Social Communists, and so-called Centrists. The common people also criticize you (and not without reason). They have become disillusioned by the present leadership and present government due to the catastrophically declining standard of living. Let us, Leonid Makarovych, speak openly.

[Kravchuk] Okay.

[Zholdak] UKRAYINSKA HAZETA also has and does criticize you, if you have read its publications.

[Kravchuk] I have. I follow your newspaper's activity. I like it.

[Zholdak] This is probably why you agreed to hold this meeting, because our attacks on you do not involve insults or pinning on labels. Our columnists, among whom, as you know, there is one of the most authoritative, decent, and integral Ukrainian figures—Ihor Yukhnovskyy....

[Kravchuk] Yes.

[Zholdak] Our columnists assess what you are doing for Ukraine's good and where you are failing....

[Kravchuk] You have a subjective view of things.

[Zholdak] No, Leonid Makarovych, we have an independent point of view. We are not inclined to support a single party or a single political force and, of course, we do not support the opposition for that matter. Our position is as follows: Assist the president, Supreme Council, government, and leaders of institutions in their best deeds and be objective in assessing their mistakes, failures, or even anti-Ukrainian actions. UKRAYINSKA HAZETA only depends upon one thing—Ukraine, its independence, and the prosperity and well-being of the Ukrainian people. All of our publications focus on two topics: Who are we? Who leads us?

[Kravchuk] I share your aspirations.

[Zholdak] In order to keep this conversation to the point and make it as frank as possible, I will tell you about my attitude toward you, Leonid Makarovych. I have mixed feelings. I feel primarily, gratitude. If you remember the year 1988 when the Kiev Ivan Franko Theater was preparing the performance "Moment," the first in Ukraine based upon the works by the "bourgeois" and, not very long ago, also nationalist, prominent writer Volodymyr Vynnychenko. At that time you, as head of the ideological department at Ukraine's Communist Party Central Committee, were the only one to rescue the first show.

[Passage omitted on cultural issues]

[Zholdak] Let us start with what is particularly important for the fate of Ukrainian independence—its national security. The preceding issue of UKRAYINSKA HAZETA, if you read it, carried an interview with Yuriy Kostenko, head of the working deputies' group on preparing for the ratification of START I and Ukraine's nuclear-free status. Yuriy Kostenko is Ukraine's people's deputy and Ukraine's minister of environmental protection.

[Kravchuk] I read it thoroughly.

[Zholdak] In particular, it expresses disagreement, Mr. President, with your position regarding the immediate transfer of all the nuclear weapons to Russia.

[Kravchuk] My position on this point is final and invariable.

[Zholdak] In our interview with Kostenko, we quoted your letter to U.S. President George Bush of 7 May 1992 in which you informed the American president that you were trying to urgently transfer to Russia all the nuclear weapons from Ukraine—tactical in 1992 and strategic—by 1994. Did you make such a commitment?

[Kravchuk] In that letter nobody made such a commitment. The entire letter should have been read. I wrote something else. I wrote that Ukraine would do what is envisaged by START and by the Statement on Ukraine's Nuclear-Free Statement, which was adopted by our Supreme Council.

[Zholdak] Why are you in such a hurry to transfer everything at one go? Russia has not paid us a cent for the tactical weapons that have already been transferred there.

[Kravchuk] The point is that even now I believe that we must transfer our nuclear weapons as soon as possible. However, of course, you are right, we must get compensation for our expenses.

[Zholdak] They [Russia] will not give compensation for anything!

[Kravchuk] Why not? We have already reached an agreement with Russia on strategic weapons. We have signed an agreement.

[Zholdak] However, that agreement applies to strategic weapons. We have received nothing for tactical ones. In the opinion of our and foreign specialists, they are worth billions of U.S. dollars.

[Kravchuk] Negotiations are now under way on the tactical weapons as well. There is an agreement in principle on compensation for those weapons, too.

[Zholdak] Cannot you, like Russia, also put pressure upon them and fight for our good?

[Kravchuk] We are fighting within the limits of our possibilities and law. However, you see, the oil- and gas tap is on the other side. So far, we are deeply in debt. Generally speaking, putting pressure means a policy from a position of strength.

[Zholdak] Leonid Makarovych, you received the belated telegram from Yeltsin regarding the ratification of START I by Ukraine.

[Kravchuk] Yes, I did.

[Zholdak] Our press wrote much about it. One newspaper even quoted the telegram and asserted that Mr. Yeltsin humiliated you and set an ultimatum to the effect that all the strategic weapons be transferred to Russia within two years. Can you read this telegram to me or give it to me to publish in UKRAYINSKA HAZETA? Or is it a secret?

[Kravchuk] No, there is nothing secret about it. However, it is a personal letter. Why make it public? It is not for publishing.

[Zholdak] However, the Ukrainian people must know that the Ukrainian president is bound hand and foot. Here, I take your side and do not want you to be humiliated.

[Kravchuk] Nobody is bound. Let us analyze the situation soberly. Yeltsin's letter deals with two aspects.

[Zholdak] Is it a letter or a telegram?

[Kravchuk] A letter telegram. It was meant as a telegram, but arrived as a letter.

[Zholdak] Excuse me, Leonid Makarovych, how does this letter telegram start? Esteemed Comrade President? Highly esteemed Mr. President?

[Kravchuk] What difference does it make?

[Zholdak] It is very interesting.

[Kravchuk] He writes: "Dear Leonid Makarovich."

[Zholdak] Oh, this is good!

[Kravchuk] No, this does not mean that this word determines the policy.

[Zholdak] Well, there are two aspects in the letter.

[Kravchuk] Two aspects. First. He analyzes the situation that has taken shape after the ratification of START I by the Supreme Council and thinks that this cannot be considered as a ratification.

[Zholdak] Whose situation does he analyze? The one that has taken shape in Ukraine or in Russia?

[Kravchuk] In the world.

[Zholdak] Why does he consider our parliament's decision wrong?

[Kravchuk] Because it deviates from the promises that were previously made by Ukraine's Supreme Council and by Ukraine in signing the Lisbon Protocol. It is true. We did deviate from our promises. Here, we must call a spade a spade. It was not my decision to deviate. I insist that we must be consistent. In my opinion, the Supreme Council did things that I consider to be short-sighted for Ukraine. Our state's international prestige has been seriously undermined.

[Zholdak] Leonid Makarovych, the Lisbon Protocol was not signed by you as president and head of our state responsible for Ukraine's well-being, but by Mr. Zlenko, the country's minister of foreign affairs.

[Kravchuk] This does not matter, because we are dealing with a certain status of the document.

[Zholdak] How come it does not matter? Why, in that case, is there any need for the Supreme Council's decision? It must ratify or refuse to ratify that protocol. This is world practice. I believe that the minister's signature is legally not valid. The Supreme Council has the right to either ratify or not ratify, to do either one or the other.

[Kravchuk] The right must be used in the interests of the state.

[Zholdak] Was it not ratified in the interests of the state, with demands that we must receive compensation for different things? That we must get international security guarantees? Was that a bad thing to do, Mr. President?

[Kravchuk] Am I saying anything against it? However, it was also necessary to ratify the NNT.

[Zholdak] The what?

[Kravchuk] NNT—that we join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

[Zholdak] Is this the fifth item?

[Kravchuk] Yes. I am not saying that the Supreme Council was wrong to make those reservations. However, it depends on which of them. I agree with some of them, while others are fundamentally at variance with our previously determined position.

[Zholdak] However, if we had endorsed that fifth item of the Lisbon Protocol, we would have agreed juridically that we did not possess nuclear weapons, and then we would have been rejected like worn-out horses.

[Kravchuk] How do you mean we do not possess nuclear weapons?

[Zholdak] This is what is written there.

[Kravchuk] It is written there that we do not spread nuclear weapons.

[Zholdak] If we sign it, Russia will get the right to remove anything it wants from our territory. Knowledgeable specialists told me about this.

[Kravchuk] That is what they are saying. You had better listen to what I tell you.

[Zholdak] Yes.

[Kravchuk] Has Russia joined the protocol?

[Zholdak] It has.

[Kravchuk] It has joined the protocol. Have Belarus and Kazakhstan joined it? Yes, they have. All states have joined, and Ukraine has not done so. Why? How will you explain this to people? That you are in favor of the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Tell me how you are going to spread them. Or explain to me that nonsense one hears from the lips of both ultra-left-wing and ultra-right-wing chatterboxes to the effect that we can change the codes of our warheads. I want to ask you my first and main question. These are not abstract notions. Do you want to retarget them against the United States, or Russia, or France? There is no such thing as abstract coding. The missiles are presently targeted against the United States.

[Zholdak] Yes.

[Kravchuk] However, the button is in Russia. Do you understand?

[Zholdak] Yes.

[Kravchuk] This means that, today, I, as president, have nuclear weapons, but I do not control them.

[Zholdak] We have them as a dangerous tenant?

[Kravchuk] For me, they only constitute danger. I know that the button is "there." That is why I am saying: Why don't we deactivate these weapons, and demand compensation for them, and give them away? We will never use them. Everybody must realize this.

[Zholdak] At the same time, Mrs. Thatcher said that this is protection and that this is deterrence against attacks.

[Kravchuk] In what way?

[Zholdak] If we have these formidable weapons, we will not be attacked.

[Kravchuk] But I told her. Suppose, you have a stick.

[Zholdak] Yes.

[Kravchuk] A cue. It is yours. At present, a person who sits there in the reception room holds it. Tell me, will you be able to use it?

[Zholdak] No.

[Kravchuk] Then why prattle, excuse me for the word? I have missiles that I cannot use.

[Zholdak] What can we do to make them usable for us?

[Kravchuk] It is un-re-a-lis-tic! [hyphens as published].

[Zholdak] That is why you did not want the Supreme Council's decision not [as published] to specify 36 and 42 percent of the initial reduction of nuclear weapons?

[Kravchuk] This is all nonsense, because when the service life of the warheads expires, we will transfer them irrespective of decrees or edicts. Nobody will allow a tragedy to happen. When I gathered all scientists that could be found in this sphere and we discussed this question twice at the Security Council, the scientists proved in detail that it is the manufacturer alone who can change anything. We in Ukraine do not manufacture the warheads. Russia does. The manufacturing plant installs a code and nobody else in the world knows it.

[Zholdak] I see.

[Kravchuk] We can remove the warhead and put it aside "for storage."

[Zholdak] And launch....

[Kravchuk] Never. A missile may be launched, but there will be no nuclear explosion. Because this is encoded and the codes are in Moscow. Well, this is common knowledge. Moreover, every part has its own service life. The fact that the Supreme Council did not ratify.... I reiterate, suppose that tomorrow the period of safe physical life of a missile expires.... They may refuse to ratify, I do not care. **I will remove these warheads! I am making this statement through UKRAYINSKA HAZETA. Because, tomorrow, it may be too late and, tomorrow, something irreparable may happen.** It will not be your responsibility and not the responsibility of the Supreme Council as a legislative organ, but of the president who allowed this to happen.

[Zholdak] You have made very strong statements, Leonid Makarovych.... I am already inclined to believe that this is what should be done....

[Kravchuk] I am telling you how things really are. By comparison with what may happen in connection with the nuclear weapons, Chernobyl was child's play. I do not want to intimidate anybody. We have 176 missiles, and every warhead is such a terrible force that is hard to imagine.

[Zholdak] As you are saying, one of them may explode on its own if its "death" comes?

[Kravchuk] Well, we will not allow this to happen, because we will ensure technological supervision. However, there are time limits beyond which the warheads acquire a difficult state. Then I will turn to Russia: "Take them away!" To this, specialists may say: "We will not go there. It is already dangerous." That's it! Do anything you want with them. Then you will give them away and beg to have them taken, but they will not be taken.

[Zholdak] I see.

[Kravchuk] These are such complicated things, and should not be resolved through emotions or in an unprofessional manner. One can declare with pride: "We have nuclear weapons, and we are strong!" Those who say so realize that, today, Ukraine cannot use its nuclear weapons.

[Zholdak] It appears then that it is pointless to hope that we may leave at least one missile to intimidate somebody?

[Kravchuk] Absolutely! There is, however, one thing, if we approach this problem realistically. We can see how we can use the launchers for peaceful purposes. I reiterate that nuclear weapons cannot be used by our country. We are driving ourselves into a deadlock. Why? I will tell you. Every nuclear state manufactures its own nuclear weapons.

[Zholdak] We cannot manufacture them on our own?

[Kravchuk] No, we cannot, because we do not have a nuclear industry. In order to create a nuclear industry, we need many years and tens of billions of karbovantsi.

[Zholdak] In order to manufacture them and to build a plant?

[Kravchuk] A plant.

[Zholdak] Tens of billions.... This.... This is, so far, unrealistic for us....

[Kravchuk] This may be achieved in 15 years.

[Zholdak] We will have this much money?

[Kravchuk] No, if this question arises and the entire economy is aimed at this, as well as the resources and the people's efforts.... And if there is also money, then we could handle this.... The enrichment of uranium.... Control.... In that case, the state does everything on its own. Nobody sells nuclear weapons to anybody. It is not a rifle. A state that proclaims itself as nuclear, must have the entire nuclear cycle. By its decree, the Supreme Council has, in fact, proclaimed Ukraine's nuclear status. On what grounds? We are not a nuclear power. We only have the nuclear weapons that we have inherited. The world and Yeltsin are saying: Once you have proclaimed yourselves as a nuclear power, take upon

yourselves all the relevant responsibilities. Can you service your nuclear weapons? No. Can you create them? No. Do you have technological provision or spare parts? No. What do you want then? What can I say to that? Nothing.

[Zholdak] Is this what Yeltsin wrote to you?

[Kravchuk] Not in these words, but this is the meaning. Another thing. He wrote about the consequences of all of this for Russia. If you are a nuclear power, then why should we service your nuclear complexes? You must do that on your own. What do we need all those intricacies for? You have not joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, whereas Russia has. By helping you, we will be in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. For my part, I am telling him: We want compensation. For us, this is the main issue. So that there is no recurrence of our transferring our weapons for free. After all, it is the people's work. Both tactical and strategic weapons cost something. Let us resolve these issues: One—compensation, and the other—security for our statehood....

[Zholdak] They will agree and then deceive us.

[Kravchuk] Well, if we proceed from this, then not a single document can be signed. This is not serious. The third condition is financial and technological assistance. Three aspects. Shall we resolve them? Then we will proceed further, and the Supreme Council will return to this question. I am sure of it.

[Zholdak] Did you say that to him?

[Kravchuk] To him and to Clinton.

[Zholdak] You have already answered his [Yeltsin's] letter?

[Kravchuk] Of course. I wrote and also said this in a conversation.

[Zholdak] What kind of letter was that of Yeltsin's? Benevolent? Without any ultimatums?

[Kravchuk] There were no ultimatums. He reasons what and how could be done. That he is concerned. That the world may look upon Ukraine as a state that may be blamed for halting nuclear disarmament. You know what they say and write abroad: You have not joined the treaty, you have, in fact, failed to ratify the treaty, and, therefore, you stand in the way of total nuclear disarmament. START I is followed by START II. If historians start analyzing, believe me, we will be accused of causing political and military tension on our planet. You will not be able to prove anything to hi-sto-ry.

[Zholdak] It is, however, suspicious that America is so keen on our disarmament. It does not disarm itself and, while being, perhaps, the strongest nuclear power, it puts pressure upon us not to allow us to be a nuclear power. Even though we are now economically weak, our military armor and guns are powerful. That is why they [the

Americans] are preoccupied with us like big dogs with a nice little cat. The cat has sharp claws. If these claws are cut off, we will do what they want us to do or else we will be punished. We also want to be a strong state. We deserve it.

[Kravchuk] There is also much I would like to have. However, we must think soberly. The missiles deployed in Ukraine are targeted against America.

[Zholdak] That is so.

[Kravchuk] They know that the button is in Moscow. There is economic chaos both here and there. There is also political chaos. The Americans fear that this chaos may be dangerous for the world and for peace. It may occur to somebody.... When there is stability, order, discipline, and scientific supervision, it is a different matter. They are afraid. I understand them. I told Clinton that we are ready to deactivate our warheads and leave them in Ukraine. Not to transfer, but to store them here.

[Zholdak] Will they be safer then?

[Kravchuk] To begin with, safer, and I will know that the button will not be used by somebody somewhere to launch these missiles from the territory of Ukraine. I am responsible before the world. These are ideas and assumptions. We will do everything to prevent this from ever happening, but we must take into account other countries' fears.

[Zholdak] This is not bad. We can arrive at such a decision: Either you or the Supreme Council?

[Kravchuk] Yes, we can! However, we want some steps to be made toward us. We want other countries to trust us, and I will do everything I can to achieve this trust and get some normal assistance without humiliating conditions, an economic assistance and normal attitude not only because we possess nuclear weapons. We must see to it that Ukraine is looked upon as a country with high culture, science, and a large economic potential, which may be put into effect. To make first steps. We will make them, too. We will start working in a civilized manner and with respect for one another.

[Zholdak] Leonid Makarovych, they [the Americans] do not really want to help us. They promise us \$175 million. According to estimates made by specialists, up to 2 billion is necessary for disarmament. Nobody will give us that much money. Our state treasury is empty. What difference will it make if the Supreme Council does adopt a decision, which you, Yeltsin, Clinton, and the whole world expect?

[Kravchuk] After adopting such a decision, we could raise the question of money. We want it like in [Ilf and Petrov's] "Twelve Chairs" [on a blue-bordered plate—without any effort on our part]. I already said this at the Supreme Council session: If chairs are handed over in the morning, then money must be paid [the previous]

evening, or, if the chairs are handed over in the evening, then money is received [the previous] morning, but money first.

[Zholdak] Did you speak to Clinton here, from your office?

[Kravchuk] This is the telephone through which I spoke to Clinton.

[Zholdak] How did he talk to you? Politely or as a dictator?

[Editorial note] To be continued in the next issue.

Kravchuk To Meet Clinton in Kiev 12 Jan

LD1001172794 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] The Ukrainian president's and Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers' press service has just reported that agreement has been reached on a consultative meeting between Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and U.S. President Bill Clinton to be held in Kiev on 12 January to discuss issues of bilateral relations. It is also envisaged that a Ukrainian-Russian-U.S. summit will be held in Moscow on 14 January in order to complete the recent trilateral negotiations.

Kiev Confirms 14 Jan Moscow Trilateral Meeting

LD1001183694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1828 GMT 10 Jan 94

[by UKRINFORM-TASS]

[Text] Kiev January 10 TASS—The press service of the Ukrainian president confirmed that a Ukrainian-Russian-US meeting will be held in Moscow on Friday "with the aim to conclude trilateral talks".

In Brussels US President Bill Clinton announced that on Friday the United States, Russia and Ukraine will sign an agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil.

"This trilateral agreement we will sign will lead to the complete removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine", Clinton said, adding that this includes 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and some 1,500 warheads targeted on the USA.

The press service of the Ukrainian president also confirmed that a consultative meeting between Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Bill Clinton will be held in Kiev on Wednesday.

Kiev To Receive Compensation, Technology

LD1101034894 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0300 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] On 14 January the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and the United States will sign an agreement in Moscow

on the complete elimination of Ukraine's nuclear arsenals. In exchange, Ukraine will receive guarantees of security. Kiev will also receive necessary technological assistance, as well as compensation for the cost of the enriched uranium which is contained by nuclear warheads.

Kiev Casts Doubt on 'Definitive' Accord

AU1101111194 Paris AFP in English 1051 GMT
11 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev, Jan 11 (AFP)—Ukraine on Tuesday cast doubt on whether it will sign a definitive agreement to dismantle its nuclear arsenal on Friday, as announced by U.S. President Bill Clinton in Brussels.

"Despite Bill Clinton's declarations in Brussels, the Ukrainian side is not sure that the definitive version of the accord on the fate of its nuclear weapons will be signed in Moscow on January 14," Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Sergeyev said.

"If by that date the definitive version has not been worked out, realised, the three-way summit (between Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk) in Moscow will be purely consultative," Sergeyev told reporters.

Zlenko Terms Russia 'Special Strategic Partner'

MK1101100094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Jan 94 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "NEGA Reports" rubric: "Ukraine"]

[Text] Speaking on Ukrainian television, Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko stated that the inability to find the necessary ways of solving imminent problems of Ukrainian-Russian relations "does no credit to either Ukraine or Russia." However, according to Zlenko, Russia for Ukraine is a special strategic partner, and therefore the result of bilateral talks "always determines the desire to find ways to settle differences that crop up." Anatoliy Zlenko also stated that he values highly the efficiency of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev while always openly criticizing him for inconsistency. Characterizing his relations with the current Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, Zlenko stated that they are businesslike because the deputies had passed a number of documents elaborated by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular the guidelines of Ukraine's foreign policy. Zlenko expressed the wish that a future parliament of Ukraine would consist of professionals, honest people who would not so often revile Ukraine, a country which they intend to serve. The foreign minister listed among Ukraine's accomplishments last year the establishment of the first stage of foreign policy, the creation of the basis for expanding relations between states, the establishment of an embassy and consulate infrastructure abroad, and the acquiring by his agency of new premises and new diplomatic cadres. Anatoliy Zlenko pointed out

as the main event of last year the fact that the Ukrainian people "showed patience, wisdom, and good sense, and we have come to the New Year in peace and accord."

Zlenko on '93 Accomplishments, Ties With Russia

WS1101104994 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1650 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Zlenko by an unidentified reporter at the Foreign Ministry; date not given; from "Without a Protocol" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] What, in your opinion, were the most dramatic events in the sphere of foreign policy in 1993? Were they the Massandra agreements, the START-I ratification with all its provisos, the adoption of Ukrainian foreign policy directions, or some aspects of negotiations?

[Zlenko] I want to start by pointing out that Ukraine has been acknowledged by 145 nations of the world, and 132 have initiated diplomatic relations with us. This is very pleasant. This is a factor of great significance for the development of our state. With regard to dramatic events, all the issues that you mentioned had influenced the work of the Foreign Ministry in some way, as well as the life of the state in general. However, speaking of the most relevant problems that may impact on the future, I think these were nuclear issues, in particular, the discussion and ratification of START and the Lisbon Protocol. I would like to underline that right at this moment, when we are holding this interview, Ukraine is not in isolation. It enjoys normal relations with different nations of the world and this, too, gives me grounds to say that we will soon find a resolution for this difficult problem. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Andrey Kozyrev is another representative of a new generation of diplomats. You probably worked with his predecessors. Interesting situations something occur when this man says different things about Ukraine.

[Zlenko] I pay attention to this, and I openly criticize Andrey Kozyrev in his and my retinue's presence. I openly speak out at forums trying to rebut [his statements] to a maximum extent. This, in particular, happened both in Brussels and Rome. Speaking of who is victorious in such disputes.... We have special relations with Russia; we are trying to treat Russia as a special partner. Of course, a large number of unresolved, complicated problems has piled up. We are trying to find ways to resolve them which determines the nature of our negotiations. One cannot say that these issues have been unresolved because Ukraine did not try hard or because the Russian side outwitted us. I think that the very fact that these problems still exist does no credit to either Ukraine or Russia.

[Reporter] What are your relations with the current legislature? One sometimes gets the impression that the

Supreme Council treats the Foreign Ministry as an office issuing documents for lawmakers' foreign trips.

[Zlenko] I want to point out that in general, my relations with the current legislature are good. A lot of legislative acts drafted by the Foreign Ministry were approved by the Supreme Council. There were difficulties in lobbying the foreign policy concept but lawmakers finally passed it. I think that the majority of deputies have an understanding of today's foreign policy and the activities of the Foreign Ministry. Of course, there have been conflicts with some of the deputies, even overt attacks on me. But I have never descended to their level and held debates with them. I would like the next Supreme Council to be professional and manned with patriots of Ukraine with an understanding of the problems of foreign policy. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] What was your and your team's main accomplishment in 1993 on the international arena?

[Zlenko] I think that the first matter worth mentioning is the completion of the first stage of determining Ukraine's foreign policy. Second, we have managed to create the basis for developing international relations. Third, we have formed a diplomatic and consular infrastructure abroad. Finally, it is the very fact that we are now sitting in this new building with new people arriving. The process of expanding the Foreign Ministry is under way. However, the main issue for me is that during the difficult year of 1993 our people displayed courage, patience, and wisdom and that we have ended the year in peace and accord. There were no ethnic conflicts. Perhaps, the living standards have deteriorated but we have not stooped to grabbing arms to resolve ethnic or other problems. I believe that this was our main accomplishment in 1993.

National Affairs

Congress of Fifth Officers' Union Viewed

WSI021173094 Kiev VECHIRNIY KYIV in Ukrainian 6 Jan 94 p 2

[Report by Volodymyr Chikalin: "Nobody Can Prohibit Loving Ukraine"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the fifth congress of the Ukrainian Officers' Union [SOU] has taken place. Some observers predicted it could be the last congress, however, similar forecasts were voiced prior to all the previous congresses. As Mykola Rerikh once said: "The loftier the idea, the more dogs bark at it."

The fifth congress, unlike previous ones, was held in an everyday atmosphere which is understood, because the Army, like the rest of society is living through hard times. When times get hard, people concentrate on the most acute problems.

The Ministry of Defense leadership did not attend the conference, which demonstrated its attitude toward the

SOU. On the eve of the congress, the ministry discussed whether delegates should be permitted to arrive in Kiev. However, some commanders had concealed the cable with the permission to hold the congress and a group of deputies failed to show up. Those who arrived said: "Banning the SOU is like banning love for Ukraine." When I was listening to their speeches, I became more and more assured that the strengthening of the national Armed Forces had become the primary goal in these people's lives.

The union is currently being blamed for involvement in political activities. However, is it not politics to implement the national policy of safeguarding Ukraine's security? Or why not grant officers a right to express their opinions regarding reform in the Army? Yet, the military command believes that every serviceman can only express opinions regarding his post. Thus, a squad commander can only speak on behalf of his squad and not meddle in the company's affairs. Those officers refusing to live in accordance with the cobbler-should-stick-to-his-last principle are risking the loss of their posts and ranks. This information was made public at the congress—Colonel Serhiy Dudko was relieved of duty for sending a report on embezzlements of military property to a local newspaper. Even generals are being persecuted for "dissidence." Not long ago, General Major Oleksandr Rol, deputy chief of staff of the Ukrainian Air Force, expressed his viewpoint on reform of the Air Force speaking to a VECHIRNIY KYIV correspondent. For this, he fell into the Staff's and Council of Ministers' disgrace. Persecution of "dissidents" is under way at all levels.

I met a former colleague of mine who is now a military reporter, and he said: "When I visit a military unit and people learn that I am a reporter, they run away from me."

Not all the officers put up with this kind of mentality prohibiting independent thinking. Speaking at the congress, SOU Deputy Chief Hryhoriy Omelchenko said: "We must leave this conference hall having relieved ourselves from our slave mentality. Without this, one cannot be a genuine patriot."

The congress demonstrated that not all the members of the union withstood the test. Some people backed out after abandoning hope of resolving social problems, others simply got scared in the face of reactionary command's attack. There was not a single regiment, battalion, or similar level commander among the delegates. Delivering a revision committee's report, Volodymyr Tymofeyev pointed out that the number of retired officers in the union is twice as large as that of active ones. Retired officers are even chairmen of some oblast organizations. When the union was being formed that situation was easy to account for—people had nothing to lose. However, when the union was registered and entered the history of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as one of the most active forces supporting their development, a decrease in the number of union members gives

ground for thought. I have already named some of the causes of the situation, but some demand separate consideration. Among SOU members, 85 percent are represented by Ukrainians, while the number of Ukrainians in the Armed Forces is much smaller. This is why delegates discussed the issue of reviewing personnel policy. Colonel Tsybalyuk and Captain Second Rank Khryshchuk emphasized that the command is trying to ban SOU representatives from working in certification committees. The same opinions were voiced in the speech by Rukh Chairman Vyacheslav Chornovil, who added that without reforming personnel policy we cannot build a national army capable of guaranteeing Ukraine's independence.

Deputy Defense Minister Volodymyr Mulyava also spoke on working under new conditions. He called upon delegates to expand SOU's influence in all spheres of Army life. In his opinion, in the future the union should be transformed into a general association of officers and noncommissioned officers.

The words "concrete measures" were not used at the first four congresses, because at that time, a program was being drafted. Not abandoning this line, the fifth congress paid more attention to resolving current problems, in particular, the union members' image as a model in combat training and social activities. Colonel Tre-tetskyy, chief of a unit's psychological service, said in

this respect: "We used to have 17 officers in our organization; only 12 are left today, but they are real fighters for the cause of building Ukraine's Armed Forces. We are determined to serve as a model for others to follow. This opinion found its reflection in the resolution of the congress.

Today, when our Army is experiencing hard times, officers' personal examples play a very significant role. Here are a couple of examples demonstrating how difficult it is for the military to perform their functions. The Army receives only 33 percent of necessary financing and even lacks money to pay servicemen's wages in timely fashion. Thus, it is no wonder that the Defense Ministry has recently bought only one T-80 tank produced in Kharkov. Shortages of fuel and spare parts have had a negative impact on training of airmen and led to the resignation of 170 young pilots. However, it takes a lot of determination to unselfishly serve the motherland in these conditions. The fact that the union appealed for personal examples means that the organization will see better times. The more difficult the situation in the Army, the higher its rating among the people. Today, 62.5 percent of Ukrainians have confidence in the officers' corps, while among farmers this figure reaches 83 percent. The people rely on its defenders for the protection of their most cherished values—freedom and independence. This gives the Army strength and inspiration.

Belarus

Shushkevich-Yeltsin Meeting Postponed to 12 Jan

LD1001132294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1136 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Chairman of the Belarusian parliament Stanislav Shushkevich put off his visit to Moscow until January 12. He had earlier agreed with Russian President Boris Yeltsin that the visit would take place on January 11.

Valeriy Tsepkalo, an adviser of the head of parliament, told INTERFAX that Shushkevich needed more time to analyze the results of the Moscow visit by a Belarusian government team headed by Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich.

Shushkevich will go to Moscow by train, which will leave Minsk late on January 11 and arrive in Moscow early next morning.

Vasily Vorobyov, Shushkevich's press secretary, told INTERFAX that Shushkevich would meet with Yeltsin alone behind closed doors in the Kremlin on January 12.

Shushkevich will leave for Minsk on the same day and give a news conference there on January 13 about the results of his meeting with the Russian president.

Shushkevich Expresses Views on Clinton's Visit

WS1101121294 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by Valer Kalinowski: "Shushkevich on Clinton's Visit to Belarus]

[Text] [Supreme Soviet Chairman] Stanislav Shushkevich has described the upcoming 16 January official visit by U.S. President Bill Clinton as an important and positive event for Belarus. Currently, special committees are preparing and drafting special interstate agreements. Stanislav Shushkevich emphasized that an array of important agreements is to be signed during the visit. In his opinion, the main goal of the visit is to clarify positions on the main strategic objectives of our policy and, in particular, the issue of Belarus' security. We would like to obtain guarantees for the protection of our neutrality—such as Finland once received from the United States and the USSR—when Belarus implements its constitutional law on neutrality and nonnuclear status, stressed Stanislav Shushkevich. Additionally, the Belarusian Supreme Soviet chairman noted that he does not expect that such a statement can be voiced by the United States already on 16 January, however certain steps will undoubtedly be made.

Commenting on Bill Clinton's "Partnership for Peace" initiative, Stanislav Shushkevich stated that he considers it expedient to examine Belarus' official strategy in establishing in Central Europe a belt of neutral states with certain guarantees from great states of the world.

Additionally, Stanislav Shushkevich believes that Bill Clinton's visit to Minsk will contribute to Belarus' international image and encourage U.S. investment in its economy.

Shushkevich To Present Strategy for Neutral 'Belt'

WS1001153594 Minsk BELAPAN in Belarusian 1000 GMT 9 Jan 94

[Text] As BELAPAN has learned, U.S. President Bill Clinton will pay a visit to Belarus on 16 January 1994. During the visit, Belarusian and U.S. officials are expected to specify their positions on the issue of security guarantees for Belarus, which has implemented its constitutional law to become a neutral and nonnuclear state. Although it is unlikely that such guarantees will be announced on 16 January, in a conversation with BELAPAN, [Supreme Soviet Chairman] Stanislav Shushkevich said that he will present, within the framework of Bill Clinton's Partnership for Peace initiative, Belarus' strategy for establishing a belt of neutral countries in Central Europe.

Problems connected with the protection of U.S. investments in Belarus will also be discussed during the negotiations.

Shushkevich Dismisses Kebich's Plan To Join NATO

LD1001191694 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1815 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] In an exclusive interview with a BELINFORM correspondent, Belarus Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich confirmed news agency reports that he is to meet with Boris Yeltsin. The sides intend in the very near future to make adjustments to their positions before U.S. President Bill Clinton's coming visit to Moscow and Minsk, and also to discuss the major problems of Belarusian-Russian relations.

Stanislav Shushkevich said the state of our economy is critical. Moreover, I do not support suggestions that joining a single ruble zone will solve all our problems. [Words indistinct] sick and must be cured. We ourselves must find ways of restoring our economy on market relations. If that does not happen, the republic will be threatened with a terrible collapse.

Speaking about Bill Clinton's coming visit to Minsk, Shushkevich noted that if we solve theoretically such problems as disarmament, conversion, and monetary questions, then signing the corresponding agreements after that will be essentially just a technicality. So it is hardly likely that many specific documents will be signed in Minsk. That will have to be done in the future.

Stanislav Shushkevich's statement also dealt with the INTERFAX report quoting Vyacheslav Kebich as saying that after Russia joins NATO, Belarus may also become a member of that bloc. The point is, the speaker

explained, that all Belarus's most important documents, including the constitutional law, indicate that Belarus adheres to a path of neutrality and of not adhering to any blocs. We have a completely different foreign policy doctrine, at whose center lies neutrality. Belarus never officially declared its desire to enter the North Atlantic union. This statement is no way connected with the CIS countries' collective security treaty, which Vyachaslav Frantsavich [Kebich] has always supported. Perhaps this is some sort of mistake by journalists, Stanislaw Shushkevich concluded.

Shushkevich Criticizes Monetary Unification

WS1001182594 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian
4 Jan 94 p 1, 3

[Statement by Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich in Minsk on 31 December: "On Unification of Belarusian and Russian Monetary Systems"—first paragraph is ZVYAZDA introduction]

[Text] On the eve of the new year, Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman S. Shushkevich met with the staff of our newspaper and answered numerous questions. Mr. Shushkevich concentrated on the issue of creating the ruble zone. What is his assessment of this move by the Belarusian parliament? What implications will it have for Belarusian citizens? When should the unification be expected? Here is what Stanislav Shushkevich told journalists.

[Shushkevich] I abstained from voting on the issue of unification of the monetary systems because this is not the only way to solve this problem. Even when Russia, for political reasons, accepts the losses it would incur by the merger, our life will continue to depend on the way we manage our economy. No one is going to take care of us all the time. But what kinds of situations might this move create? For example, salaries may not be paid out because a Russian bank did not release the cash. (Incidentally, it would be a wise thing to do—one should shrewdly conduct business.) Thus, all this can give rise to populist politicians who want to capitalize on this move. Let us see what advantages it will bring for the Belarusian economy? Take our tractor plant, for instance. Suppose the price for one tractor is about 1 million Russian rubles [R]. For this money, the plant can receive 4 million "hares" [nickname for Belarusian national currency] at the official exchange rate. The purchasing power of our currency, as far as foodstuffs are concerned, is almost the same as that of the Russian ruble. So what do we get? A rank-and-file worker gains by exchanging the "hare" for the ruble. However, it is like a shot out of the blue for the manager of the tractor plant. Now, with the plant's funds in Russia, he is able to settle their accounts for raw materials and components, while here he has to pay using the one-to-four exchange rate.

By the way, Fedorov and Gerashchenko no longer have anything against this idea. Only their deputies continue

to press for the one-to-two rate. A political decision certainly depends on Russia's highest leadership.

I believe that different prices for energy sources is the key issue in our relations with Russia today. This undermines our economy. Experts estimate that energy consumption accounts for 4 percent of the production cost of the world's best tractors. The figure for Belarusian tractors is almost twice as big. If this tendency continues, energy consumption might jump to 15 percent this year. In this case, we will pay 40 ECU more for oil than Russia, greatly reducing the competitiveness of our products. This puts our economy at the edge of an abyss.

Among consequences that we could see from the merger of our currencies is the removal of all custom duties. However, one should be completely frank here. When the OPEC countries gather for their meetings, they do not decide what price they should sell oil to Germany or France. They set just one common price. Russia is a kind of OPEC for us. What happened? It set different prices for Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Even though we behaved ourselves, we pay 40 ECU more for their oil than clients inside Russia. We should be outspoken about this if we consider ourselves honest politicians. What kind of political union it is supposed to be when it makes our economy a mess. I think it tightens the noose around our neck, which is in the interests of Russia. I believe that in this situation, Russia should make some concessions to us and cancel all customs payments. And when we manage to merge our monetary systems along decent and fair lines, I think a lot of government members, bank chairmen, and many other officials will lose their jobs. It is going to be a time for tough monetary policies, which many politicians are not able to accept because of their market-hostile mentality.

Opposition Denounces Shushkevich, Opposes NATO Entry

WS1001155394 Minsk RID in Russian 1025 GMT
10 Jan 94

[Text] Representatives of the opposition Belarusian Popular Front [BNF], Z. Paznyak, V. Golubev, and S. Naumchik have held a news conference at the Belarusian Supreme Soviet. In the words of S. Naumchik, "despite the resistance of certain circles," U.S. President Clinton will visit Kuropaty [burial site of thousands of victims murdered by Soviet security police in the 1930's] on 16 January and meet with BNF Chairman Z. Paznyak. "The initiative to meet came from the American side," Z. Paznyak specified. The parliamentary opposition leader also voiced harsh criticism of Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich for signing the CIS Collective Security Treaty. He accused Shushkevich of betraying the national interests of Belarus. Speaking on the issue of unifying the Belarusian and Russian monetary systems, Z. Paznyak noted that Russia is "waging economic war against Belarus," and that the last agreement concluded by Yeltsin, Kebich, and Chernomyrdin means that "our country has surrendered." At the news

conference, parliamentary opposition activists denounced Belarus' entry into NATO. "Only a policy of neutrality and the support of European states will help Belarus survive," Z. Paznyak emphasized. In addition, he said he doubted that the elections set for this spring will actually take place.

Discrepancies With Russia on Monetary Union Reported

WS1001152794 Minsk BELAPAN in Belarusian 1156 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] As BELAPAN has learned at the National Bank of Belarus [NBB], there are two principal discrepancies between Belarus and the Russian Federation as to the unification of monetary systems of the two countries. The first one concerns currency exchange rates. Belarus insists that NBB's bills be exchanged for Russian rubles at the one to one rate. Russia demands that the rate be one Russian ruble to three Belarusian ones. Another controversy is that whereas Belarus demands that Russia's internal prices for energy sources be extended to Belarus, representatives of the Russian Government do not agree with this. The Russian Ministries of Finance and Economy present a particularly uncompromising position. Yet another meeting of Russian and Belarusian Government delegations is to be held in January, at which attempts to solve the problems are to be made. The visit last week to Moscow by a Belarusian delegation resulted, as is known, in signing another declaration on intentions to unify the monetary-credit systems of Belarus and Russia.

Government Program for Military Conversion Viewed

LD1001215994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1736 GMT 10 Jan 94

[by BELINFORM-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Minsk, 10 Jan—"Conversion—employment—entrepreneurship—energy saving." The government of Belarus has embarked on creating a national program under this title. While it is being implemented, it will provide jobs for about 7,000 military servicemen in the republic who are now living in military townlets which the Russian strategic troops are leaving. Soon former servicemen and the members of their families will be able to work in the sphere of small and medium-sized business. Representatives of entrepreneurial structures of the republic and the Minsk energy center of the European community have declared an interest in this.

The military townlets in the Polotsk, Gomel, Klimovichi, and Bykhov rayons will be the first to be reconstructed. The prospects for their transformation were discussed at an international seminar on conversion which ended in Minsk today.

The problem of creating new jobs for military servicemen was discussed with representatives of international labor organizations and business circles of Britain, Italy, the United States, and Switzerland. Representatives of the World Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development have said they are willing to take part in financing the program.

Official Denies Transfer of Oswald Files to Clinton

LD1001171794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1613 GMT 10 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] In an interview with Interfax the chief of Belarus's Security Committee, Eduard Shirkovskiy, has dismissed rumors that the copies of the files relating to Lee Harvey Oswald, who was charged with having assassinated President John Kennedy, will be handed to President Bill Clinton during his visit to Minsk. The massive files relating to Oswald, who lived in Minsk for some time, are in the archives of the Belarusian KGB.

According to Shirkovskiy, "the Oswald files are classified, and in the absence of parliamentary resolution on the destiny of the KGB archives it's impossible to hand these materials to any one."

Ukrainian Ex-Prime Minister Kuchma Arrives on Visit

WS1001210794 Minsk BELAPAN in Belarusian 1700 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Unattributed report: "Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma Has Arrived in Minsk"]

[Text] On 10 January, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma arrived in Minsk at the invitation of the Belarusian Confederation of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. He met with Mikhail Lawrinovich, president of the Belarusian Scientific-Industrial Association [BSIA]. During talks, the parties discussed cooperation between the BSIA and the Ukrainian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs [UAIE], headed by Leonid Kuchma.

On 11 January, Leonid Kuchma will meet with a group of deputies of various levels, representatives of government structures, and various economic and public organizations. A press conference regarding the results of this meeting will be held after the end of the talks. Tomorrow, Leonid Kuchma is going to visit one of the larger enterprises in Minsk; it will likely be the Minsk automobile factory. BELAPAN has learned that the parties are going to sign a cooperation agreement between BSIA and the UAIE.

The visit by Leonid Kuchma will conclude on 12 January.

Europarlament Delegation Continues Visit, Holds Talks

WS1101092194 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Belarusian 5 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by BELINFORM: "Europarlament Delegation in Belarus"]

[Text] A Europarlament delegation for cooperation with CIS states has arrived in Minsk.

Magdalene Phoff who headed this delegation said that the main aim of the visit is to get acquainted with the political and economic situation in the Republic and to widen the existing contacts between the Europarlament and Belarus.

On 4 January, Vyacheslav Kuznetsov, first deputy chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, received the members of the Europarlament delegation. During the talks, Magdalene Phoff said that the Europarlament will provide Belarus with specific aid. The Europarlament has already drafted a program for cooperation in the sphere of technology, and currently the implementation of this program is being studied.

Vyacheslav Kuznetsov, in his turn, spoke about the situation in the Republic. He said that 1994 will become a year of political activity for Belarusian citizens and a turning point for the development of the Belarusian economy. He stressed that the Supreme Soviet elections and the elections of a leader of Belarus will give an impulse to this process. The Supreme Soviet deputies are convinced that presidential elections should be carried out through nationwide elections. Further, Vyacheslav Kuznetsov, emphasized: "It is very important for us to hold presidential elections in the spring of 1994. A new president will form a new government; later, we could elect a new legislature."

The first deputy chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet spoke about the moves of the Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet aimed at the creation of an economic union and a ruble zone of a new type. This will enable us to upgrade cooperation among the CIS states and, particularly, to bolster economic cooperation. Speaking on the historic relations with Russia, Vyacheslav Kuznetsov emphasized that in the new political and economic situation the Supreme Soviet is striving to integrate the Belarusian economy into the world economic community. In connection with this, the lawmakers have adopted a range of laws regarding the foreign economic relations which, in the experts' opinion, correspond to existing international norms.

On the same day, Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanka and CIS Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya received the Europarlament delegation.

Moldova

Snegur Rebuts 'Irresponsible Accusations'

PM1001125994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Jan 94 p 6

[Lyudmila Feliksova report: "Moldova: President's Protest"]

[Text] Chisinau—The election struggle in Moldova is gathering momentum. The usual methods are being employed to see who can inflict the worst bite. An official spokesman for the Moldovan president has issued a statement on the election campaign, in the course of which M. Snegur's is being bandied about in a variety of contexts and for a variety of reasons. Opposition political forces are accusing him, in particular, of not failing to give international publicity to the conflict in the Dniester region and of bringing about economic disaster in the republic. The president rejected all these charges as absurd and unsubstantiated. Snegur promised to issue a statement in the very near future "in response to irresponsible accusations by those who have turned patriotism into a trade" and to name those who are really to blame for the bloody conflict on the Dniester. Snegur once again peremptorily brushed aside suspicion of being involved in affairs connected with a branch of the Seabeco firm, which is headed by his son-in-law. Finally, he expressed confidence that the people will make their choice and thereby dot all the "i's."

Press Agency Denies Rumors of Ilascu's Execution

AU1001191794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Correspondent Mircea Dascaluic report from Chisinau]

[Text] MOLDOVA PRESS has issued some information denying rumors according to which the sentence to death by shooting, pronounced in the case of Ilies Ilascu by the court of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic was carried out yesterday, on 9 January, after one month had passed since the respective sentence had been pronounced. The MOLDOVA PRESS correspondent contacted competent sources at the Presidency, Parliament, and Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Moldova, which categorically denied these rumors, calling them ill-favored and conniving in the current social-political context, their disseminators having other goals in mind than the ones directed by common sense and healthy reasoning.

According to MOLDOVA PRESS, Ilies Ilascu continues to be imprisoned in the Chlnaia-Grigoriopol Prison. As a matter of fact, in an interview granted exclusively to our radio station, Mr. Nicolae Andronic, president of the parliamentary subcommission in charge of solving the conflict in the eastern rayons of the Republic of Moldova made the following statement:

[Begin recording] [Andronic] What can happen because one month has passed? I do not know where the term one month comes from, but in the old legislation, which the Dniester Region is currently observing, it is not stipulated that the sentence should be carried out within one month or less than a month. The respective legislation stipulates that in two days the accused can still submit an appeal for a pardon.

[Unidentified reporter] Then why was the term of one month mentioned for submitting the pardon appeal in case of a sentence against which, the court stated, no appeal can be made.

[Andronic] Thus, again, the term one month was used more as a political than a legal term. A certain date was

announced to ruffle spirits and set an ultimatum, maybe not a direct one, but an indirect one. However, I want to tell you that, currently, the date of 12 January is expected when the State Duma will start its proceedings in [word indistinct]. After Maracuta's [Grigore, president of Dniester Republic Parliament] latest visit there, he found people to support among those who [word indistinct] as a results of the elections in the Duma. This in order to receive something from Moscow. [end recording]

[Dascaliuc] This was the statement made to our correspondent in Chisinau, by Nicolae Andronic, president of the parliamentary subcommission in charge of solving the conflict in the eastern rayons of the Republic of Moldova.

Tajikistan

Russian Troops Come Under Attack on Afghan Border

'Militants' Attack Russian Guards

LD1001132494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1136 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Tajik militants attacked Russian border guards three times over the weekend. As a Russian officer reported to Interfax, the rear of the 12th outpost of Moscow's Border Unit came under fire from mortars, recoilless guns, and rocket installations.

A Russian border outpost on Turg mountain and Parvar and Arvar villages were also attacked. The servicemen suffered no casualties. Counter strikes were delivered on the militants' positions.

The officer also reported an attempt by a gang of militants to break through a border section guarded by the 3rd outpost of the Pyanj Border Unit. After a clash with guards, the gang retreated back into Afghanistan.

Stepped-up militant activity is linked to better weather conditions on the Tajik-Afghan border.

Opposition Forces Attack Russian Troops

LD1001232894 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1930 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border is not calm. According to officers of the Russian operational group in Dushanbe, over the past few days the Tajik opposition has continued its armed provocations from the territory of Afghanistan. The 12th and 13th outposts of the Russian border troops and the positions of the servicemen of the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division are being subjected to sporadic firing. Fortunately there are no casualties among the servicemen of the Russian Federation.

According to the Russian military, the new spiral of tension on the border has been caused by the exacerbation of the military and political situation in Afghanistan, where clashes between various conflicting groups are taking place.

Russians Deny 8-9 Jan Missile Attack

PM1101112394 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

[Valeriy Yakov report: "No Shooting at Russian Border Guard Subunits on This Occasion"]

[Text] Sundry news reports over the last few days have repeatedly announced that the Moscow Border Guard Troops 13th Subunit in Tajikistan had come under missile fire Saturday and Sunday [8-9 January]. The Russian Border Guard Troops Press Bureau refutes these reports.

There was indeed fire along the border over the weekend, as reported by INTERFAX citing the headquarters of Russian Border Guard Troops in Tajikistan. But for some unknown reason the report went on to identify the 13th Subunit and even mentioned the exact number of missiles launched against it—five on Saturday and seven on Sunday. Moreover, the time when they were fired was given down to the minute.

On hearing this report on the radio, the duty operations officers at Border Guard Troops headquarters in Moscow were initially alarmed: Why had they not been informed of these facts? It proved to be a false alarm. In actual fact—and reports to this effect had arrived at headquarters—Tajik opposition gunmen had fired mortars and recoilless rifles at positions held by border guard troops from the 12th Subunit on 7 January.

On Saturday the gunmen launched five rocket-propelled projectiles and fired two recoilless rifle rounds at the village of Pervar. On Sunday, again using recoilless rifles, they fired eight rounds at the village of Arvar. The fire came from the territory of Tajikistan. Both villages are located in the zone controlled by the 12th Border Guard Troops Subunit and the gunmen's positions came under appropriate retaliatory fire. We are very happy to report that there have been no casualties among servicemen from the 12th Subunit, let alone from the 13th Subunit.

Parliamentary Coup, Internal Political Scene Assessed

LD1001183294 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Station commentary]

[Text] During the past week as well as during the first days after the 18th session of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, the deterioration of the situation in relations between the Center and Leninabad oblast has not decreased. On the contrary it [deterioration of situation] has been increased.

The Parliamentary coup, as a result of which the dynasty of ex-Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullodzanov fell, became the theme of a lot of talks in different circles in Khujand.

According to a report on Radio Liberty, this event in particular became the reason for the intense rivalry between the ethnic groups and political disputes between the dynasties which are fighting for power.

A well known Tajik journalist [word indistinct] writes: The existence of the groups and the dynasties which are fighting for power in Tajikistan is a reality which one cannot deny. At no other time was the government of Tajikistan in such a state of disarray and mistrust. The politicians are developing the spirit of the local tendencies by their actions among the citizens and explain all

their mistakes and failures only because of the existence of misunderstandings between the groups and the dynasties.

Recently, thanks to the efforts of the so-called Kulyabi dynasty, the representatives of the Khujand dynasty [words indistinct] Abdullodzanov, former chairman of the Council of Ministers and his relatives, Homidov, chairman of the executive committee of Leninabad oblast and his supporters were removed from power. Abdulmadjid (?Dostiyev), first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan and Abdulmadjid Samadov the new prime minister arrived in Khujand during the final days of 1993. They have relieved (?Abuljalil Homidov), [chairman of the executive committee of Leninabad oblast] as well as the prosecutor of the oblast, the head of department of Internal Affairs and the head of the National Security Committee of the oblast of their posts and have appointed to these posts the people who are loyal to the Central government.

According to the latest news, (?Homidov) is at present at the government hospital of Tashkent city. Ergash Kurbonov, the other representative of this dynasty who was the head of the Leninabad oblast National Security Committee and who took the initiative in killing and arresting hundreds of opposition supporters have fled the oblast. Kurbonov, being an experienced employee of the KGB and former chairman of Committee on Legislation and the Human Rights of the Parliament of Tajikistan, has played a big role during the bloody events of Tajikistan. In particular, he took a great part in formation of the people's front in Syrkhandarya oblast of Uzbekistan and exerting big pressure on the people's deputies in the town of Khujand during the historical [16th] session of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan. And it was Ergash Kurbonov, who by the order of Rakhmanov forced the deputies of Leninabad oblast to abandon their separatist views and to come to Dushanbe for the 18th session of the Supreme Soviet.

But all these worthy services of the latter could not change the decision of Dushanbe with respect to him. The oblast [Leninabad] calmly reacted to the forced resignation of its leaders. According to many analysts, the reason of this is that Abdullojonov and Homidov have transformed the new economic structures in oblast into their dynasty's monopoly and caused hindrance to dozens of businessmen and entrepreneurs. That is why this middle class of the Khujandi society have approved the sudden changes; but on the contrary the reaction of the leadership of the neighboring Republic of Uzbekistan to these events was provocative.

Right after the resignation of the top persons of Leninabad oblast, two platoons of the army of Uzbekistan left Tavildarinskiy rayon and one platoon left the mountainous region of Mastchoh and Aniyskiy, former Zahmatobod, rayon and returned to Tashkent.

The relations between Imamali Rakhmanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan and Uzbek President

Islam Karimov have become further complicated. All of these are evidence to the fact that lately the leadership of Uzbekistan had relied on Abdullojonov and Homidov. In particular the proposals related to revival of the presidential structure and nomination of (?Homidov) to this post could be the evidence of this. It is thought that these proposals have been started from Tashkent. The support given to the above-mentioned proposals by Uzbek speaking deputies of the Parliament and the Society of Uzbeks of Tajikistan also point to the same conclusion.

The measures of Tashkent with respect to Imamali Rakhmanov took place at the time when the latter has established close relations with Afghan President Borhanoddin Rabbani. It is possible that the latest events in Afghanistan may be connected with these political games. At present, the units and companies of the Uzbek Army have only remained in the border region of Shaartuzskiy rayon and their presence is because of the events in Afghanistan.

Similarly, protection of the Tajik-Uzbek border in the north has been reinforced after the changes in Khujand. Tashkent fears that in the case of the deterioration of the situation in Khujand oblast [as heard], the unrest could spread to Fergana, Syrdarya, Tashkent, Dzhisakh, Samarkand and Bukhara oblasts.

According to the opinions of the local observers, the action of Imamali Rakhmanov related to relieving the leadership of Leninabad oblast of their post as well as resignation of Abdullojonov took place because of Russia's support. Essentially, all these rivalries are the result of contradictions between Russia and Uzbekistan in order to have influence in Tajikistan. However, according to analysts, the course of events could completely destroy the situation in the region and cause even greater bloodshed. The experts say that only finding a way of reconciliation between the government of Tajikistan and the Tajik opposition can solve this case.

Official Meets With Iranian, ECO Officials

NC1001155294 Mashhad EQTESAD-E KHORASAN
ECONOMIC WEEKLY in Persian 1 Jan 94 p 11

[Text] Deputy Foreign Minister of Tajikistan Kholamreza Mirzayev [name and title as published] has met with Mir 'Ali Asghar Musavi, director general of the West Asian desk at the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and with the head of the Economic Cooperation Organization [ECO] Council of Deputies in the Tajikistan Foreign Ministry.

During this meeting, expanding economic cooperation between Tajikistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran within the framework of the ECO was assessed. According to Tajikistan radio, the Islamic Republic of Iran's ambassador to Tajikistan, Mojtahed-Shabestari, stated that the induction of the newly independent

central Asian Republic of Tajikistan into the ECO has created the possibility of its economic cooperation with the countries of the region.

Turkmenistan

President, Foreign Minister Meet Pakistan's Ali

BK1101043394 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 0200 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, who is now on a visit to Turkmenistan, has called on President Saparmurad in Ashkhabad. They exchanged views on bilateral and international issues. The foreign minister briefed the Turkmenistan president about the massive human rights violations and the atrocities committed by Indian troops in occupied Kashmir. The Turkmenistan president concurred that the Kashmir issue should be resolved peacefully and that continuing human rights violations there should be halted. They also discussed the situation in Afghanistan.

After the meeting, Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ali told newsmen that the two sides expressed willingness to take solid steps to strengthen ties. Pakistan International Airlines will begin its flights between Karachi and Ashkhabad from 2 February. Pakistan will offer a loan of \$10 million to Turkmenistan. Both the countries will provide \$20 million each for development projects and will exchange delegations to explore the possibilities for larger cooperation.

The foreign minister also met with his Turkmenistan counterpart, Khalykberdi. They stressed the need for including the agricultural sector besides communications, transport, and trade in the ambit of cooperation. Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali also exchanged views with Turkmenistan authorities on the laying of a gas pipeline from the Turkmenistan border town of (Khushka) to the Pakistani region (?Jhelum). He agreed on the preparation for an initial feasibility study report on this project. This project is expected to cost \$2 billion.

Uzbekistan

Kazakh President Nazarbayev Arrives on Visit

LD1001153294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1437 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vilor Niyazmatov]

[Text] Tashkent January 10 TASS—Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev arrived in Tashkent on an official visit on Monday. His plane just landed in Tashkent airport.

This is his first trip to neighbouring Uzbekistan this year. In 1993 the leaders of the two republics held five such meetings in Tashkent, Almaty, Kokchetav, Kzyl Orda and Chimkent.

Those were not spontaneous or off-hand meetings. It is common knowledge that official contacts and the policy pursued by the two leaders who have already been recognised by the world will largely affect the situation in the entire Central Asian region. Each such meeting helps solve urgent economic and social problems and lay the foundation for building a common market in the region.

These issues will feature prominently during the talks between Nazarbayev and Uzbek leaders. The sides are expected to sign a package of documents which will bring the two countries even closer together and provide a basis for stronger cooperation.

It is symbolic that today's meeting between Nazarbayev and Uzbek President Islam Karimov has coincided with the first anniversary of the creation of the term "Central Asia" coined by the leaders of Kazakhstan and five Central Asian republics at their summit meeting in Tashkent last January. It was then that the Central-Asian-region notion was brought to life. Despite all economic hardships it has taken firm roots in the political lexicon. Although not all goals were fulfilled at that meeting, regional integration is beginning to take up real shape.

Further on Arrival

LD1001214894 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Jan 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev arrived today on an official visit to Uzbekistan. The leaders of the two countries signed a package of documents necessary for the creation of a single economic space between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. [video shows nazarbayev arriving at airport]

[Begin Nazarbayev recording] I think we will open the borders for trade, we will remove the customs barriers, we will remove licensing and quotas; when we are in different monetary systems and national currencies this can only be beneficial. [end recording]

The heads of the Central Asian states are to discuss another global problem, the problem of the Aral, which they will visit tomorrow. [video shows President Karimov at airport]

[Begin Karimov recording] If today we do not take this initiative then it will be impossible to solve this problem, and its consequences will be felt not only in the lives of people but—this is most terrible—on the genetic pool of people, and one cannot look at the future of this region as a whole, and not just this region, without a solution to the problem of the Aral, the Aral problem. [end recording]

Karimov, Nazarbayev Sign Accords

LD1101094194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0632 GMT 11 Jan 94

[BY ITAR-TASS correspondents Vladimir Akimov, Amangeldy Akhmetlimov]

[Text] Tashkent, 11 Jan—Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have demonstrated goodwill. The negotiations between the two countries' official delegations, headed by Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov, ended late yesterday evening in a spirit of complete understanding.

As a result, a number of important documents directed at intensifying integration processes have now seen the light of day. Among other things, a treaty on the creation of a single economic space between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has been signed, along with agreements on intensifying cooperation between the two countries in culture, healthcare, science, education, tourism, and sport, on settlement of mutual payments in accordance with results of trade and economic cooperation in 1992 and 1993, and on the organization of payments in 1994.

This morning, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov set off for the town of Nukus, capital of Karakalpakstan, to participate in the conference of heads of state of the Central Asian region on the problems of lake Aral.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Ali Arrives

BK0701142894 Islamabad PTV Television Network in English 1400 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Text] The foreign minister, Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, has arrived in Tashkent on the first leg of his week-long visit to the Central Asia states of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. He was received at the airport by his Uzbek counterpart Mr. Saidmukhtar Saidkasymov. Talking to newsmen at Tashkent airport, he said the Government of Pakistan attaches great importance to improving bilateral relations with the Central Asian countries, especially in trade and commerce. He said he

is carrying a message of goodwill from the prime minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto, for the Uzbek president, Mr. Islam Karimov. Earlier on his departure for Tashkent from Islamabad airport today, Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali said he will exchange views with the leadership of the Central Asian countries on regional situation, including latest developments in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and ECO [Economic Cooperation Organization] affairs. Talking to PTV representative Abdul Khaliq Sarghana, he said he will review the progress on agreements signed between Pakistan and these states.

[Begin Ali recording] The Central Asian republics are practically our neighbors and we have good relations with them; and since this government has just come in, we have to reinforce these relations and try to improve the relations in the regional context. [end recording]

Tashkent-Built Ilyushin Passes Flight Tests

PM1001154994 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Video report by Mukhtar Ganiyev and Sadyr Ziyamukhamedov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [video opens with shot of airliner taxiing] [Ganiyev] After lengthy tests, the aircraft builders of the Chkalov Aviation Production Association in Tashkent today released the first Il-114 passenger plane for use by the Uzbekistan airline. Hava Yolari, Uzbekistan's national airline, has acquired two of these planes. The comfortable passenger compartment has room for 64 people. The fundamentally new, multiblade, virtually silent engines are twice as powerful and economical as those of the An-24. It can even land and take off from a dirt strip. The cabin controls have been simplified as much as possible. Many of the instruments have been replaced by an on-board computer. The new plane will replace the outdated Yak-40 and An-24 on CIS internal routes. To be frank, this shows that once again the series production of modern equipment is reliant on economic integration between Russia, Uzbekistan, and other CIS states.. [video shows extensive views of aircraft interior and exterior]

Armenia

Karabakh Forces Report Large Azeri Losses

NC1001213094 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First
Program Network in Armenian 2050 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] According to the latest information obtained from the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] Defense Army Press Service, the Azerbaijani side has been carrying out a large-scale offensive all along the war front since 0700 this morning. The enemy directed its main thrust in the direction of Matagis and Hakop Kamari [Lulasaz] in Mardakertskiy Rayon in northern Karabakh, Agdam-Askeran in the east, and Fizuli-Gadrut in the south.

In the afternoon, the Armenian forces managed to halt the offensive and then regrouped and launched a counterattack. The Karabakh Defense Army units managed to encircle and destroyed a large enemy Army unit made up of two battalions, that is, 300 soldiers, which was moving in the direction of Matagis and Hagop-Kamari. (Two) were killed and 15 injured on the Armenian side.

Again, following fierce battles in the direction of Agdam-Askeran, in the afternoon the Karabakh formations managed to halt the Azerbaijani advances and completely destroy an enemy battalion, nearly 200 soldiers.

An important post was ceded to the enemy in Martuninskiy Rayon in the morning. However, it was retaken in the afternoon. Here, Azerbaijanis lost 30 soldiers. There are injured on the Armenian side and their numbers are being determined.

The Karabakh Defense Army units' operations were more successful in the southern war front in the direction of Fizuli-Gadrut. There, they halted the enemy's attack and then launched a counteroffensive and penetrated 12 km into enemy territory. According to preliminary reports, both sides have losses in this sector, and casualty figures are being determined.

The same source reports that the Azerbaijani side used the Air Force today. The aircraft violated NKR's airspace but did not take part in the combat operations, apparently their purpose was reconnaissance.

Battles were still continuing all along the Karabakh fronts as of 1830 today.

Government Issues Statement on Karabakh Conflict

NC1001153494 Yerevan ARMENPRES International
Service in Armenian 1041 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Statement issued by the Armenian Government in Yerevan on 8 January]

[Text] Having once again rejected the CSCE and the Russian Federation plan for the peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan unilaterally renounced the cease-fire and launched new military

operations, not only against Nagorno-Karabakh but also all along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. This time an intensified economic blockade, now being implemented even on the territory of a neutral country, is accompanying the military operations. The gas pipeline entering Armenia was again blown up on Georgian territory. It has not yet been repaired.

All this proves that Azerbaijan, having chosen the use of force as the only way to solve the problem, is trying at all costs to drag Armenia into the conflict. Azerbaijan is attempting to internationalize the conflict by using armed men from other countries in its combat operations. It obstinately tries to implement a visionless plan: Every time its aggressive operations fail, it resorts to every propaganda gimmick to present itself to the international community and various international forums as the victim of Armenian aggression. All such statements are then followed by massive new offensives.

The Armenian Government resolutely condemns Azerbaijan's policy of solving the problem by the use of force, a policy that is fraught with the danger of the eventual deepening of the conflict between the two peoples and will in the end lead to further human loss on the Azerbaijani side and diminish the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh-Azerbaijani conflict.

Armenia has always favored a peaceful solution to the problem and is ready to continue its efforts in this direction.

Spokesman Views Karabakh, Pipeline, Iran Talks

NC1001191994 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First
Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Report by Gevorg Nazaryan on news conference held by presidential Press Secretary Aram Abrahamyan in Yerevan on 10 January]

[Text] Today's news conference was of interest for reporters not only because it was the first of the year but because recently the political situation has become tense in the Karabakh conflict zone and in Armenian-Georgian border regions.

In congratulating the reporters on the occasion of the new year, Press Secretary Aram Abrahamyan said:

[Begin Abrahamyan recording] As is already known to you, an unprecedented escalation of military operations has been taking place in Nagorno-Karabakh since 18 December. Having rejected every peace plan, Azerbaijan is launching fierce offensives all along the Karabakh-Azerbaijan front. The Azerbaijani infringements have taken place against our Republic in recent days. The political assessment of these operations has already been made in the statements issued by the Republic's president and government.

Azerbaijan is again entertaining the illusion that the problem could be solved by military means. The neighboring country is always paying dearly to be convinced that such illusions do not conform with reality.

Regarding our position, Armenia has always realized that there is no military solution to the problem. Therefore, the Armenian leadership will use all the possibilities, even the infinitesimal ones, at its disposal to make the problem a political one. [end recording]

Regarding Armenian-Russian relations, the press secretary said that they are stable and practical. As you know, the Armenian prime minister was in Moscow at the beginning of this year. The result was positive on the three main issues under discussion: the nuclear power plant, unfreezing of credits, and trade-economic relations between the countries in 1994.

Mr. Abrahamyan referred to the reoperation of the gas pipeline entering Armenia through Georgia. It is obvious that in this case also we are dealing with one of the worst manifestations of the Azerbaijani militaristic policy. The neighboring republic is sending terrorist and sabotage groups to another country, in this case Georgia, and is blowing up the only gas pipeline entering Armenia and is mining the area around the pipeline. The Armenian Government is taking various measures to resolve the gas pipeline issue. Following the meeting between the three deputy prime ministers of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, there was a possibility that mine cleaning work would begin. However, certain problems have arisen between the bordering Armenian and Azerbaijani villages, delaying the mine cleaning work.

Mr. Abrahamyan informed reporters of the difficulties of obtaining fuel by the Georgian railway. Stable state structures have not yet taken shape in Georgia and the state is not in full control of the situation. Talks with the Georgian Government are continuing at various levels, and there is positive movement on the issues under discussion.

The press secretary noted that U.S. colleagues have not yet succeeded in bringing heating oil to Armenia as part of humanitarian assistance.

As you also know, the Armenian president called for a Supreme Council meeting on 12 January to discuss the 1994 program for privatization. This program, as well as the 1994 socio-economic plan submitted to the parliament, arise from the situation prevailing in our Republic. There are plans to private a total of 15 percent of the industrial enterprises. Abrahamyan said: We hope that this will stimulate the development of industry.

The press secretary also said that Vice President Gagik Arutyunyan will leave for Zangezur [southern Armenia] on 11 January. The next day, an extraordinary session of the Coordination Council on Armenian-Iranian ties will be held in Megri. In addition to the members of the council, representatives from all the interested organizations, local authorities, customs posts, border guards,

and business circles in both countries have also been invited to the meeting. It is expected that [Iranian charge d'affaires in Yerevan] Ahmad Sobhani and [Armenian charge d'affaires in Tehran] Vahan Bayburdyan will also take part in the meeting. The entire complex of Armenian-Iranian economic-trade ties will be examined, such as the construction of the bridge, transit transportation, border trade, the normal functioning of customs posts, and so on.

Minister Reacts to Opposition Party Charges

NC1001214294 Yerevan SNARK in English 1611 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Yerevan, January 10 (SNARK)—Vahan Papazyan, Armenian foreign affairs minister, mentioned today that the appeal to the terror and bloodshed should be punished. Recently speaking in Vanadzor Garnik Isagulyan, deputy of the Armenian Parliament and a representative of the "Deshnaksutyun" Party [Armenia Revolutionary Federation], accused Armenian authorities declaring that "the Foreign Affairs Minister Papazyan did with the pornoproduction [word as received] trade". In his turn Vahan Papazyan appealed to the "Dashnaksutyun" making the party specify the attitude to Isagulyan and expressed his sorrow in connection with the fact that "Armenian Parliament is not only unable to express his attitude but to accuse the deputy of his declarations".

Says Party Should Denounce Deputy

NC1101090194 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Following the publication in the 7 January edition of HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN of a statement made in Vanadzor by Garnik Isagulyan, an Armenian parliamentarian, member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF], and member of the ARF's parliamentary group, the Armenian Foreign Ministry Press Service asked Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan to comment on Isagulyan's statements.

Papazyan said: I think the ARF must publicly clarify its position on this member because the Armenian security organs must know whose political views Isagulyan expressed—his own or ARF's. If they are party views, then the Armenian Justice Ministry must open a serious investigation into the ARF's programs and decide on the legality of the party.

It would be logical to expect parliament to express its position on a member.

Regrettably, this is not the first time a deputy of the Armenian Supreme Council has issued overt or covert threats or calls to topple the government in an illegitimate way. Sadly, our parliament has never shown enough strength to react to or condemn such behavior by a member.

The case is already extremely bizarre. An open call for terror and bloodshed by a deputy cannot go unpunished. Any self-respecting parliament would have stripped a deputy of his mandate for such a statement. I think that this time around parliament has no right to remain silent.

As for the calumny directed against the Armenian foreign minister—who does the orator have in mind? He has mentioned no specific name. The previous foreign minister was also appointed by the same authorities. In that case too the calumny would have been as disgusting. Isagulyan must be brought before the court. If he made his fiery revolutionary rhetoric in a feverish moment or under the influence of alcohol or drugs or if he is suffering psychological trouble—his statement does leave that impression—this should represent extenuating circumstances for Garnik Isgulyan, as long as this is confirmed by an authorized medical group and made public.

Personally in such cases I try to persist despite my heavy workload and regardless of the personal worth of the author of calumny. If we aspire to a law-based state we must realize that each of us must persist so that laws in the Republic can finally take effect, Papazyan concluded.

Azerbaijan

Army Contains Azeri Offensive; 40 Reported Dead

LD1001161094 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1516 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Jan—Karabakh defense army sub-units are managing to contain the offensive by the Azerbaijani National Army.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned by telephone from the Nagorno-Karabakh defense army headquarters that at 1700, the offensive was continuing in the north and northwest and in the east and southeast of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Approximately 40 fighters of the Azerbaijani Army were killed during the day in the southeastern Gadrut sector, according to information from Stepanakert. The source also reported that there were wounded on the Karabakh side, the number of whom was being clarified.

Ministry Says 90 Armenians Killed

NC1001175794 Baku *Azerbaijan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri* 1600 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] The following report was issued by the Defense Ministry on 10 January: Armenia's Armed Forces have been trying to attack our positions all along the front lines since yesterday. Supported by armored cars, the enemy is trying to control Agdam-Barda motor road in

the northern sector of Agdamskiy Rayon. The battles are mostly continuing around Salakhly and Kengerli settlements. The Azerbaijani troops are bravely halting the enemy's offensive. Forty enemy troops and four tanks were destroyed during the battles. There are a great number of injured. Two tanks seized as war trophies by our brave fighters are now being used to inflict destructive blows on the enemy.

Following a long artillery barrage on 9 January, the Armenian troops tried to attack our positions in Beylagan. This attack also ended in failure. According to reliable sources, the Armenian side lost 50 soldiers in this fight and more than 70 were seriously injured.

The Azerbaijani Army units destroyed the enemy's firing positions around Tonashen and Akopgomer settlements in northern Karabakh. Four Armenian armored cars, which used to shell Terterskiy Rayon, were destroyed and one T-72 tank was captured.

Armenia's Army units tried to attack our troops' positions in the Murov mountain range to the north of Kelbadzharskiy Rayon in the early hours of 10 January. Facing a strong resistance, the enemy withdrew after suffering losses.

Baku Reports Front Line Details

NC1001215694 Baku *TURAN in English* 1708 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Baku, January 10 (TURAN)—The Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan says that yesterday's fighting in the front continues.

Units of Armenian Armed Forces are attempting to intercept the initiative. Last morning they launched an offensive towards the north of the city of Agdam. Earlier they bombarded positions of the Azeri Army from "Grad" power-plants. The Armenian's attack was repelled with return firing. Having sustained losses, Armenian units retreated to their positions.

Fighting in the southern section of the front continues. The Azeri Army reached the Goradiz-Fizuli Highway. Yesterday the Armenians abandoned a number of important positions and Azeri Army units were able to reach the city of Fizuli.

The enemy has withdrawn from the village of Lulasaz and a predominant hill-top in the northern section of the frontline. The fighting near the Sarsang Reservoir continues.

For the past two days the Armenian Army lost 3 tanks, 2 BMPs and approximately 50 soldiers, say military sources.

Karabakh Defense Chief on Conflict Issues

LD1001221594

[Editorial report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1915 GMT on 10 January carries its

"Moment of Truth" program, hosted by Andrey Karaulov, who interviews Robert Kocharyan, chairman of the State Defense Committee of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The interview was recorded on 4 January 1994. Topics covered include Kocharyan's personal background, the danger of escalation of the war in Karabakh, the causes of the conflict, the Khodzhaly massacre in February 1992, whether anything has been gained since the conflict began, whether the Armenians' demands were realistic in 1988, how the Armenians obtained their weapons and whether they received aid from Armenia proper, and the state of the Karabakh economy.

Asked by Karaulov whether he would be prepared to sit down together with Azerbaijani Leader Geydar Aliyev in another edition of "Moment of Truth," Kocharyan says: "Yes, I would. What's more, we have things to talk about; I am ready, of course. I think that in general terms, if it works out, maybe it will save a few lives. If it only saves one life, it is already an achievement."

Pressed by Karaulov to confirm that Nagorno-Karabakh would never be prepared to be part of Azerbaijan, Kocharyan replies: "On 10 December 1991 a referendum was held in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the will of the people was expressed in the terms you have used. I believe that at the present time it would be more correct to freeze the war, if need be to bring in some disengaging forces which would simply take the heat out of the conflict between the two sides, and talks would be held, talks on status, talks on relations. Maybe some kind of mutually acceptable solutions would be found, some kind of treaty-based relations with Azerbaijan. It is not necessary at present, in the current situation, to touch on the subject of territorial integrity, the subject of independence, but simply to stop the war, and give people time to get their breath back. The people will decide what should then be done, it's their right, their business."

At the end of the program, a caption states that news of the latest Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh came in just as the program was being prepared for broadcasting, and that a statement has just been received from Kocharyan by telephone specially for the program. The statement says: "Azerbaijan, having rejected the Russian initiatives for a cease-fire and the CSCE Minsk group's plan for a settlement to the conflict, began a major offensive in early December along the entire front. Continuous heavy fighting has been going on for more than a month. The situation is extremely difficult. On the southern section of the front the Azerbaijani army has managed, in spite of heavy losses, to make substantial headway. The territory of the adjoining state is being used in the offensive. The Azerbaijanis have prepared the offensive quite thoroughly. A large number of new tanks and armored personnel carriers have appeared, and troops are armed with 1993 model firearms, American anti-tank systems, American military radio sets and shells, and Turkish mortars. Artillery is constantly in action. All this testifies to major supplies of munitions and arms. And this is alongside the existence of a

number of UN Security Council resolutions banning arms supplies to the region. Fighting in the Azerbaijani army are mujahedin from Afghanistan, specialist instructors from Turkey, and numerous mercenaries from Ukraine and Russia. It only remains to ponder on who pays for all this. It is very difficult for us to fight back with our limited human and material resources. We are too few to fight everyone. We are relying on the courage and will of our people."

POW Says Russians Recruited To Fight Azeris

*NC0801194694 Baku TURAN in English 1135 GMT
8 Jan 94*

[Text] Baku, January 8 (TURAN)—During the latest fightings at the southern sector of the front a Russian citizen, Lugovoy, Vladimir Vasilyevich, (1960) was taken prisoner.

A dweller of Krasnoyarsk region Vladimir Lugovoy was recruited on November 1993 by the leader of Armenian community of Pyatigorsk to fight in Karabakh. As Lugovoy said, special groups of Armenians actively recruit Russians in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Minvodi, Krasnodar and Vladikavkaz and send them to Armenia and Karabakh. Besides, Russian businessmen of Armenian origin transfer a certain per cent of their income to the special account for purchasing arms for Karabakh fighters.

As Lugovoy said, the recruiters prefer highly qualified retired servicemen. So, Lugovoy himself is a scout who served in Germany for a few years.

As Lugovoy also said, they promised to pay him 35 thousand rubles per day. Women sharp-shooters from Estonia and Latvia are being paid in hard currency for each killed Azeri. The mercenary also said that two Russian mercenaries from Voronezh were killed by Armenians for "being too insistent" in their demands to pay them fee earned for several months.

According to Lugovoy Russian battalion, recruited from the servicemen of the 7th Russian Army, a battalion consisting of Cossacks living along the Don River, a Special Battalion consisting of Russians and Cossacks are fighting on the Armenian side at Fizuli line of advance.

Mercenaries Paid 500,000 Rubles

*LD0801144394 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in
Russian 1400 GMT 8 Jan 94*

[Text] According to POWs from CIS countries captured in Karabakh, Azerbaijan pays each of the mercenaries fighting on its side 500,000 Russian rubles a month. For carrying out especially important military assignments, a soldier of fortune receives additionally up to 10,000 US dollars. Member of parliament of the Nagorny Karabakh Republic writer (Zuriy Balayan) has given this information to SNARK agency. Apart from this, nearly 1,500 Afghan modjaheddin are also fighting on the Azeri

side, which is not even being denied by Kabul. Balayan expressed his surprise by the total absence of any reaction from the Russian leadership to the recent television report on a group of mercenaries recruited in Ivanovo that was departing for Azerbaijan. This was an IMA-press report.

Action Planned on 'Mercenaries'

LD1001225794 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2203 GMT 10 Jan 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Today the authorities in Baku stated that they have proof that foreign mercenaries are taking part in combat actions on the side of the Armenian armed forces. A well-informed source in the apparatus of the Azerbaijani president informed INTERFAX that the republic's leadership is preparing a confidential message to the leaders of Russia, France, the Baltic countries, Syria, and Lebanon with a request to take measures and recall their citizens from the Armenian Armed Forces.

TV Carries Iranian-Produced Azeri Program

NC0701154394 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Turkish 1630 GMT 6 Jan 94

[Text] Azerbaijan's television network has begun to telecast a program by the Iranian television network in the Azeri language. The telecasting of the program began on Tuesday [4 January]. The 60-minute program will be telecast daily, from 1330 to 1430 Baku time—that is, from 1300 to 1400 Tehran time. It includes Koranic recitations and political, social, and cultural news.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Rejects Use of Russian Troops

LD1001131794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1136 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze dismissed the idea of using Russian troops to enforce law and order in Georgia. In a regular Monday radio interview he said that a country which cannot instill law and order on its own did not deserve independence.

This was his response to the statement made by parliament speaker Vakhtang Gogvadze Sunday that law and order could not prevail in Georgia unless Russian troops were called in and Georgia entered the ruble zone.

Nevertheless, Shevardnadze admitted that there could be no law and order in Abkhazia and North Ossetia without Russian help.

Shevardnadze noted that entry into the ruble zone should be given serious thought. In his words, the introduction of a national currency in Georgia was an erroneous and premature action. "The state and every family had to pay dearly for this," he emphasized.

Shevardnadze said that during his visits to Turkey, France, and the U.S., and talks with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, he might seek advice of foreign statesmen on entry into the ruble zone.

Strict Terms Imposed for Joining Ruble Zone

LD1001173094 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1450 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Tbilisi, 10 Jan—IBERIA news agency learned from reliable sources that Georgia might join the ruble zone in the immediate future. Russia is putting forward quite strict terms for this; in particular, it is ready to accept Georgia in this zone provided Georgia refuses that part of the foreign countries' debt which, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, belonged to it, and refuses foreign assets, gold mines (if such are available or will be available in future), and independent credit emissions.

According to the reports by the same source, Russia may also demand that nominees for the posts of finance minister and president of the national bank be chosen only with Russia's participation.

Ardzinba on Abkhazia's Status, Problems, Future

AU1001170894 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 6 Jan 94 p 8

[Interview with Vladislav Ardzinba, chairman of the Republic of Abkhazia Supreme Council, by Wojciech Gorecki in Gudauta; date not given: "There Will Be a State"]

[Text] [Gorecki] Could you define the present status of Abkhazia? Is it formally a part of Georgia, a part of the Russian Federation, or is it a fully sovereign state, albeit one that has not been recognized by anyone in the world?

[Ardzinba] Abkhazia is, in fact, a sovereign state and it is worth pointing out here that the Abkhazians have a tradition of statehood that goes back to the 12th century. We want to join the family of democratic countries: Our parliament accepts all the norms of international law and has ratified all human rights.

Unfortunately, the path toward the recognition of Abkhazia on the international arena is a long and complicated one. We have to proceed along it; however, we have already succeeded in taking the first step.

[Gorecki] How would you personally assess Russia's policy toward Abkhazia? On the one hand, your biggest neighbor has sent a contingent of peacekeeping forces while, on the other, it is imposing a blockade upon Abkhazia and restricting the supply of electric power to five hours a day....

[Ardzinba] Russia is behaving in a strange manner toward us and I view the steps taken by Moscow as harmful and unjust. Following a war that lasted many months, in which people were killed, villages and towns

destroyed, and material losses amounted to approximately 2 trillion rubles, our country wants peace. In order to ensure the latter, we have turned to Russia and international organizations for help. We were counting on the fact that world opinion would condemn Georgia as the aggressor and impose sanctions upon it. Meanwhile, although Georgia is constantly violating the terms of the Sochi agreement (that formally brought the war to an end—W.G.), repressive measures are being taken against us. Why is this happening? Please ask the authorities in the Kremlin.

[Gorecki] How do you view Abkhazia's future? What are the main problems facing your republic?

[Ardzinba] Until we sign an agreement with Georgia on the regulation of bilateral relations and receive political guarantees that peace will be maintained, we will not view the war with this state as being over. We, for our part, are ready to negotiate.

The most important problem is, of course, the normalization of daily life and the strengthening of Abkhazian power throughout the republic. Once the Russian Federation has lifted the economic blockade, our fundamental task will be to conclude a bilateral treaty with it.

In the near future, the draft of the new constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia will be submitted to the Supreme Council. The general public will decide upon its final form in a referendum.

Gamsakhurdia Death Reports Under Investigation

LD1001182994 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION
AGENCY in Russian 1745 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] An investigatory body of representatives of the prosecutor's office of the Republic of Georgia is continuing its work in Zugdidi and Tsalenjikha rayons checking the authenticity of reports on former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia's death. The investigatory body does not yet possess any data confirming these reports.

The investigatory group will arrive in the villages of Nakipu and Jagira in Tsalenjikha rayon today because, according to rumors, Zviad Gamsakhurdia committed suicide and was buried in one of them.

Shevardnadze Discounts Gamsakhurdia Threat

LD1001131294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1136
GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze said that the former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who killed himself recently, "did not represent a serious political force in today's Georgia because his ideology and his supporters had been defeated."

Shevardnadze warned against complacency, however. In his words, there have been certain groups behind Gamsakhurdia which "will try again to set up a pro-fascist organization which will oppose the existing authorities."

Shevardnadze believes that it was up to Gamsakhurdia's family where to bury him. "We will agree to anything," he said.

He called for an international investigation of Gamsakhurdia's death "to prevent any rumors."

Party Issues Statement on Death

LD1001213594 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1450 GMT
10 Jan 94

[Text] Georgia's National Ideology Party press center today gave IBERIA news agency the following statement: To UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali; Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, chairman of Russia's Liberal-Democratic Party; Iliya II, the catholicos-patriarch of all-Georgia.

Georgia's National Ideology Party expresses deep sorrow over the tragic death of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the leader of the national movement of contemporary Georgia, the first president of Georgia. He was an internationally recognized dissident, human rights activist, writer and philosopher. Georgia's National Ideology Party calls on the current official authorities of Georgia to show good will and hand over the body of Zviad Gamsakhurdia to the Georgian nation. Meanwhile, this will give Georgian people the possibility to pay proper homage to their first president. Those who think that the national and political symbol of Zviad Gamsakhurdia will fade following his tragic death are mistaken. On the contrary, with time this symbol will grow larger and become stronger for the good of the Georgian nation. Georgia's National Ideology Party, expressing the wish of the ancient Georgian people, demands that Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia's first president, the author of Georgia's soul mission, be buried in the Mtatsminda pantheon [overlooking Tbilisi] next to Merab Kostava, and the day of his burial be made a day of national mourning.

By holding the corpse and keeping it in secret, certain forces wish to create a myth of the dead president's life, as if he were alive, which confuses people and neutralizes the Georgian people's reaction to the death of the president. Then these forces could claim that Zviad Gamsakhurdia's death had no impact on the Georgian people. The appearance of the corpse would dispel all kinds of misinformation and would not further psychologically torture the people, who have already been tortured enough.

Moreover, in our opinion, there are well-grounded doubts that before his tragic death, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, together with his entourage, were arrested under strictly secret circumstances. It is obvious that the arrest was aimed at the political and personal repentance to which Gamsakhurdia would have reacted by going on hunger strike.

Was it a forced suicide or murder? Time will establish which. Today only one thing is clear—the first president of Georgia is no longer alive and a proper homage must be paid to him.

Georgia's National Ideology Party firmly believes that the political farce connected with the murder of Zviad Gamsakhurdia must end and the Georgian people and the whole world must be told the truth. A special commission comprising the leaders of political parties, alongside public representatives, must be set up for this aim.

[Signed] Zurab Gagnidze, chairman Georgia's National Ideology Party, Tbilisi, 10 January 1994

Body Said in Zviadist Village

PM1101105694 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[INTERFAX report: "Gamsakhurdia's Body Is in a Village Controlled by the Zviadists"]

[Text] The body of Georgian ex-president Zviad Gamsakhurdia is in the village of Dzhikhashkari in Tsalendzhikskiy Rayon in Western Georgia.

This was stated at the Georgian Internal Affairs Ministry press center. According to a staffer of the press center, the village is under the control of armed Zviadists who are demanding that international experts come. Z. Gamsakhurdia died on the night of 31 December-1 January in a settlement in Western Georgia. It is believed that he committed suicide.

Sigua Condemns Shevardnadze's 'Double Game'

AU1001211094 Tbilisi NOVAYA GAZETA in Russian
No. 37 (66) Dec 93 p 4

[Interview with former Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua by Eteri Kakabadze; place and date not given: "Tengiz Sigua: 'Gamsakhurdia Had a Choice; the Opposition Did Not'"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Kakabadze] Could you tell us how and by whom was the decision taken to bring Shevardnadze back to Georgia? Why was he specifically chosen? After all, the opinion about him in Georgia was far from unanimous.

[Sigua] I can tell you how I viewed it. This is a person with enormous international prestige and it would not have been serious on our part had we dismissed this aspect. Shevardnadze's return to Georgia could have given us two big advantages. He could have ensured Georgia received international recognition and its entry into such influential international organizations as the United Nations, CSCE, and so forth. It is wholly natural that these processes would have been connected with the name of Shevardnadze. Indeed, this is what subsequently happened. The second advantage lay in the fact that he could have developed international action on a broad scale and attracted foreign credits into the country with the help of which we would have been able to get the economy back on its feet. According to my calculations, just some four to five months after his return, we would

have received \$300-400 million in the form of preferential credits. Unfortunately, this did not happen. However, there were also two big disadvantages. The first was western Georgia; with his return, the situation there would have become even more acute. The second was the attitude of the Russian generals to the Gorbachev-Yakovlev-Shevardnadze [alliance]. However, when I weighed the pros and cons, the former outweighed the latter.

[Kakabadze] Did you have any opponents in this matter?

[Sigua] Yes. However, I managed to persuade them that Shevardnadze was no longer the same person whom Georgia used to know. Moreover, I sincerely believed this myself.

[Kakabadze] Why have you said this with such regret? Do you think you made a mistake?

[Sigua] Of course, I made a mistake. Life has shown that he has not changed a bit since he was first secretary of the [Georgian] Central Committee. I can see that no genuinely democratic—not pseudo-democratic—transformations have occurred in the country since his arrival. There is just the appearance of democracy. Tell me, how can one simply justify the fact that the law on elections was changed by him five times as a result of which people entered parliament who now make up the majority. This was just the start. One voluntaristic decision followed another.... The appointment of God knows who as ministers. Who can explain to me what guidelines one needs to follow in order to appoint a person with two criminal convictions as minister of internal affairs? One can go on and on. I admit that I made a mistake regarding this person.

[Kakabadze] However, can one suppose that what is at play here is not so much the subjective factor but objective conditions? Do you think that anyone else in his place could have done more?

[Sigua] I know that Shevardnadze's double game with the West was our ruin. It was already clear at the Malta summit that something had occurred in the division of spheres of influence and that Georgia and perhaps the whole Transcaucasus would be the first to leave Moscow's sphere of influence. At least, I felt that Shevardnadze knew what we simple mortals did not know and, therefore, he set his sights exclusively on the West. However, I realized as early as April that this was not the case. In such a situation, it would have been necessary to change one's policy and speak with Russia in a different way and not use the language of intrigue while playing up to the West. When those 88 UN observers did not come to Georgia, I already knew that the West, if not completely, had started to give us up as a bad job. On whose support had we been counting on all that time? Shevardnadze refused when [Russian Defense Minister] Grachev suggested bringing a contingent of Russian troops into Oчамchire [Abkhazia], Poti, Zugdidi, and Senaki [Mingrelia]. As a result, we experienced the Sukhumi tragedy. Who will answer for this? And one more thing—

why, if we are opposed in principle to the introduction of Russian troops, should we destroy our principles and bring them in no matter but with less effective results? Where is the logic in this?

[Kakabadze]Where does the solution lie today? The people are already saying that independence is costing us too much.

[Sigua] There is a solution. First, we have to retrieve the credits issued by the National Bank and this should be done as a matter of urgency. I have already stated that, according to my calculations, some \$70-100 million from these credits have ended up in foreign banks. They must be returned and, in order to do this, our police should join Interpol whatever it may cost us and, thereby, establish ties with European banks. We should retrieve at least half of this money. This is the first thing. Second, for some five months now, no one has said a word about the fact that the IMF has elaborated a special mechanism aimed at giving support to system changes in Georgia. It is stated in the letter, which I handed to Shevardnadze and to which he has not reacted in any way, that the fund is ready to grant 50 percent of our quota in this organization right away. This amounts to \$200 million. These \$200 million plus the returned credits plus the work done in order to obtain more preferential credits from developed capitalist countries.... I believe that approximately \$400-500 million, which can be collected in this way, is wholly sufficient for the initial stage of establishing Georgia's economy. Of this amount, approximately \$70 million has to be allocated to the Georgian National Bank in order to strengthen the new national currency—the lari—that will be introduced in the near future. Otherwise, the same thing will happen to it as happened to the coupon. I view this way as a realistic one. We will then be able to purchase the necessary quantity of energy sources and the necessary raw materials and get our industry off the ground. According to my calculations, on this basis, we

could achieve 65 or possibly 70 percent of the level of production that was attained in 1987. This is the figure that will bring our economic depression to an end.

I am often being asked why am I opposed to our joining the CIS. I am not against our membership, provided it is officially established that we were forced to take this step. In that case, I will know that there was no other way out. However, when we are being told that joining the CIS is our only chance of survival, I do not agree with this. Russia will not feed us for free and trade with us at dumping prices. It is another matter that we should maintain very close financial and economic relations with all the former republics of the USSR as, at present, we basically do not have the means to conduct trade on new alternative markets. However, it is not necessary to join any new alliances in order to do this.

Police Arrest 'Gangsters,' Confiscate Weapons

LD1001142194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1336 GMT 10 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi January 10 TASS—Over 1,000 Georgian policemen and interior troops arrested 80 gangsters during a major anti-crime operation conducted in the south of the country over the weekend. 60 of the arrested were wanted for grave crimes.

The arrested are charged with kidnappings, car thefts, acts of terrorism and subversion, burglaries, murders and other grave crimes.

During the operation police confiscated 40 submachine guns, as well as machine guns and grenade launchers, a big amount of ammunition, as well as 20 stolen cars, large quantities of stolen food, as well as drugs.

The Georgian interior ministry said on Monday that nobody was injured during the operation in the Dmanis region of the country bordering on Armenia.

Estonia

National Independence Party on Cabinet Reshuffle

WS1001132394 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in
English 0803 GMT 10 Jan 94

[From 10 January RAHVA HAAL, p 2]

[Text] Monday, January 10—The National Independence Party (ERSP) leaders held a news conference on Friday [7 January], describing the past year and the party's views of the cabinet changes. Chairman Tunne Kelam admitted internal conflicts and assured that the party strengthened itself and also maintained its supporters (approximately 1,000 members). Kelam described the ERSP as more centrist and orientated at the national identity than the "Fatherland". Juri Adams stressed the need for the cabinet reshuffle. Kelam pointed out that the government made a major move towards "a real politicians' government." Viktor Niitsoo criticised Toomas Sildmae's performance at the Economy Ministry, claiming that the ministry had submitted only one "low-quality" draft law to the Riigikogu [parliament] last year. Adams added that the "Fatherland" had been forced to admit Sildmae's unsuitability and claimed that Estonia "will lose nothing" by his resignation.

Officials Voice Opinions

WS1001124794 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in
English 0803 GMT 10 Jan 94

[From 10 January RAHVA HAAL, POSTIMEES, HOMMUKULEHT, PAEVALEHT, p 1,3]

[Text] Monday, January 10—One of the authors of the constitution, MP [member of parliament] Juri Adams, described the situation as leading to a constitutional crisis, and hoped that the president will accept the candidates. He claimed that the president's actions convey a message of no confidence in the prime minister and the government coalition to the voters. "The president will have to provide a good explanation, why the candidates recommended by the prime minister are unacceptable," Adams said.

Prime ministerial legal advisor Aino Lepik von Wiren described the presidential decision as arbitrary and stressed that the constitution was not intended to delegate such powers to the president.

Riigikogu [parliament] foreign affairs commission Chairman Vello Saatpalu claimed that the president is seizing more power than the constitution allows and described his manners in signing agreements with other states as "incomprehensible." Saatpalu further claimed that foreign ambassadors had expressed their amazement at the vagueness of the president's powers.

Coalition Party member Academician Endel Lippmaa claimed that the economic development has been successful and there was no need to replace the ministers.

He criticised the refusal of the appointed new ministers to start performing their duties as "excessive party loyalty" and described the situation as a crisis of interpreting the constitution rather than a constitutional crisis.

Leader of the Liberal Democrats Tiit Kbin was of the same opinion, stressing that the constitution should have been more accurate about the president's authority in the matter.

Former MP Jaan Kross invited the appointed ministers to start working and expressed his regret at the "politically uncomfortable" situation.

Environment Minister Andres Tarand described the situation as a threat of a crisis, rather than a crisis itself. But he claimed that the president is not to decide over the suitability of ministerial candidates.

MP Valve Kirsipuu expressed her confidence in Heiki Kranich's ability to handle the functions of the finance minister and described the president's actions as "petty".

Meri on Reasons for Delay

WS1001133794 Tallinn BNS in English 1059 GMT
10 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 10, BNS—Estonian President Lennart Meri in a statement, addressed to the public on Sunday [9 January], explained the reasons behind holding back his approval to new ministerial nominations.

Meri, denying allegations by some leading politicians, said there was no constitutional crisis in Estonia. Meri said he as the country's president had based his actions on the president's rights and responsibilities, as stipulated by the Constitution.

He quoted the Constitution's Article 90, which says that no minister can be relieved of duties or appointed to office without a presidential ruling, which in turn has to be preceded by a formal proposal by the prime minister. The choice between approval or non-approval of the candidate is left with the president, Meri says in the statement.

"The proposal concerning changes in the Cabinet, submitted by the prime minister on Jan. 6, was a rather large-scale one: the proposal suggested the replacement of the foreign minister, the economics, the finance minister and the defense minister; the defense minister was to replace the foreign minister, the rest of the vacant ministerial positions were to be given to three members of the parliament. The President of the Republic, taking as basis the prime minister's proposal, made a decision in a smaller scale than what was suggested. With this ruling from Jan. 7, 1994, the president didn't create a constitutional crisis. On the contrary, while making my decision I proceeded from the presidential oath: to faithfully fulfil my duties with all my abilities and to the

best of my judgement for the good of the Estonian people and the Republic," the president said.

Meri said he had talked with Prime Minister Mart Laar about the possibilities to more effectively organize the state leadership work already in September. The prime minister then had considered it unnecessary to make changes in the Cabinet.

"The outcome of the local elections, which were held after that, showed that power relations between the political forces in Estonia had changed during the year. The prime minister made his conclusions and decided on Cabinet changes, for which purpose he started to resolve the crisis emerged in the Pro Patria (party). International developments went their own way, which was not quite favorable for Estonia. Therefore I suggested to the prime minister and the foreign minister on Dec. 22 to postpone making changes in the Cabinet until late February, so that we could realistically take into account the new power relations in Europe. /—/ These arguments, which directly concern Estonia's security policy, were not taken into account and the proposed Cabinet changes regrettably have coincided with crucial foreign political events," the president's statement reads.

Meri says no concrete shortcomings were pointed at in the work of Economics Minister Toomas Sildmae. He says Sildmae also enjoys the trust of many Cabinet members. The president says he has met Heiki Kranich, candidate for the post of the finance minister, only twice so far, and economics minister nominee Toivo Jurgen-son, only once.

"Under such circumstances it would have been irresponsible of me to approve the candidates. I once more say: I have sworn to the State Assembly and to the people to fulfil my duties to the best of my judgement. Therefore please allow me to once again emphasize that in a democratic practice of state leadership the advisability of decisions by the head of the government has to be clear to the Estonian citizens, the State Assembly and the president," Meri says.

The president said he had made a decision to some extent different from what had been suggested, thus giving the prime minister the opportunity to once again and with full seriousness wage giving or not giving the control levers of the country's economy into the hands of the best experts.

"I regret that the government has interpreted my position from a one-sided point of view and presented the problem in a different light, in order to exert pressure on me by referring to a constitutional crisis. I am particularly worried by the time-point. At present we should concentrate our forces on the most critical section of the front—on the foreign policy, on ensuring Estonia's security. The head of the government has chosen the wrong time and the wrong way," the president says.

Premier Appoints Acting Ministers

WS1001134094 Tallinn BNS in English 1059 GMT
10 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 10, BNS—Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar in his ruling No. 10-k today sacked Economics Minister Toomas Sildmae and appointed Arvo Niitenberg, the energy minister without portfolio, as acting economics minister. Laar in the same ruling appointed Minister of Justice Kaido Kama acting finance minister.

Opposition Criticizes Premier

WS1001134194 Tallinn BNS in English 1059 GMT
10 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 10, BNS—The chairman of the opposition Coalition Party, Tiit Vahi, accused Prime Minister Mart Laar of failure to cope with his duties and said it was the head of the government rather than the Cabinet as such that needed replacement.

"Our (the Coalition Party's—BNS) position is that the head of government is failing to cope with his tasks," Vahi said. Vahi, the predecessor of Mart Laar in the prime minister's office, said his party would be ready for cooperation if the opportunity came up to appoint a new prime minister candidate.

Vahi said there was no constitutional crisis in Estonia, as the constitution gives the president the right to sack ministers and approve new ministers into office.

"How the authors of the constitution meant it, is quite another thing," Vahi said.

But the Coalition Party leader also added he had been somewhat bewildered by the president's decision not to relieve the economics minister of office.

"In my personal opinion, this can be interpreted as the president's wish to shape the setup of Mart Laar's Cabinet," he said.

Vahi added that the interior political crisis emerged in Estonia had to be resolved by intensive negotiations between the prime minister and the president.

Meri Signs Decree

WS1001161394 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in
English 1427 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Tallinn, Jan 10—President Lennart Meri on Monday signed a decree appointing all four ministers proposed by Prime Minister as ministers, Mart Laar said.

"I am glad that the problem was solved. That will enable us to resume peaceful and constructive work and, surely, we all got a useful lesson," Laar said and added that "constitutional dispute had ended".

Laar said he had received the information from Tunne Kelam, vice chairman of Estonian parliament who had

been informed of the President's move over the telephone by Meri's office. Laar also said Meri had expressed wish to hold a speech before the parliament on Tuesday in order to explain his latest moves.

Meri's office has not confirmed the news.

Last Saturday, Meri rejected Laar's government reshuffle plan refusing to dismiss Economics Minister Toomas Sildmae while sacking Finance Minister Madis Rike and turning down Premier's nominee for Finance Minister, Heiki Kranich.

Meri agreed to award Foreign Minister's portfolio to Juri Luik and Defence Minister's portfolio to Indrek Kannik. Both ministers refused to take up their new positions if Meri refused to approve the whole package. [passage omitted]

Meri Denies Approving Ministers

*WS1001204094 Tallinn BNS in English 1619 GMT
10 Jan 94*

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 10, BNS - Estonian President Lennart Meri at 3.40 p.m. [1340 GMT] today officially denied reports on having approved the list of the four minister nominations and said the information provided to the press by Prime Minister Mart Laar was wrong.

Meri also said he had "no intention to sign the ruling," the president's spokesman said.

The spokesman confirmed reports that the president was going to address the parliament 10 a.m. Tuesday.

The president also confirmed the reports that he had talked with the parliament's Deputy Speaker Tunne Kelam on the telephone, but denied having told Kelam that he was going to approve the minister candidates.

The president's statement came after the prime minister less than two hours earlier had quoted Kelam as saying that the president had promised to approve all four minister candidates. Kelam conveyed the president's words at a meeting with the ruling coalition MPs at the government and parliament residence at Toompea today, Laar said.

The prime minister said the government coalition at the meeting had ruled to offer to the president the possibility to meet all the coalition's MPs at a time and conditions convenient for the president.

"I am glad that the problem got a solution. This provides us with the possibility to continue our work confidently and with constructiveness. There are things to learn for all of us in the recent developments. The things that happened show that we have to adopt a number of laws to establish more exactly how things have to proceed. That sparks strike every now and then from contacts between the institutions of the president, the State Court and the chancellor of law unfortunately cannot be

avoided in the first year following the adoption of the constitution, since we are a young democracy," Laar said.

The prime minister said a constitutional dispute was no sign of the constitution's weakness.

"The same provisions also exist in the German constitution, for instance, and our legal system in many aspects is based on that system. In Germany the democratic tradition quite simply is so long that problems like this never come up," Laar said.

Ain Saarna, spokesman to the prime minister, said the government was expecting the document from the president and was going to abstain from comment for the time being.

The presidential press office in the latest report said Prime Minister Mart Laar on Sunday, Jan. 9 had presented to the president the new ministerial candidates and submitted a new proposal to approve the ministerial nominations.

The president is going to make his decision Tuesday and read it to the parliament at 10 a.m. the same day.

Further on Meri Accepting Proposals

*LD1101102894 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in
Estonian 0900 GMT 11 Jan 94*

[Text] President Lennart Meri signed today, in front of the Riigikogu, the proposals by Prime Minister Mart Laar, so to speak, concerning the government reshuffle.

In his speech, the president emphasized it was not what one would wish, but it was compelled by this moment in the internal and external political situation. In the words of Meri, an exceedingly unsuitable time has been chosen for the government reshuffle, because leading Estonian politicians should, at present, give the main attention to the NATO and the U.S.-Russia summit meetings, and not to the examination of, so to speak, one's own navel.

The president regards the wish by the Isamaa [Fatherland faction] to stay in power at any cost as the cause of the situation that has arisen. The president expressed surprise that Laar himself did not resign, but began a government reshuffle. The resignation of Laar, in the opinion of Lennart Meri, is in the interests of Isamaa itself. The Isamaa crisis is a crisis for the prime minister. Meri appealed also for a decisive expansion of the government coalition.

With that, the president has officially released Toomas Sildmae from the position as economy minister, and appointed Heiki Kranich and Toivo Jurgenson as finance and economy ministers respectively.

Special Representative to Paldiski Appointed

LD0701180694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1625 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Text] The Estonian Government has appointed a special envoy to the town of Paldiski 50 km southwest of Tallinn where the Russian Navy deploys a nuclear training center. He is Yuriy Tikk, a Defence Ministry adviser, government spokesman Ain Saarna told reporters on Friday. His area of responsibility is law enforcement in the town which was closed to foreigners until recently.

Paldiski is the country's only place which held no local elections and Tikk will represent the central government until local self-management is introduced there.

Various estimates put the number of town residents from 6,000 to 7,000 with 1,20% of them belonging to the Russian naval base there. There are about 200 ethnic Estonians who are eligible to stand in local elections.

The envoy is given two weeks in which to draft proposals for solving the town's problems. Simultaneously, the Interior Ministry is instructed to register all town dwellers by the end of March and the Justice Ministry given two weeks to put forward proposals on the legal basis of local self-government.

Colonel Raul Luks who was appointed by President Lennart Meri as military administrator of Paldiski has been at work since January 1. He is responsible for any decision making linked to Russian pullout from the town.

A trainload of machinery and equipment needed for dismantling nuclear reactors crossed the Estonian-Russian border en route to Paldiski on Friday, the spokesman said.

Security To 'Pay Attention' to Foreign Parties

WS1101105894 Tallinn BNS in English 1805 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 10, BNS—The Defense Police at present has got no reasons to initiate criminal proceedings against Pyotr Rozhok, a representative of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Russian Liberal Democratic Party in Estonia, the head of the country's security police said.

Juri Pihl, the director general of the Defense Police Department, added that Estonia still needed "to keep an eye on such people." He said this was necessary despite the fact that the country's authorities knew of nothing Rozhok or his fellow Russian Liberal Democratic Party supporters had done against Estonia's national interests.

Rozhok a few days earlier told the press a branch of Zhirinovskiy's party existed in Estonia.

Estonian Justice Minister Kaido Kama has called the party's alleged activity in Estonia illegal, because the branch organization has not been formally registered

with the country's authorities. Kama said the activity of the Zhirinovskiy group in Estonia should be investigated by the defense police.

Also President Lennart Meri in a speech recently said the country's security police had to pay attention to the activity of "some foreign political parties in Estonia."

Rozhok, a resident of the northeastern town of Narva, claims his telephone is being tapped, but says he has had no direct contacts with Estonian defense police officials so far.

Ministry Terms Past Work 'Satisfactory'

WS1101114894 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 0750 GMT 11 Jan 94

[From 11 January RAHVA HAAL, HOMMIKULEHT, pp 3,9]

[Text] Tuesday, January 11—Finance Minister Madis Urike and his associates held a news conference yesterday, describing their past work as satisfactory.

The ministry succeeded in its main tasks last year—to lead a strict monetary policy and to cut the inflation, to balance the budget, to prepare draft laws and to perform the role of an "economic policeman", Minister Urike said. Chancellor Enn Pant added that the ministry had completed the taxation reform, compiled four budgets and submitted 58 draft laws. He rejected Prime Minister Mart Laar's accusations of the ministry's insufficient support to reforms, stressing that it would be unfair to demand more of the ministry. Deputy Chancellor Tiit Saat announced that up to 20 percent of profits go untaxed, but Pant stressed that the enterprises' unpaid taxes have been reduced as compared to 1992.

Urike added that the national investment programme will be prepared by February. The review of foreign aid in 1993 has not been completed as yet, but the approximate amount had been similar to that of 1992—1.1 milliard kroons. Most of it is used on business trips and foreign consultants, he added.

Latvia**Deportation of Russian Generals Disrupts Talks**

LD1001164694 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1600 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] According to an order by Andrejs Rucs, the head of the local government of the Vidzeme district of Riga, two generals of the North-Western Group of Russian Forces were detained and deported to the state border today. The above-mentioned persons were detained this morning when representatives of the local government of Vidzeme district came to a Russian Army facility in Riga to take it over.

Andrejs Rucs spoke to Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis about today's incident and this issue was also

discussed at a session of the National Security Council today. Rucs added that the fact that the generals were detained on a day talks were scheduled between Russian and Latvian delegations was a coincidence. He expressed an opinion that the incident might cause the Saeima and the government to demand finally from the Russian side a concrete timetable for the army withdrawal.

Sergey Zotov, the head of the Russian delegation, arriving for the talks on army withdrawal today, said that the talks could not begin until the above-mentioned incident is clarified.

Martins Virsis, the head of the Latvian delegation for talks with Russia, while waiting for the Russian delegation on the airfield, commented that the incident was a deliberate attempt to disrupt the talks. The Latvian side will correspondingly [words indistinct], (?said) Virsis.

Official Responsible Faces Charges

LD1001193594 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1800 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Criminal proceedings were instigated at the Latvian prosecutor's office today over the detention and deportation to Russia of Major Generals Nikolay Taylakov and Anatoliy Vodopyanov, who are serving at the headquarters of the Northwestern Group of Russian Troops. Both generals have been sent back to Russia on the orders of Andrejs Rucs, the chairman of the local government of Vidzeme district of Riga, when representatives of the local government went to a property of the house management enterprise of the Russian Army at 9 Krusta Baznīcas Street this morning in order to take it over according to the local government's resolution.

Taylakov and Vodopyanov threatened to set guards at this and two other sites due to be taken over, but as the sites were already under control of the Home Guard, Rucs decided to send the generals out from Latvia to avoid incidents.

Rita Aksenoka, aide to the prosecutor general, reports that corpus delicti can be seen in the action by the local government officials. The proceedings were instigated according to Clause 162 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Latvia, which deals with abuses of power and authority, and Clause 125, which deals with illegal detention. The case is being investigated by the prosecutor's office's department for particularly serious cases.

Ilgonis Upmalis, head of the Latvian bureau for monitoring the Russian troop withdrawal, reports that both generals have already returned to Riga. According to the LETA news agency, Russia has discontinued the talks on troop withdrawal from Latvia in this connection.

'Extraordinary' Cabinet Meeting Called

LD1001195294 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1900 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] The detention and deportation to the Latvian border of Russian army generals Nikolay Taylakov and

Anatoliy Vodopyanov is right now being discussed at an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers.

Consultations between representatives and experts of the delegations for the Latvian-Russian interstate talks on the dismantling of the Skrunda radar station were scheduled for today, but Sergey Zotov, head of the Russian delegation, said on his arrival in Latvia that the talks will not resume until the incident has been clarified and relevant permission received from the Russian leadership.

According to the Latvian Foreign Ministry's press center, representatives of the delegations have nevertheless agreed to meet at 1000 tomorrow.

Cabinet Amends Laws, Dismisses Rucs

LD1101104094 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in
Russian 0900 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Excerpts] An emergency session of the Latvian cabinet was held during the night from Monday to Tuesday [10-11 January]. It decided to punish those guilty of the provocations against Russian military personnel and diplomats. [passage omitted]

The cabinet adopted a number of amendments to laws making it possible for the government to dismiss leaders of local government authorities who break the law. At the same time, Andrejs Rucs was dismissed and criminal proceedings were instituted against him on charges of exceeding his authority and illegal detention of people, Interfax reported.

Minister Andrejevs Comments

LD1101022794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in
Russian 0000 GMT 11 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, 11 Jan—The actions against the Russian ambassador and the representatives of her army that occurred in Latvia on Monday [10 January] were called thoughtless and a provocation by Georgs Andrejevs, Latvian minister of foreign affairs. On the instruction of the head of one of Riga's districts, four of Russia's military facilities were blockaded, the ambassador's car was detained, and two major generals were arrested and taken away in the direction of the frontier in handcuffs. As a result, talks with the Russian delegation scheduled for today have been postponed.

"Armed conflict was a reality," Andrejevs noted in an interview on television on Monday evening. According to him, President Yeltsin had given the command for a number of divisions stationed close to the frontier with Latvia to be in a state of operational readiness. In a report for the press circulated that same evening the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified that "the Government of Latvia will do everything possible to prevent similar measures of a provocative nature from happening in the future which might have a negative effect

on the prestige of Latvia in the world and complicate the internal political situation in the state." The government stresses, it goes on to say, that in the future all questions connected with the withdrawal of Russian troops will be resolved by means of talks.

It has been announced that criminal proceedings have been instituted with regard to all the facts that will establish the degree of guilt of each participant in the action. The Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia gathered for an extraordinary sitting late in the evening.

Evening television broadcasts also showed the main instigator, Andrejs Ruchs [as transliterated], head of the Vidzemskiy [as transliterated] district of Riga, who had ordered that anyone hindering his instruction should be shot. He warned the generals when they were arrested that if they did not resist they would be taken to the frontier unharmed. Ruchs stated that there will be no more talks on the territory of his district.

"It is naive to think," the minister of foreign affairs of Latvia noted, "that what happened is the outcome of the 'creativity' of just a few people."

Home Guard Reportedly Implicated in Attacks

PM0701155994 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by Senior Lieutenant Oleg Groznetskiy of the Northwestern Group of Forces: "Robbery Under Cover of Misunderstandings. Provocations Against Russian Servicemen by Latvian Home Defense Guard Continue"]

[Text] In the chronicle of actions by the Home Defense Guard against Russian troops temporarily stationed on Latvian territory, a UAZ-469 automobile was stopped by home defense guards 27 November 1993 at around 1200. Under threat of the use of weapons, the driver and the automobile were taken to the Home Defense Guard 12th Battalion headquarters, where a R-838 radio transmitter set was removed from the automobile.

In the area of Plavinas 14 December 1993 at 1200 a GAZ-66 automobile belonging to the courier-mail communications service, which was transporting correspondence from Riga to Jekabpils, was shot at with a small-bore weapon by unknown individuals following behind in an automobile. As a result of the shooting, a wheel was pierced. The camouflage uniform of the people doing the shooting, as well as the color of the vehicle, provide grounds for believing that they belonged to the Home Defense Guard.

An officer from the Northwestern Group of Forces press center asked Mr. Juris Dalbinsh [name as transliterated], deputy chief of staff of the Home Defense Guard, to comment on these and other similar actions in respect of Russian servicemen.

"The incident involving the removal of the portable radio transmitter was an annoying misunderstanding," Mr. Dalbinsh explained. "The reason for it was that the home defense guards had not made themselves familiar with the intergovernmental agreements on the use of postal and electric communications and Russian Federation Armed Forces radio frequencies. In this case the home guards acted unlawfully, and therefore a court investigation will be conducted and we will inform you of the results in writing. The culprits will be disciplined. As for the shooting at the Russian military vehicle 14 December, we have no information about this. I specially got in touch with the battalion on whose territory this incident supposedly took place, and I found out that they were not given any tasks that day, and were not even on patrol."

[Groznetkiy] "Mr. Dalbinsh, would you not admit the possibility of the unsanctioned use of weapons by your subordinates?"

[Dalbinsh] "No, that is out of the question. In broad daylight, in a vehicle with 'Home Defense Guard' symbols on it—that's going too far. We recently had a very serious discussion with Latvian Republic President G. Ulmanis (the president is the commander in chief of the Home Defense Guard—O.G.) during which it was pointed out that it is impermissible to use weapons without grounds for doing so. The Home Defense Guard command drew the relevant conclusions: The requirements concerning who can be issued with weapons have been made tougher. However, people are human. Not everyone can bear the burden of authority provided by weapons in a normal way; but we will conduct the relevant work..."

Following the conversation with Mr. Juris Dalbinsh, another report came in. As Major V. Turovskiy's household effects were being transported along the Riga-Nizhniy Novgorod route on 23 December of last year in the area of Jekabpils, the KamAZ truck was shot at with a small-bore pistol. The attackers were in a light-gray Riga Bus Plant automobile bearing Home Defense Guard emblems on its doors....

Cooperation Treaty Concluded With Denmark

LD0801212794 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1930 GMT 8 Jan 94

[Text] Latvia and Denmark have concluded a treaty on military cooperation. The document has been signed in Riga by Valdis Pavlovskis and Hans Haekkerup, the defense ministers of the two countries, during an official visit by a Danish military delegation to this Baltic Republic. The treaty envisages mutual consultations on security issues and military planning, as well as an exchange of experience and information, and also joint development of programs for military training.

Denmark is the first NATO country to conclude a military treaty with Latvia. Latvian Defense Minister

Pavlovskis noted that this treaty will facilitate the integration of Latvia into the European Union and NATO.

Birkavs, Lithuania's Slezevicius Hold Talks

*LD1001202894 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1900 GMT 10 Jan 94*

[Text] [Latvian] Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs met with Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius at Nica [western Latvia] today.

Valdis Birkavs admitted that the talks were productive. An agreement was reached on the joint construction of an oil import-export terminal in Liepaja.

[Words indistinct] the prime ministers also discussed the sea border.

Talks between the two prime minister will continue in Riga on 19 January.

Paper Publishes Data on Defense Forces

*WS1001152694 Riga LETA in English 1420 GMT
10 Jan 94*

[From the "Review of the Latvian Press"]

[Text] The newspaper "NEATKARIGA CINA" publishes the data concerning the Latvian Army. At present, the personnel of the Latvian Defence Forces consists of 1,500 soldiers and 150 officers. 600 soldiers and 30 officers serve in the naval forces and 150 soldiers and 30 officers - in the air forces. 3.8 thousand soldiers and 340 officers guard the Latvian frontiers. On the whole, 6 thousand soldiers and 550 officers make up the Latvian Army. 15 ships are at the Latvian Army's disposal. Only 9 of them are cleared of planes: "-2" and two-410". [sentence as received] Only one of them is ready for action. 4 helicopters out of 6 are ready for action. This year, 1.8 per cent from the budget funds are supposed to be allocated for the needs of the Latvian defence forces.

Lithuania

Reportage on NATO Membership Request

*LD1001131494 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in
Lithuanian 1000 GMT 10 Jan 94*

[Excerpt] Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas speaking at a news conference this morning touched upon the NATO summit in Brussels, in addition to other issues.

Here is correspondent Audrius Baciulis with a report from the news conference and about other events which took place at the Lithuanian Seimas.

[Baciulis] Algirdas Brazauskas said that today a response is expected from Brussels concerning Lithuania's wish to join NATO. He also said that when NATO received the written membership application from Lithuania, it was

immediately disseminated among all its sixteen members. According to the president, not all the states had submitted written applications asking to join NATO.

In the president's view, although there will be no specific date given from which Lithuania will become member of NATO, Lithuania nevertheless supports the Partnership for Peace initiative proposed by the USA which, according to Algirdas Brazauskas, is a starting point in the process of joining NATO. [passage omitted]

Christopher Letter Noted

*WS0701175194 Tallinn BNS in English 1612 GMT
7 Jan 94*

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 07, BNS—U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher expects the upcoming NATO summit in Brussels to make decisions on the establishment of essentially new cooperation between the alliance and East European countries.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys received a letter from Christopher this week, saying the Brussels summit would be a favorable possibility to start closer security cooperation between the alliance and the newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, including Lithuania, the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry said.

Christopher said the summit is likely announce that NATO will welcome new members in the future. The alliance's evolutionary expansion would preserve its strength, harmony among its members and its ability to act.

The secretary of state said the Partnership for Peace program offers Lithuania close practical cooperation with both military and political structures of NATO. The initiative would require serious military and political steps—to observe international obligations, to guarantee civil control of the armed forces and to properly arrange the military budget.

Christopher expressed hope that Lithuania will support the Partnership for Peace program and will take an active part in it.

Estonia's Meri Approves

*LD0701213294 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2000
GMT 7 Jan 94*

[Text] The President of Estonia, Lennart Meri, has called upon NATO not to react to the warnings of the Russian president. If NATO wants to survive it must prove that it is Manfred Woerner, not Boris Yeltsin, who holds the NATO council, the Baltic News Service quotes the Estonian president. In Lennart Meri's opinion the Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas acted very correctly in making an official request for Lithuania to be admitted to NATO. According to the Estonian president, there is a vacuum of security in the Baltic states at present, and certain forces in Russia may be tempted to fill it.

Decision Not To Affect Relations

LD1001170694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1618
GMT 10 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] The lack of a "too sensitive reaction" from Russia and other countries to Lithuania's decision to join NATO proves that this step is in line with the processes taking place in real life, said President Algirdas Brazauskas on Monday [10 January].

Addressing a press conference in Vilnius, he said he hopes that a resolution concerning the prospects for integrating Lithuania and other countries of Eastern and Central Europe into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be adopted at the NATO summit taking place in Brussels.

Brazauskas believes that the implementation of the "partnership for peace" initiative, designed to pave the way for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe to membership in the continent's collective security structures, will be conducive to this.

According to the president, there is a need to search for solutions that would make it possible to include the whole of Europe in a system of collective security.

Brazauskas told his hosts at the National Radio's Russian Service in Vilnius over the weekend that Lithuania's decision to integrate into NATO must not change its relations with Russia and other neighbors in any way.

In his words, this political move "should not be interpreted as an intention to "alter or stiffen ties with Russia and other states." All European leaders, in his opinion, should agree on "a single security umbrella."

Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius, accompanying Brazauskas, added that "Lithuania's pro-western orientation is nothing new in its foreign policy". According to him, integration with NATO and other European security structures will be conducive to regional stability, indispensable not only to Lithuania but to all neighboring states.

Deputy Foreign Minister Comments

LD1001172394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1613
GMT 10 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Lithuania does not believe that it committed "an unfriendly act" toward Russia by expressing its desire to join NATO, Deputy Foreign Minister Albinas Januska told Interfax on Monday [10 January].

In his opinion, he said, a number of views expressed by the Russian president's press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, and by Russia's Foreign Ministry recently "look odd." However on the whole, Januska said, Moscow's reaction to the letter sent by the Lithuanian authorities

to NATO, with the request to consider the possibility of admitting Lithuania to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "is quite natural for Russia," and it "testifies to some vestiges of the past in Russian thinking." According to him, even the highest echelons of power in Russia evidently have not completely shed their notion of NATO as a "hostile bloc."

Lithuania's decision to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was prompted by the circumstance that the country "is not in a position to ensure full security for itself on its own," the deputy foreign minister explained. "We view NATO as the only guarantor of stability and security in Europe, and therefore we appeal to that organization," he said.

"The strengthening of nationalist and expansionist forces in Russian politics gave rise to some anxiety" in Lithuania, the diplomat said. "To some extent, this is what prompted us to search for other means to ensure our security, but our striving (to join NATO - IF note) must not be explained only with this," he noted.

According to Januska, sometimes Moscow tries to pretend that the desire of Russia's neighbor countries to join NATO provides the nationalist forces in Russia itself with trump cards. "If we continue to be in fear of aggravating frictions within Russia, we simply will not be able to uphold our own interests," he said.

Lithuania is prepared to cooperate with the Russian Federation within the framework of the "partnership for peace" concept worked out by NATO, the deputy foreign minister said. He added, however, that Lithuania's ultimate goal is to be a "full-fledged member" of that organization.

Gyls Comments Further

WS0701173894 Tallinn BNS in English 1612 GMT
7 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 07, BNS—Estonia and Latvia were informed in advance about Lithuania's intentions to officially ask for NATO membership, said Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys.

In an interview with the leftist TIESA newspaper, Gylys said the reaction of the two Baltic neighbors was slightly different because Estonia is more reserved about Lithuania's step. Apparently, the Lithuanian minister gave the interview before Estonian President Lennart Meri's view on the matter was made public.

Gylys said "although we maintained close relations with NATO, our desire was unexpected to many."

The minister said Lithuania's request for NATO membership is based on national security interests and is not directed against anybody. "We move toward an era of politics without confrontation."

In Gyls opinion, rapprochement with the alliance is an evolutionary process, while Lithuania's move might only speed it up. "This depends not only on Lithuania."

Brazauskas on Advance Preparations

WS1101115194 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 0814 GMT 11 Jan 94

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 411]

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 10, ELTA—Lithuania did not suddenly decide to join NATO, President Algirdas Brazauskas told a news conference on Monday [10 January].

Consultations upon NATO membership began in mid-1993 and a letter to NATO secretary-general Manfred Woerner was sent last October. Brazauskas was induced to formally apply to NATO by "a resolution concerning NATO membership accepted by various parliamentary factions on December 23 and NATO summit taking place on January 10-11 in Brussels". By the way, Lithuania's application was received and distributed to NATO leaders and a "preparatory work" had been done, Brazauskas said.

Brazauskas confirmed he consulted with Latvian and Estonian presidents before sending the entrance application and they had approved the Lithuanian step. Besides Russian reactions already announced in the press, Brazauskas said he did not receive any other statements from the leaders of that country.

Waiting for an answer from Brussels, it is worthless to expect any concrete date of admitting Lithuania into NATO, president said.

He noted a lot of money would be needed for integration into NATO. More than five per cent of national income—130 million Lt [litas]/about 33 million dollars/—are allotted to the needs of National Defence system this year. But it would hardly be enough to reconstruct Lithuania's military structures according to NATO standards, so Brazauskas is "expecting support from other states as well".

Brazauskas Statement on Integration

LD1001191394 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Statement to the press issued by President Algirdas Brazauskas—read by announcer]

[Text] Having recently declared a wish to join NATO, Lithuania is observing the NATO summit in Brussels with great interest.

I welcome the invitation to participate in the program called Partnership for Peace which was presented this morning by the heads of the NATO states and partners in cooperation. This is the road for Lithuania for complete integration into NATO political and military structures.

Lithuania looks positively at the efforts made by NATO to respond to the changes in Europe and in the world and to ensure a stable entrance into the 21st century.

I believe that the document defining the nature of partnership signed by Lithuania and NATO will be a consistent supplement to the efforts made by Lithuania to set up a democratically controlled military force and relevant relations between military and civilian institutions.

I have entrusted the government and the leaders of relevant ministries to take the necessary steps and get ready to sign the document on partnership, to assess the supplies, the resources, and the forces, and to prepare a program of measures through the implementation of which all the common objectives of partnership will be achieved.

Seimas Deputy Chairman on Foreign Policy

LD0701175994 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Today's news conference in the Seimas held by Seimas Deputy Chairman Aloyzas Sakalas focused its attention on foreign policy and international relations. [passage omitted] I asked him to describe our foreign policy

[Begin Sakalas recording] Lithuania's foreign policy must be based on some main principles. There must be a foreign policy concept containing some main principles. [passage omitted] Unfortunately, I do not at present see such a concept in our foreign policy based on principles. These principles should be as follows: Relations with the closest neighbors, relations with other countries.

In relations with the closest neighbors I would put in the first place relations with Russia. Russia, as is known, has taken over the rights of the former USSR, it has only taken over the rights of the former USSR. If only rights, then why not responsibilities, too? And if responsibilities, then such issues as compensation and others may be discussed. If it has taken over rights only, then on what basis? So much about relations with Russia. In addition, we must evaluate the Russian military doctrine that has been published and is well known. We must respond correspondingly to this doctrine. There has been no such response so far. [passage omitted] We must evaluate this doctrine. [passage omitted] We must support all democratic forces in Russia and evaluate statements by the Liberal Democratic Party. We have not done this so far.

When we have all such criteria, our evaluations, we will be able to conduct our diplomacy in relations with Russia.

As for other neighbors, for instance Poland, are concerned, we have no treaty with Poland, we have no treaty with Belarus. [passage omitted] We must evaluate on what basis we are prepared to sign a treaty with Belarus.

[passage omitted] The trouble with Poland is the Zeligowski action and the Suwalki Treaty that was broken, and it seems to me that we must say whether we adhere or refuse [as heard], but there must be a decision, and not like it is now—diplomats travel to Poland and back and there is no order. Either we firmly say that until this is evaluated we do not intend to sign the treaty, or give up some things and sign a treaty that does not mention history and deals with the present only.

As far as Germany is concerned, there are many people who have suffered from the Nazis, were deported to Germany and were lost there. The Bundestag is examining the issues of compensation and we should say something and not wait for something to happen.

And lastly, Latvia and Estonia. Either we integrate in a common economic zone with some common political obligations, or each country remains separately. We must think about this. [passage omitted]

We must not find ourselves under the influence of a single foreign state. [passage omitted] It must not happen that 60 percent our economy is linked with some specific country that can later dictate its economic and political conditions. [passage omitted]

I do not think our statement on joining NATO will result in a positive decision. I think that there has to be an additional incentive for the West to think, as soon as possible, about the possibility of admitting us to NATO, but not yet as the solution of such possibility. [sentence as heard] [end recording]

Citizens Granted Right To Carry Firearms

LD1101120694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1132 GMT 11 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Vilnius, 11 Jan—The Lithuanian Seimas today ratified a law permitting citizens of the republic to acquire and carry light firearms. The new law comes into force on 1 April this year, although, as one of the Seimas members joked, "1 April is not the most appropriate date."

Firearms may be legally acquired by persons over the age of 25 who have no court record, do not abuse spirits, are well-balanced, not addicted to drugs, and who are not registered at a psychiatric clinic.

It was pointed out at the Seimas session, that the adoption of such a law was a forced measure, since the rise in crime in Lithuania is getting beyond state control.

Parliament To Discuss 'Little Constitution'

WS1101112194 Tallinn BNS in English 1805 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 10, BNS—During its spring session, the Lithuanian parliament is scheduled to discuss laws

dealing with reforms in local administration and the country's administrative-territorial division. The whole package has been tagged "the little Constitution" of Lithuania.

The Lithuanian president, lawmakers government members, municipal officials and regional government commissioners met in the parliament Monday [10 January] to discuss the principles of local administration and territorial division reforms.

The meeting's participants discussed several issues, including a new administrative-territorial division of Lithuania, municipal property problems and a bill on municipal elections.

Municipal elections in Lithuania are scheduled for next fall. The draft provides for a single-mandate system of elections, but several members of the ruling Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party faction proposed to introduce proportional representation.

Opposition MP [member of parliament] Andrius Kubilius said Monday the opposition will only back a single-mandate system.

President Refuses To Confirm Property Law

LD1001163994 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas did not confirm the law on the declaration of property by civil servants and sent it back to the Seimas for a second round of debates.

According to the president, some articles of the law run counter to the clauses of the Constitution which declare general equality before the law and inviolability of private property.

Everybody understands that this law is needed. However, it is absolutely not necessary to carry it too far and violate the Constitution, Brazauskas said at a news conference this morning. According to him the law was adopted in certain psychological circumstances.

The provisional law on the declaration of income and property by civil servants and [word indistinct] was adopted 23 December on the initiative of and great pressure from the rightwing opposition. According to the law, civil servants and office workers must supply information about property which is in their possession until 1 February, 1994. Furthermore, the information must be supplied by 1 May this year. Information concerning the purchase of property in 1994 must be supplied by 1 March, 1995.

According to the president, a number of office duties specified in the law which are subject to the declaration of property violate the constitutional concept about general equality before the law.

According to the president, the seizure of undeclared property envisioned by law is anticonstitutional.

Mr. Brazauskas pointed out that a package of laws on taxation which also includes the law on general declaration of property is currently being prepared. According to him after this law has been adopted then it will be possible to speak about the declaration of property by individual persons.

The president also said that he personally is ready today to declare his property and his income.

Opposition Leader Reacts

LD1001191894 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Comment on the president's refusal to endorse the law on property declaration was presented today by Andrius Kubilius, head of the Seimas opposition.

[Begin recording] [Kubilius] This draft law was prepared by the efforts of the opposition, and I can even say that thanks to the efforts of the opposition it was adopted by the Seimas before the New Year. Today, the president announced that he would probably not endorse this law, saying that allegedly it runs counter to the Constitution of Lithuania.

I would like to say that according to our point of view, and as far as I know, judging by the reports I read in the press, when this law was adopted this point of view is supported by some representatives and the leaders of the government, and this law is one of the main laws in the struggle against corruption because there is no other way to fight corrupt officials except by means of this law. This law binds every official to declare his property and income. At the same time the source of their income must also be revealed.

The president said that this law runs counter to the Constitution because the Constitution indicates that all citizens of Lithuania are equal before the law. However, he said that this law allegedly singles out certain officials in Lithuania and places some additional obligations on them.

I would like to say that the Constitution should be regarded as a certain general document, and when one specific clause is taken out then, of course, different points of view can be adopted.

However, I must say that there is also a clause in the Constitution, Clause number five, which reads that government institutions should serve the people. Therefore, this clause defines clearly how the officials at the governmental structures should work, i.e., they have to serve the people, the public and the state, and in no way should they serve their own interests. Extensive documents have been worked out in the West, called the code of practice of state officials, say, of the United States. Personal interests of a state official and those of the state are clearly defined. [passage omitted]

I think that in refusing to endorse this law the president is making a mistake, because the refusal to endorse this

law, which is a rather complex law and which will become fully operational only in 1995, means that this law will not now become valid in 1995.

On the other hand, I fully agree with the president when he says that we must have a general law on income declaration by all citizens of Lithuania. However, I must say that the government believes that such a complex law can only be implemented at the beginning of 1996. This means that until then, i.e. 1996, corruption in our governmental circles will continue to flourish.

[Unidentified correspondent] Could this unwillingness to endorse the law on income and property declaration by state officials be regarded as an apprehension by some, or rather individual, officials?

[Kubilius] Absolutely. I can say firmly that, I am 100 percent sure, that...[pauses] I do not want to say that the president is concealing something because the president is also obliged to reveal his income. I think that Lithuania is in no way different from any Western country where, at times, corruption scandals shake a state.

Rimantas Smetona, chairman of the Nationalist Union of Lithuania, said earlier at a news conference that while running away from socialism, Lithuania is now approaching Sicilism—he means the Sicilian mafia.

In this sense, both corruption and the mafia in Lithuania are flourishing and we must make all efforts to fight it. The West could not invent anything else in the fight against corruption but this law on the declaration of income and property by state officials.

[Correspondent] [Passage omitted] The law was somehow linked to the elections. Can you comment?

[Kubilius] What the president said today reminded me of the words spoken by deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Seimas, Juozas Bernatonis, when he spoke during the debates on the law in the Seimas. The same articles of the Constitution were mentioned and the same problems were raised.

Already during the parliamentary debates on this law Bernatonis somehow said, half in joke—although nobody speaks at the Seimas half in joke, and quite often very serious matters are spoken half in joke—well, he said that instead of adopting this law let us declare new elections to the Seimas.

[Correspondent] Elections and the adoption of such a law: The Seimas is dismissed, and in this way the officials escape responsibility.

[Kubilius] In principle this would be so. I think that here some officials do not want to reveal their income and the source of their income, therefore, they think that it would be better to leave the parliament in a nice way through new elections. [passage omitted].

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